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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis undertakes a fundamental reappraisal of Shakespeare's existentialism. The 
drama of Shakespeare and existentialist philosophy, I contend, are equally fascinated by 
issues such as inwardness, authenticity, freedom, and self-becoming. In recent years, 
Shakespearean criticism has shied away from these fundamental existentialist concerns 
reflected in his drama, preferring to investigate the historical and cultural conditioning 
of human subjectivity. However, as this thesis argues, a failure to acknowledge and 
address the existential problems and intensities at the heart of Shakespeare’s plays 
prevents a full appreciation of both the philosophical and the theatrical dimensions of 
his drama. This thesis treats Shakespeare as existentialism’s prolific precursor, as a 
writer who experimented with existentialist ideas in his own distinctive theatrical and 
poetic terms long before they were fully developed in the philosophical and literary 
terms of the twentieth century.  
 
The introductory chapter of this thesis provides a preliminary sketch of existentialist 
thought and surveys the influence of existentialism on readings of Shakespeare. This 
paves the way for the second chapter, which offers a historical account of the inception 
of existentialist thought in the early modern period. By identifying existentialist 
concerns and ideas in the work of writers such as Montaigne, Pico, Raleigh, Bacon, 
Donne and others, I argue that an embryonic form of existentialism was beginning to 
emerge in the literary, philosophical and religious discourses of the Renaissance. The 
third chapter suggests that Shakespeare and modern existentialist thinkers share a deep 
interest in the creative fusion of fiction and philosophy as the most faithful means of 
articulating the existentialist immediacy of experience and the philosophical quandaries 
that existence as a human being entails. The subsequent three chapters explore the 
existentialist predicaments and problems dramatised in three Shakespearean tragedies. 
My readings trace the broad trajectory of existentialist thought in these plays, firstly by 
looking at the ontological and subjective concerns of Hamlet, then by examining 
Shakespeare’s treatment of ethics in Coriolanus, and finally by considering the 
existential resonance of the politics in King Lear.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SHAKESPEARE’S EXISTENTIALISM: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Shakespeare and existentialists share a special philosophical kinship: both are fascinated 
by how human beings live in the world, how they experience themselves, and how they 
interact with and respond to other people. Shakespeare’s plays – and his tragedies in 
particular – are full of existentially painful and intense moments. Time and again, 
Shakespeare shows his interest in complex ontological and existential issues by 
presenting characters who experience themselves as divided, damaged, and even 
dissolved. Richard III’s syntactically disjointed speech after his nightmare on the eve of 
battle demonstrates Shakespeare’s particular aptitude for dramatising the disintegration 
of subjectivity: 
 
Cold fearful drops stand on my trembling flesh. 
What do I fear? Myself? There’s none else by. 
Richard loves Richard; that is, I am I. 
Is there a murderer here? No. Yes, I am. 
Then fly! What, from myself? Great reason. Why? 
Lest I revenge. Myself upon myself? 
Alack, I love myself. Wherefore? For any good 
That I myself have done unto myself? 
O no, alas, I rather hate myself 
For hateful deeds committed by myself. 
I am a villain. Yet I lie: I am not.  
Fool, of thyself speak well.   (Richard III, V.v.135-46) 
 
‘Richard loves Richard’: the narcissistic embrace of self is a desperate attempt by 
Richard to repair this internal fracturing and become self-identical, but the tight 
  8 
rhetorical structure of the speech and the self-estranging use of the third person are 
literally and figuratively self-defeating. As Eric Langley notes, ‘Paradoxically, it is the 
language of self-assertion or definition that unravels in reflective repetition.’1 An act of 
self-identification becomes an act of self-annihilation for Richard. Rather than 
reaffirming his identity, his oscillations - ‘No. Yes, . . . I love myself . . . I rather hate 
myself . . . I am . . . I am not’ - cancel each other out and only succeed in intensifying 
and exacerbating his traumatic experience of self-loss.  
 Throughout his work, Shakespeare frequently presents his characters as inwardly 
divided. In Troilus and Cressida, Cressida struggles to come to terms with her 
fragmented sense of self: 
   
Troilus. What offends you, lady? 
Cressida. Sir, mine own company. 
Troilus.  You cannot shun yourself. 
Cressida. Let me go and try. 
  I have a kind of self resides with you— 
  But an unkind self, that itself will leave 
  To be another’s fool.   (III.ii.132-7) 
 
At such moments, Shakespeare compels his characters to sever their identity, their 
socially constructed self, from their subjectivity, their internal relationship with their 
immediate and intuitive sense of self. Linda Charnes suggests that, as a result of this 
gap between identity and subjectivity, ‘the possibility of indeterminacy, of dis-
identification, as well as a fantasy of autonomous choice in thought, action, or emotion, 
becomes thinkable.’2 In these implicitly philosophical lines, Cressida explains to Troilus 
that her self is made up of multiple, conflicting selves, which can betray, deceive and 
mislead each other. As she declares her desire to distance herself from her self or selves, 
Shakespeare reveals his fascination with the workings of human consciousness. His 
plays repeatedly ask: what does it mean to have a relationship with your self? What 
faculty of the human mind makes conscious self-reflection and self-differentiation 
possible? Similar issues emerge in The Comedy of Errors, when Adriana mistakes 
Antipholus of Syracuse for her husband. She says: ‘O how comes it, / That thou art then 
estrangèd from thyself?— / Thy ‘self’ I call it, being strange to me / That, undividable, 
incorporate, / Am better than thy dear self’s better part’ (II.ii.119-23). As she addresses 
                                                            
1 Eric Langley, Narcissism and Suicide in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 20. 
2 Linda Charnes, Notorious Identity: Materializing the Subject in Shakespeare (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 8-9.
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her husband’s identical twin brother, the product of a literal division of the self, Adriana 
plays on the idea of being estranged from oneself and from others. There is a strong 
sense in these lines that Shakespeare is posing fundamental questions about the nature 
of human subjectivity.  
 The alienated and unstable subjectivity of Othello is another compelling example 
of Shakespeare’s interest in ruptured interiority. When Lodovico asks, ‘Where is this 
rash and most unfortunate man?’, Othello answers: ‘That’s he that was Othello. Here I 
am’ (V.ii.289-90). It is a strange, disconcerting statement, which suggests that Othello’s 
sense of himself is no longer linked to his social identity. He and I: Kiernan Ryan 
argues that ‘The entire tragedy is contained in the gulf that divides those two 
pronouns.’3 At the end of the play, Othello’s social identity dissolves, leaving behind a 
sense of self, a contingent subjectivity that exists purely in the present moment. His 
plight reminds us of our own existential vulnerabilities. As Ewan Fernie puts it: ‘The 
way in which the once glorious Othello has turned into an abject and disfigured creature 
elicits pity and fear in the audience, and the fear is for their own more fragile selves.’4 
Shakespeare implies that, as human beings, we have a delicate and unstable relationship 
with our selves. We can try to be true to ourselves and live a more authentic life; we can 
also deceive ourselves and try to evade our existential responsibilities. For Shakespeare, 
human existence is contentious and problematic. But his plays force us to question what 
it means to exist as a human being in the world, and this is why so many modern 
existentialist thinkers have found his work philosophically advanced. In The Tempest, 
when Miranda gazes on the shipwrecked Ferdinand, Prospero instructs her: ‘say what 
thou seest yon’ (I.ii.413). Miranda responds not with a statement but with more 
questions: ‘What is’t? A spirit?’ (I.ii.413). Through Miranda’s innocent reply, 
Shakespeare asks an immensely significant ontological question: ‘what is a human 
being?’5 For a philosophically inquisitive dramatist such as Shakespeare, basic 
ontological, epistemological and ethical questions are the building blocks of great 
drama. 
 In Shakespearean tragedy, the idea that human beings have an intimate, inward 
self-experience broadens into a wider consideration of the ethics and politics of human 
existence. Shakespeare is not only interested in what human beings are, he is also 
concerned with how they live and interact with one another. His plays do not establish 
ethical boundaries in a prescriptive or didactic way, but they do imply that ethical limits 
                                                            
3 Kiernan Ryan, Shakespeare, 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 89. 
4 Ewan Fernie, Shame in Shakespeare (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 166. 
5 I am indebted to Ewan Fernie for drawing the implications of this line to my attention.  
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and feelings of inwardness are connected. After the witches’ cryptic predictions, 
Macbeth remarks in an aside: 
 
 This supernatural soliciting  
Cannot be ill, cannot be good. If ill, 
Why hath it given me earnest of success 
Commencing in a truth? I am Thane of Cawdor. 
If good, why do I yield to that suggestion 
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair 
And make my seated heart knock at my ribs 
Against the use of nature? Present fears 
Are less than horrible imaginings. 
My thought, whose murder yet is but fantastical, 
Shakes so my single state of man that function 
Is smothered in surmise, and nothing is 
But what is not.    (Macbeth, I.iii.129-41) 
 
Macbeth’s moral deliberation is characterised by the continuous interplay of thinking 
and feeling. It is experienced phenomenologically, welling-up inside his consciousness. 
The thought of transgression makes Macbeth’s hair stand on end and his heart pound in 
his chest; he is physically unsettled by the ‘horrid’ contemplation of breaching the 
ethical codes that bind him to his community. But the experience is both existentially 
terrifying and thrilling, because, as Andy Mousley argues, morality in Shakespeare’s 
plays ‘cannot be easily externalised. Moral roles aren’t merely “roles”, but selves or 
possible selves. These selves come into conflict with other selves, because life in the 
Shakespearean world is densely complicated.’6 The existential intensity of human ethics 
can also be seen when Lear, hovering between lucidity and delirium, is reunited with his 
daughter: 
 
King Lear.    Pray do not mock. 
 I am a very foolish, fond old man, 
 Fourscore and upward, and to deal plainly, 
 I fear I am not in my perfect mind. 
  Methinks I should know you, and know this man; 
  Yet I am doubtful, for I am mainly ignorant 
  What place this is; and all the skill I have 
  Remembers not these garments; nor I know not 
  Where I did lodge last night. Do not laugh at me, 
  For as I am a man, I think this lady 
                                                            
6 Andy Mousley, Re-Humanising Shakespeare: Literary Humanism, Wisdom and Modernity (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2007), p. 113. 
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  To be my child, Cordelia. 
Cordelia.   And so I am. 
King Lear.  Be your tears wet? Yes, faith. I pray, weep not. 
If you have poison for me, I will drink it. 
I know you do not love me; for your sisters 
Have, as I do remember, done me wrong. 
You have some cause; they have not. 
Cordelia.  No cause, no cause.   
(King Lear, xxi.57-73) 
 
Cordelia’s ‘No cause, no cause’ is a heart-breaking reply. In this scene, Shakespeare 
creates an ethics based on empathy and identification. There is an existentially 
important understanding between Cordelia and her father, a sudden recognition that 
they live alongside each other, and are therefore responsible for each other. 
 Unable to explain fully Shakespeare’s persistent curiosity about the nature of 
human existence, a great deal of criticism of the last twenty years has overlooked the 
extraordinary existential power of such passages. These moments that punctuate 
Shakespeare’s drama call for a fresh, informed reading of the inward experience of 
trauma and self-estrangement his tragic protagonists undergo. The philosophical reward 
of viewing some of Shakespeare’s tragedies through the lens of existentialist literature 
and philosophy is an enhanced appreciation of the existential energy that pulses through 
the plays and ensures their continuing appeal. Although reading Shakespeare as an 
existentialist avant la lettre and illuminating the existential intensities in Shakespearean 
tragedy is its primary purpose, this study is also conscious of the fact that Shakespeare’s 
plays had a tremendous influence on the development of existentialist thought. As they 
were formulating their ideas about human existence, many of these philosophers were 
immersing themselves in Shakespeare’s texts. Jean-Paul Sartre’s letters to Simone de 
Beauvoir reveal that he was deeply engaged with Shakespeare’s writing. In a letter 
dated 20 November 1939, he writes: ‘I’ve read Troilus and Cressida again and, you 
know, liked it less than last time. On the other hand, I’m enchanted by Anthony and 
Cleopatra, a little gem. It’s true that the guy is astounding.’7A couple of weeks later, 
after reading Hamlet (which he applauds as ‘terrific’), he informs Beauvoir that he is 
about to start reading Othello, Macbeth and The Tempest. One week later, in a letter 
discussing a recent breakthrough in his thinking, Sartre remarks: ‘I’ve discovered new 
ideas on liberty, facticity, and motivation and I’m coming up with, God forgive me, 
                                                            
7 Jean-Paul Sartre, Witness to my Life: The Letters of Jean-Paul Sartre to Simone de Beauvoir 1926-1939, 
ed. Simone de Beauvoir and trans. Lee Fahnestock and Norman MacAfee (London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1992), p. 353. 
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bold new ideas about human nature.’8 It is not unreasonable to suggest that his reading 
of Shakespeare helped him forge these new ideas. Shakespeare’s power to provoke an 
invigorating, renewed confrontation with questions of inwardness and self-
understanding is a privileged point of reference in existentialism, and it furnishes a 
warrant for a critical engagement with both Shakespearean drama and existentialist 
philosophy.   
 Before examining the kinds of existential ideas that were emerging in the 
Renaissance and in Shakespeare’s plays, I shall first provide an overview of the main 
ideas and arguments of existentialism. To approach existentialism in this categorical 
way is at odds with the movement’s characteristic denunciation of systematic thought, 
but a broad, permissive sketch of important existentialist themes will lay the 
foundations for further detailed discussion and elaboration in subsequent chapters. I 
shall then explore how existentialism has influenced Shakespearean criticism and argue 
that in the recent years, Shakespeare critics have begun to renew existentialism as a 
critical discourse. This will pave the way for a full investigation of Shakespeare’s 
existentialism.  
 
 
What is Existentialism? 
 
Defining existentialism has proved an exceptionally problematic task. Some intellectual 
historians have offered general and often ambiguous definitions of the movement; 
others have preferred to characterise existentialism as a supple, protean attitude rather 
than a cohesive school of philosophy. Marjorie Grene pessimistically laments that ‘the 
word is nearly meaningless’ because ‘nearly every philosopher since Hegel is shown to 
be in some sense an existentialist.’9 The struggle to define existentialism is made harder 
by the fact that many of its key figures resist narrowing their work to a single, clear-cut 
set of ideas. In the introduction to Search for a Method, Sartre declares: ‘It is in the 
nature of an intellectual quest to be undefined. To name it and define it is to wrap it up 
and tie the knot. What is left? A finished, already outdated mode of culture, something 
like a brand of soap, in other words, an idea.’10 Penelope Deutscher regards the 
‘transformational terms’ in Simone de Beauvoir’s work as ‘an increasingly complex 
                                                            
8 Ibid., p. 416. 
9 Marjorie Grene, Introduction to Existentialism (London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1948), pp. 1-2. 
10 Jean-Paul Sartre, Search for a Method, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 
xxxiii. 
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intersection of accumulated meanings’, which are ‘constantly challenged, reconsidered 
and refined.’11 The same can be said of existentialist thought more generally, as its 
central terms are always in the process of critical negotiation and re-evaluation. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the themes and concepts explored by existentialists are 
interconnected. Even though many of the figures identified with the movement 
expressly repudiated the term ‘existentialism’, there are various overlapping ideas in the 
writings of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, 
Beauvoir and Camus. Rather than attempting to wrestle with conflicting definitions of 
existentialism, it is more helpful for the purposes of this introductory chapter to 
enumerate the principal philosophical ideas shared by key existentialist thinkers.  
 ‘The word existence,’ explains Karl Jaspers, ‘is one of the synonyms of the word 
reality, but owing to Kierkegaard it has acquired a new dimension; it has come to 
designate what I fundamentally mean to myself.’12 Kierkegaard’s most significant 
contribution to existentialism was his observation that human beings are deeply 
invested in the experience of existing. For Kierkegaard and the major existentialist 
thinkers who followed him, philosophical investigations begin with the basic premise 
that individuals are actively engaged in the processes that shape and constitute their 
existence. As Heidegger argues, to exist is not simply to be, but to be concerned about 
oneself; we ‘care’ about the nature of our existence.13 This leads existentialists to 
suggest that human existence is not reducible to an aggregate of definitive essences or 
instantiated universals. This anti-essentialist view of the human self is crucial for 
existentialists. Heidegger chooses to hyphenate the word ‘ex-ist’ in order to bring to 
light the word’s etymological roots and draw attention to the way human beings ‘stand 
out’ from their characterising properties. Sartre tells us: ‘Man first of all exists, 
encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards.’14 What 
Sartre suggests here is that an individual has the ability to decide how he or she stands 
in relation to his or her own life. This idea underpins his famous dictum ‘existence 
precedes essence’.15 In a similar way, Heidegger’s describes Being and Time as an 
                                                            
11 Penelope Deutscher, The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Ambiguity, Conversion, Resistance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 22. 
12 Karl Jaspers quoted by Jean Wahl, Philosophies of Existence: An Introduction to the Basic Thought of 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel, Sartre, trans. F. M. Lory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1959), p. 30. These lines are originally from Karl Jaspers, Philosophy of Existence, trans. Richard F. 
Grabau (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971), pp. 3-4. 
13 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 1962), p. 235. 
14 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. Philip Mairet (London: Methuen, 1980), p. 28. 
15 Ibid., p. 28. 
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inquiry into the ‘being that we ourselves are.’16 For existentialists, human beings are 
conscious, sentient, self-creating individuals. Existence is always in a state of flux, 
constantly being formed through an individual’s actions and choices. Existentialists 
insist on the characterisation of a human being not as an object or thing, but as an event 
- the unfolding realisation of life as a whole. 
 Existentialists suggest that there are two elements of human existence: facticity 
and transcendence. Aspects of facticity – race, class, age, past, body, beliefs, desires, 
personality traits - are the given, factual dimensions of human existence. They are 
aspects of a human being that can be viewed from a third-person perspective. Human 
beings, existentialists claim, have a special, complex relationship to these aspects of 
their existence. Although an individual can try to adopt an objective stance towards 
them, that perspective will remain largely subjective, because an individual will always 
interpret these facts in terms of what they mean to him. He cannot truly view himself as 
others do, as if he were an object. My facticity belongs to me and my perspective on it 
contributes to my sense of my unique, distinctive existence. In Sartrean terminology, 
human consciousness exists ‘in-itself’ (en soi) and ‘for-itself’ (pour soi). In a 
fundamental sense, consciousness exists: this is what Sartre calls Being-in-itself. But a 
distinctive feature of consciousness is its capacity to separate itself from its determining 
factors: this is what Sartre calls Being-for-itself. As a consequence, consciousness is 
irreparably divided. Consciousness is not the property of an individual; likewise, there 
is no inhabitant of consciousness. Instead, it acts as a mental framework that structures 
our apprehensions of the world. It is the ability of consciousness to reflect on itself that 
makes choice, decision, action and agency possible.17 
 Although existentialists insist that human beings have the ability to transcend the 
givens of their existence, they also insist that human lives are always enmeshed in 
social, historical and cultural situations. There is no sharp, definitive distinction 
between self and world: they form a tightly woven whole, which Heidegger terms 
‘Being-in-the-world’.18 Transcendence allows an individual to formulate projects or 
position themselves in the world, but these projects are also situated and circumscribed. 
We can transcend our situations, but we cannot transcend the limits of the world we 
know. Human consciousness is always situated and embodied. But human beings are 
not solely the product of their historical and cultural conditioning. They are also capable 
                                                            
16 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 26. 
17 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel E. 
Barnes (London and New York: Routledge, 2003). 
18 Heidegger, Being in Time, p. 65. 
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of choosing how they respond to the world. Jaspers puts it this way: ‘Although my 
social I is thus imposed upon me, I can still put up an inner resistance to it. . . . 
Although I am in my social I at each moment, I no longer coincide with it. . . . I am not 
a result of social configurations, for though my social existence determines all of my 
objective phenomenality, I retain my own original potential.’19  
 Existentialism is popularly associated with the idea of absurdity. It is important to 
separate existentialist philosophy proper from the fashionable existentialist cultural 
movement that swept through Western Europe in the wake of the Second World War. 
The popular image of the existentialist dressed in black and brooding on man’s 
pointless struggle against an irrational and absurd universe is one that must be dispelled. 
The notions of alienation and absurdity are still important for existentialism, but they 
must be properly explained and qualified. Existentialists claim that there is no ultimate, 
transcendent meaning to the world. Human beings create gods, religions, and 
teleologies because they want to believe the world is ordered and purposeful. According 
to the existentialists, responsibility for one’s life lies entirely with oneself. Although 
there are religious and Christian forms of existentialism, the major thinkers argue that 
the world contains meaning only because individuals have projected meaning onto it. 
This shift towards a more secularised view of human meaning largely came about as a 
response to the increasing dissatisfaction in Europe with theological constructions of 
meaning. The question of the human creation of meaning arose as a result of 
Nietzsche’s questioning of the validity of a universal moral code and thus paved the 
way for the argument that human life is meaningful because man chooses to make it so.  
 But it is important to note that existentialists are concerned with the absurdity of 
human choice as well as metaphysical absurdity. Sartre argues that there is no rational 
basis for choice because all motives, justifications, reasons and desires operate within a 
chosen world. By this he means that we all choose to exist because we cannot not 
choose to exist. He writes: ‘The choice is absurd because there has never been any 
possibility of not choosing oneself.’20 What Sartre means by this is that, paradoxically, 
freedom is not freely chosen. Instead, ‘Man is condemned to be free.’21 There is no 
escaping freedom, because to exist is to be freely engaged in the world. Sartre 
elaborates further: ‘Precisely because here we are dealing with a choice, this choice as it 
is made indicates in general other choices as possibles. The possibility . . . is lived in the 
                                                            
19 Karl Jaspers, Philosophy, trans. E. B. Ashton (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1970), vol. 2, p. 30. 
20 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 501. 
21 Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, p. 34. 
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feeling of unjustifiability; and it is this which is expressed by the fact of the absurdity of 
my choice and consequently my being.’22 The absurd is located in the tension between 
our serious engagement with the world and the lack of justificatory ground on which 
this engagement is built. But, as Albert Camus stresses in The Myth of Sisyphus, 
absurdity does not inexorably lead to nihilistic despair.23 Human beings must strive to 
overcome the absurdity of existence by choosing to act. Sartre concurs and extends his 
understanding of the absurd to his understanding of the absurd in Shakespeare. The idea 
that life is ‘a tale / Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, / Signifying nothing’ 
(Macbeth, V.v.25-7), Sartre insists, ‘should not pass as Shakespeare’s final word.’24 
 An individual’s capacity for freedom is created by the way their consciousness is 
structured. For a large part of their existence, human beings are absorbed in the actions, 
concerns and desires of their everyday life. At these times, consciousness and 
circumstance are fused together. In Heidegger’s terminology, objects and things in the 
world are encountered as ‘ready-to-hand’, meaning that human beings naturally think of 
objects as types of functional equipment. But these objects have another dimension of 
being: They are also ‘present-at-hand’.25 They can be dissected, inspected and 
contemplated until they become unfamiliar. The instrumentality of things conceals a 
deeper dimension of reality. In a state of alienation, the usefulness of the object is no 
longer taken for granted.  When the individual confronts the brute existence of an object 
or thing, he becomes alienated from the world. A distinctive characteristic of human 
consciousness, argues Sartre, is that it is capable of ‘nihilating’ Being. An individual 
‘causes a world to be discovered’ through the negativity he imparts to elements of the 
world.26 Sartre uses the example of looking for his friend Pierre in a café and realising 
that his friend’s absence is as real and vivid as the other physical features of the café.27 
This leads him to suggest that there is a nothingness at the heart of human 
consciousness which allows individuals to doubt, imagine and interrogate things in the 
world. 
 Existentialists believe that the phenomenological analysis of moods reveals 
fundamental aspects of the self. Anguish or angst are the terms existentialists employ to 
describe how freedom reveals itself to human consciousness. Sartre writes: ‘The 
                                                            
22 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 502. 
23 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, trans. Justin O’Brien (London: Penguin, 2005). 
24 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Family Idiot: Gustave Flaubert, 1821-1857, trans. Carol Cosman (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), vol. 4, p. 264. 
25 Heidegger, Being in Time, p. 101. 
26 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 48. 
27 Ibid., p. 34. 
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permanent possibility of non-being, outside us and within, conditions our questions 
about being.’28 When consciousness becomes aware of its capacity to nihilate things, to 
be other than the things that surround it, the individual becomes anguished or angst-
ridden. For Heidegger, this experience has an important individualising power. In a state 
of angst, when the usual meanings of things ‘sink away’ and objects become unfamiliar, 
an individual’s understanding of himself and the world is challenged. He realises he has 
the power to shape the significance of his life by taking up the task of existing. An 
apprehension of death functions in the same way. Sartre writes: ‘Death is the limit, but 
also a constituent of my freedom . . . If a being was endowed with temporal infinity, he 
could realise all his possibilities . . . he would disappear with respect both to 
individuality . . . and to freedom’.29 If an individual’s life had no temporal limit, he 
would be pointlessly free. The finitude of life makes freedom meaningful and possible.  
Death is also crucially significant for Heidegger. He suggests that there is a deep 
connection between an apprehension of human finitude and the authenticity of a life. If 
we fully understand the limits of our existence, we begin to see the importance of taking 
responsibility for our actions and choices. But angst and the experience of apprehending 
death, although existentially important, are sources of distress, and thus human beings 
naturally look for ways to flee from them.  
 There are various ways in which human beings try to evade their existential 
responsibilities. Existentialists claim that, in a state of alienation, the sense of man being 
essential to the construction of the world is lost. This results in the individual using 
disingenuous ploys to stave off a sense of alienation.  They retreat into the world of 
what Heidegger terms the ‘They-Self’ and Kierkegaard calls ‘the Public’. In this state, 
the individual recoils from the difficult task of choosing himself and instead leads an 
inauthentic life. They become absorbed or tranquilized by ready-made belief-systems; 
they live in ‘bad faith’, an inauthentic mode of existence that involves self-alienation 
and self-deception. Bad faith is a response to anguish in the face of freedom. The 
individual’s sense of alienation is exacerbated, according to Sartre, by another facet of 
human existence: ‘being-for-others’.30 The world is not only revealed to me, but I reveal 
the world to others. For the most part, human beings unreflectively go about their life 
absorbed in their first-person perspective. However, when the individual becomes aware 
that they are being looked at, their existence becomes objectified: their subjectivity 
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becomes part of the world of another. The individual becomes aware that they have an 
external nature or character that can be objectified or viewed from a third-person 
perspective. The individual’s realisation that another person can access this dimension 
of their being (which the individual cannot) makes them feel alienated and ashamed.  
 A crucial term for existentialists is Eigentlichkeit or ‘authenticity’. Authenticity is 
best defined as the attitude with which an individual engages in his projects as his own. 
Existentialists claim that there is a gap between basic existence and the realisation of the 
responsibility one has for one’s existence, which opens up the possibility of creating an 
authentic self. Authenticity is the way individuals recover from their sense of alienation 
or anxiety without fleeing into inauthentic modes of being. A resolute commitment to 
one’s life is an explicit self-choice. In Being and Time, authentic existence is described 
as ‘anticipatory resoluteness’.31 An authentic individual is ‘anticipatory’ because he 
projects forward towards a final end: death. Whether human beings realise it or not, 
each individual presses forward in a way that imparts coherence, continuity and 
cohesiveness to his life. An authentic individual is also ‘resolute’ because he overcomes 
his groundlessness and his entanglements in everyday life by becoming his own ground 
for existing. He takes a stand on his situation and becomes fully committed to his own 
existence. To be authentic, therefore, requires a degree of transparency with regard to a 
given situation. Ironically, authenticity is often misrepresented as individualistic self-
assertion. For existentialists, this is only a more subtle and inconspicuous form of 
inauthenticity. The premium placed on self-assertion, independent thought and 
individual action actually makes an individual’s subjection to their They-self even more 
thorough. Authenticity, on the other hand, means that the individual must take 
responsibility for a self that he cannot ever be entirely responsible for.  
 The idea of freedom runs parallel to the idea of authenticity in existentialist 
thought. Sartre remarks that a man, being free, ‘carries the weight of the whole world on 
his shoulders . . . [He] is the only one by whom it happens that there is a world; . . . he 
is also the only one who makes himself’.32 But it is important to clarify some 
misconceptions about the existentialist notion of freedom.33 Firstly, unlike political or 
social freedom, it cannot be increased or decreased. It is an individual’s relationship to 
his freedom that is susceptible to change rather than the degree to which he is free. 
Secondly, existential freedom is not manifested in the commission of unmotivated actes 
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gratuits. ‘Freedom is not the caprice . . . of inclining in this or that direction’, writes 
Heidegger.34 Instead, it is the very fact that human beings are situated in the world, 
subjected to things that they cannot control, that makes them free: their facticity is a 
condition of their freedom. As David Detmer asserts, for Sartre there are two kinds of 
freedom: ontological freedom and practical freedom.35 Human beings are ontologically 
free, because the for-itself of consciousness allows them to reconsider their relationship 
to the world. But their practical freedom is always conditioned and limited by the 
circumstances in which they find themselves. Heidegger makes a similar distinction 
when he writes that an individual’s freedom is ‘released from the illusions of the They’, 
yet remains ‘within the limitations of its thrownness.’36   
 In Existentialism and Humanism, Sartre offers a broad understanding of his 
philosophy. He claims that it is a doctrine that ‘render[s] human life possible; a 
doctrine, also, which affirms that every truth and every action imply both an 
environment and a human subjectivity.’37 This is an important starting point for 
exploring existentialism in detail. More recently, David E. Cooper has offered a 
succinct summary of the core ideas in existentialist thought: 
 
Existence . . . is a constant striving, a perpetual choice, it is marked by a 
radical freedom and responsibility; and it is always prey to a sense of Angst 
which reveals that, for the most part, it is lived inauthentically and in bad 
faith. And because the character of a human life is never given, existence is 
without foundation; hence it is abandoned or absurd even.38 
 
Like Cooper, I have attempted to outline the main concerns and arguments of 
existentialism. I have not, however, provided an exhaustive history of the movement. It 
is important to remember that the perspectives and arguments of existentialists often 
vary greatly; no two existentialist thinkers are the same. Reflecting on the experience of 
writing on existentialism, William Barrett commented that ‘what had seemed a single 
branch had already broken out into a cluster’, and his aim was to find ‘a way through 
this greater density, in search of the line of development in relation to which each of 
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these philosophic shoots has its own grade of relevance.’39 This is also the way I have 
approached existentialism. A fuller and more detailed explanation of these key ideas 
will be offered alongside my analysis of Shakespeare’s plays. 
 
 
Existentialist Readings of Shakespeare - Then and Now 
 
Before looking at how existentialism can be used to produce fresh readings of 
Shakespeare, it is important to establish how existentialism has influenced readings and 
critical studies of Shakespeare in the past. There have been two main periods, I contend, 
when existentialism has been employed as an illuminating critical discourse in 
Shakespearean criticism. In the post-war years, when existentialism gained notoriety as 
a flourishing cultural and philosophical movement, there were several studies that 
sought to investigate the existentialism in Shakespeare’s plays. The popularised 
existentialism of the 1950s and 1960s (which I wish to distinguish from a more strictly 
philosophical sense of existentialism) filtered into a number of readings of Shakespeare. 
These ‘existentialist’ studies, which were often limited and inaccurate, were soon 
replaced by new lines of enquiry. The new, more historically minded critics were 
extremely wary of existentialist ideas and vocabulary. However, since the turn of the 
millennium, Shakespeare critics have started to return to existentialism and explore its 
concepts in more detail. As the quotations from Fernie, Mousley, Ryan, Charnes and 
Langley in the opening section of this chapter demonstrate, there has been an effort to 
produce more existentially sensitive criticism in recent years. In addition to this, critics 
such as Jonathan Dollimore and Stephen Greenblatt have revised their original 
suspicions of existentialist ideas and shown a renewed interest in notions such as 
authenticity, inwardness and freedom. Building on some of these changes in criticism, 
my thesis brings Shakespeare and existentialism explicitly into dialogue with each 
other.   
 After the war, existentialism became an extremely popular philosophical 
movement. The existentialist agenda chimed with the populist taste for individualism, 
the anti-establishment backlash, and the increasing interest in counter-cultural 
movements. The word ‘existentialism’ became an item of casual everyday parlance. 
However, this sudden mainstream popularity often meant that existentialism’s 
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philosophical concerns were either overlooked or wilfully misconstrued. It became 
thought of as a gloomy, morbid philosophy that stressed the impossibility of a human 
situation immune to sin, failure, flux and death. Existentialism’s sudden rise to fame 
impeded and undermined its philosophical merits. It became strangely and 
paradoxically characterised as an ahistorical, essentialist, humanistic, amoral and 
absurdist form of philosophy. As I shall show, this kind of existentialism became 
evident in readings of Shakespeare.  
 In 1959, Walter Kaufmann published From Shakespeare to Existentialism: An 
Original Study.40 It was the first study to explicitly acknowledge a philosophical affinity 
between its two subjects. However, the title is misleading, as the book is not a history of 
existentialist ideas originating from Shakespeare. Kaufmann’s study is compromised by 
a hazy, general understanding of existentialism, which he refers to elsewhere as ‘a 
timeless sensibility that can be discerned here and there in the past’.41 He identifies two 
principal existentialist aspects of Shakespeare’s drama and poetry: the existentialist 
(rather than psychologically realistic) construction of character, and the existentialist 
‘world view’ that there are no metaphysical reasons that explain human existence. He 
claims that Shakespeare ‘knew the view that man is thrown into the world, abandoned 
to a life that ends in death; but he also knew self-sufficiency. He had the strength to face 
reality without excuses and illusions and did not even seek comfort in the faith in 
immortality.’42 Rather than showing the powerful existential intensities at the core of 
Shakespearean drama, Kaufmann makes vague, pop-existentialist remarks to disprove 
Christian interpretations of the plays. He repeatedly refers to the opening two lines of 
Shakespeare’s ninety-fourth sonnet: ‘They that have power to hurt and will do none, / 
That do not do the thing they most do show’. For Kaufmann, the sonnet is an earlier 
articulation of Nietzsche’s idea of the Übermensch. In a review of the study, Hazel 
Barnes observes how Kaufmann singles out in Shakespeare’s work ‘the self-contained, 
self-sufficient man, one who lives and dies for himself and who helps humanity only by 
making himself a monument of moral perfection.’43 Kaufmann suggests that 
Shakespeare is an existentialist because he is Nietzsche’s great precursor. Although 
there may be some critical mileage in this argument, From Shakespeare to 
Existentialism falls short as a full study of Shakespeare’s existential concerns.   
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  Jan Kott’s book Shakespeare Our Contemporary (first published 1964) also 
offers an inadequate and insubstantial analysis of Shakespeare’s existentialist vision. 
Kott associates existentialism with absurdism and nihilism. He reads King Lear as a 
colossal tragic drama of the absurd and argues that the play is akin to Samuel Beckett’s 
Endgame. He concludes that in both these plays man is ‘A nobody who suffers, tries to 
give his suffering a meaning or nobility, who revolts or accepts his suffering, and who 
must die’.44 Like Gloucester’s conclusion that ‘As flies to wanton boys are we to 
th’gods, / They kill us for their sport’ (xv.35-6), Kott claims that Shakespeare’s tragedy 
epitomises man’s sad struggle in an absurd and meaningless universe. But Kiernan 
Ryan notes that in King Lear Gloucester’s world view ‘is ironically framed and 
deliberately disqualified within the tragedy. It is demolished not only by Edmund’s 
caustic parody of his father’s philosophy, but also by the whole play’s confirmation that 
its calamities stem from the fact “that men / Are as the time is” rather than as nature or 
the gods direct.’45 In sharp contrast to Kott, existentialists such as Sartre and Heidegger 
would agree with Shakespeare’s view of human existence as historically situated. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, arguments that followed a line similar to Kott’s were 
mounted in a number of journal articles. In ‘Hamlet and Absurd Freedom’ Eric R. 
Boyer reads Albert Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus as an existentialist critique of 
Hamlet.46 Anne Paolucci argued that the existential dilemmas in Shakespearean tragedy 
are identical to those found in the theatre of the absurd.47 Robert G. Collmer’s essay ‘An 
Existentialist Approach to Macbeth’ concludes that Shakespeare’s ‘treatment of 
Macbeth is curiously similar in major emphases to the diagnosis of the human 
predicament offered by modern existentialism.’48 Not only do these critics misconceive 
existentialism as a philosophy of the absurd, they also appropriate Shakespeare 
anachronistically as a fully-fledged existentialist philosopher. 
 Kaufmann’s and Kott’s studies were followed in 1965 by David Horowitz’s 
Shakespeare: An Existential View. Horowitz describes his study as an investigation into 
Shakespeare’s portrayal of ‘the relation between human vision and human realisation, 
the relation between the mode in which men see reality and the manner in which they 
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live it.’49 However, Horowitz explains that the term ‘existential’ is used broadly in his 
study to denote ‘simply a view that proves itself in the reality of lived existence, not in 
the principles of metaphysical or theological discourse’.50 He does not approach 
Shakespeare in explicitly existentialist terms. Instead, he begins his study with a general 
sense that Shakespeare offers a positive portrayal of human existence. Surprisingly, the 
major tragedies receive little attention from Horowitz. Like many of the ‘existential’ 
readings of Shakespeare that surfaced during the post-war years, Horowitz’s study is 
full of quasi-existentialist remarks that are neither polemical nor particularly revealing. 
He argues that Lear learns on the heath that ‘he is nothing, and will return to nothing’ 
and that the only aspect of life that can redeem him is the love of his daughter.51 James 
V. Baker makes a similar assessment of the existentialism in King Lear, arguing that the 
play shows how man must forge his own values ‘before death cuts him short.’52 
 In 1967, Northrop Frye published Fools of Time: Studies in Shakespearean 
Tragedy, in which he argues that existentialist ideas lie at the heart of Shakespeare’s 
tragic vision. He argues that 
 
the conceptions that existential thinkers have tried to struggle with, care, dread, 
nausea, absurdity, authenticity, and the like, are all relevant to the theory of 
tragedy. Tragedy is also existential in a broader, and perhaps contradictory, 
sense, in that the experience of the tragic cannot be moralized or contained 
within any conceptual world-view.53 
 
Frye claims that in tragedy ‘the hero is an individual, but being so great an individual he 
seems constantly on the point of being swept into titanic forces he cannot control.’54 He 
points to dying Hotspur’s last remark, ‘Thoughts, the slaves of life, and life, time’s fool’ 
(Henry IV Part I, V.iv.80), as a moment that is both existential and tragic. It is an 
example in Shakespeare’s drama, Frye claims, when the magnitude of human existence 
exceeds any philosophical system or theory. Fools of Time follows in the tradition of 
twentieth-century humanist Shakespearean criticism. Like A. C. Bradley’s 
Shakespearean Tragedy, which celebrates Shakespeare’s all-too-human tragic heroes,55 
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and The Meaning of Shakespeare, in which Harold C. Goddard suggests that 
‘Shakespeare is like life. There are almost as many ways of taking him as there are ways 
of living’,56 Frye locates a powerful existential significance at the heart of 
Shakespeare’s plays. However, Frye’s commentary does not actively engage with 
specific existentialist ideas and concepts. Like other existentialist studies of 
Shakespeare from this period, Frye’s study is weakened by an oversimplification and 
misunderstanding of fundamental philosophical ideas.  
 There are a few other studies and articles from the 1960s and 1970s that are worth 
mentioning briefly. Charlotte N. Clay’s book, The Role of Anxiety in English Tragedy, 
devotes two chapters to the existential concept of anxiety in Hamlet and King Lear.57 In 
his 1974 essay on The Tempest entitled ‘Shakespeare’s Existential Comedy’, Mike 
Frank finds the same inherently meaningless and absurd world that other critics at the 
time were identifying in the tragedies. He writes: ‘there is no external order to which 
man must commit himself; there is simply an indifferent and impersonal nature which 
will follow its own imperative regardless of what man does.’58 The Tempest presents a 
world, Frank argues, that is ‘very much like that of modern existentialism.’59 In her 
1967 essay Joyce Carol Oates traces a number of important existential features in 
Troilus and Cressida and concludes that ‘What is so modern about the play is its 
existential insistence upon the complete inability of man to transcend his own fate.’60  
 As a theoretical and philosophical discourse, existentialism initially emerged and 
was then superseded by other lines of enquiry. In the 1980s and 1990s its influence was 
less palpable in Shakespearean criticism. With many scholars preferring to investigate 
the cultural and historical conditioning of subjectivity, existentialist terms such as 
authenticity, freedom, self-becoming, angst, alienation and inwardness became 
unfashionable. However, there is evidence that existentialism is becoming visible again 
in Shakespearean studies. In Re-Humanising Shakespeare: Literary Humanism, Wisdom 
and Modernity, Mousley argues that Shakespeare has an ‘inordinate ability to intensify 
the “existential significance” of otherwise abstract ideas and precepts through human 
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embodiment.’61  He also underlines the importance of the idea of authenticity in 
Shakespeare’s plays. He writes: ‘[Shakespeare] gives us cause to question which way of 
living might be a more or less authentic expression of what it is to be human.’62 
Mousley offers a compelling reading of Shakespeare’s fascination with embodied 
existence. He recognises a resurgence of what he calls ‘literary humanism’ in criticism 
and theory. ‘Literary humanism’, Mousley explains, is not the traditional, ahistorical, 
essentialist humanism so often associated with the Renaissance, but a broader and 
deeper notion that focuses on the ethically charged question ‘how to live’.63 The 
strength of this approach is that it acknowledges that skeptical, critical questioning must 
be integrated with an awareness of the way Shakespeare’s plays encourage personal and 
passionate engagement with the world. Mousley’s central concern with the crucial issue 
of ‘how to live’ in his study makes existentialism and existential ideas relevant and 
significant once again. In his rereading of the humanist tradition, he challenges the anti-
humanists’ critique of essentialism, arguing that ‘the principle of freedom can be 
extended to mean freedom from all determination, which recognises no such thing as a 
pre-defining human essence. Rather than being “pre-made”, we make ourselves in the 
manner of Jean-Paul Sartre.’64 Although he does not explicitly invoke specific 
existentialist theories, Mousley’s reconsideration of Shakespeare’s existential intensities 
is an important starting point for this thesis. 
 Mousley’s study has in many ways paved the way for other existentially attuned 
studies of Shakespeare. In Shakespeare’s Individualism, Peter Holbrook reads 
Shakespeare ‘as an author for a liberal culture of self-realization.’65 Holbrook is aware 
of the way Shakespeare problematises and polemicises this deceptively simple notion, 
and his study reveals that questions such as ‘what actually constitutes an authentic 
self?’, ‘what does human freedom really mean?’ and ‘how does self-realisation relate to 
human ethics?’ were pertinent to the cultural climate of Renaissance England. Holbrook 
is drawn to Heidegger’s interest in how human beings always retain ‘a potentiality for 
deciding what it wants to do and what it wants to be.’66 He continues: ‘This projective 
not-yet dimension to human - only human - life, the ability to commit oneself to a 
specific identity . . . is an ineradicable part of our human reality.’67 This is a central 
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concern in Shakespeare’s drama. ‘What I was, I am, / More straining on for plucking 
back, not following / My leash unwillingly’ (The Winter’s Tale, IV.iv.453-5): Holbrook 
points to Florizel’s constancy and determination to remain true to himself in The 
Winter’s Tale as a prime example of authentically liberating human passion in 
Shakespeare’s plays. Following Charles Taylor’s seminal work, The Ethics of 
Authenticity, Holbrook notes that notions of individual authenticity and self-realisation 
are as pervasive in our culture as they were in Shakespeare’s, and philosophers from 
both our time and his worried about the moral complexity and ambiguity of human 
individualism. Throughout his study, Holbrook flirts with existentialism, frequently 
resorting to key passages from Nietzsche, Heidegger and Kierkegaard to elaborate his 
argument, but he never explicitly invokes existentialism.  
 Ewan Fernie also makes important existentialist questions central to his essay 
‘Terrible Action: Recent Criticism and Questions of Agency’. He reads Shakespearean 
action ‘in broadly existentialist terms, whereby character is the effect of action, not its 
origin’.68 The immediate advantage of this strategy is that it produces a kind of critical 
engagement that complements the energy and intensity of the plays themselves. The 
action in Shakespeare’s plays, Fernie tells us, ‘is thrilling and frightening because it is 
defining, and potentially not just of character, but of the whole theatrical mise-en-scène 
in which it takes place.’69 Fernie’s essay surveys the theories and arguments 
surrounding the contentious subject of human agency. He argues that some new 
historicist and cultural materialist criticism has produced a weak and impoverished 
understanding of personal agency, which is entirely at odds with Shakespeare’s 
fascination with the subjective, ethical, theatrical and existential implications of action. 
Fernie claims that Shakespearean criticism is only beginning to grapple with the fresh, 
existentially sensitive reconsiderations of human agency offered by thinkers such as 
Slavoj Žižek, Alan Liu and Jacques Derrida. This essay was followed a few years later 
by Shakespeare and Moral Agency, a collection of essays which investigate the 
relationship between action and moral existence in Shakespeare.70 
 Julia Reinhard Lupton’s study, Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and 
Life, also looks seriously at the existential resonance of Shakespeare’s work. She 
explains that she is attracted to what the plays have to say about human life, writing: ‘I 
take life as that which names the existential and phenomenological interests of the 
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plays; I am interested, that is, in the extent to which Shakespeare’s plays examine 
through their presentational medium as well as their plots and themes the ways in which 
human beings appear as human to themselves and others, in tandem with other life 
forms.’71 Although she focuses on the ‘biopolitical and theopolitical themes in 
Shakespeare’ by drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt and Giorgio Agamben, she 
treats Arendt as an ‘existentialist and a phenomenologist.’72 She clarifies her approach, 
explaining that: ‘By existentialism I mean a philosophy oriented around human being in 
the trembling vulnerability of our multiple dependencies on each other and our 
permanent exposure to the scars, mutation and new births delivered by the slings and 
arrows of our signifying practices.’73  
 In some of his recent work, Jonathan Dollimore provocatively criticises some new 
historicist research for overlooking crucial existential concerns. Although experiences 
such as death differ according to their cultural or historical context, claims Dollimore, 
‘the agreeable truth (diversity and difference) is used to evade the less agreeable (the 
anguish of mortality).’74 In its anti-essentialist revolt against the notion of an unalterable 
‘human condition’, historicism has also dodged some of the most basic and ineradicable 
concerns of human existence. Fernie concurs with Dollimore: ‘For all its savvy 
transcendence of a tweedier past’, he writes, new historicism is ‘frightened of life.’75 It 
is not only Renaissance scholars who are making such observations. In his discussion of 
new historicism and medieval literature, Lee Patterson underlines the importance of 
human action and experience, and suggests: ‘The self may well be made, but it is also 
self-made.’76 
 In his introduction to the third edition of Radical Tragedy, Dollimore describes 
his newfound respect for the ethically charged ‘high humanism’ of Herman Hesse.77 For 
Dollimore, there is something powerful and illuminating in humanism’s direct 
confrontation with the contradictions and antinomies of human existence. In a 
redeploying of Nietzsche’s dialectic of the Apollonian and Dionysian intensities of 
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human life, Dollimore sees human beings as conflicted by their desire for both civilised 
order and transgressive action. He celebrates the power of desire to produce ‘the 
shattering of the self into a vulnerable, receptive authenticity.’78 Following Nietzsche, 
Dollimore insists that, ‘we are most ourselves when we are in this destructive, 
dangerous and suffering state of freedom, violating the restraints of the very history 
which has produced us.’79 It is surprising to see Dollimore, a staunchly materialist and 
anti-humanist critic, suggest that an existentially alert criticism attuned to the dynamics 
of human existence may better illuminate the interdependence of historical influence 
and human agency in Shakespearean drama. But as Fernie notes, ‘One massive gain in 
Dollimore’s recent work is that it enables him to write directly about Shakespeare’s 
major characters and with an existential inwardness that is at one with the terrible 
appeal and force of the plays themselves.’80  
 It can be argued that popular lines of critical investigation have made us blind to 
existentialism and its influence on contemporary thought. The dominant turn towards 
historicism and the workings of cultural production in Shakespearean studies has left 
literary criticism’s connection to an existential heritage unexamined and suppressed. 
This is nowhere more evident than in the work of Stephen Greenblatt. Greenblatt’s grim 
concluding remarks to Renaissance Self-Fashioning have come to stand as the 
definitive overture of new historicism:  
 
In all my texts and documents, there were, so far as I could tell, no moments of 
pure, unfettered subjectivity; indeed, the human subject itself began to seem 
remarkably unfree, the ideological product of the relations of power in a 
particular society . . . I found not an epiphany of identity freely chosen but a 
cultural artefact.81 
 
Greenblatt’s provocative suggestion that subjectivity is little more than the product of 
the intersection of historical and cultural forces, and that literature is condemned in spite 
of itself to prop up the social and political status quo, has been hotly debated since the 
publication of these words. Greenblatt found that his investigations led him to shift the 
critical focus from the idea of self-constructed subjectivity to the larger processes of 
social power. However, existentialist ideas have continued to shape and inform his 
criticism even as he has tried to discard them. In the preface to the 2005 edition of 
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Renaissance Self-Fashioning, Greenblatt describes Foucault’s influence on his thoughts 
and ideas. Foucault’s position was  
 
that the innermost experiences of the individual – the feelings that lurk in the 
darkness – were not a kind of raw material subsequently worked on by social 
forces. Rather, they were called into being and shaped by the institution that 
claimed only to police them. The experiences were not, for that reason, 
inauthentic; rather, he argued, the very conviction of authenticity was 
something that the institution, with its doctrines, its hierarchies, its cultural 
arrangements, its procedures, its conception of periodicity and discursive 
adequacy, made possible.82 
 
Greenblatt speaks of ‘the innermost experiences of the individual’, ‘the feelings that 
lurk in the darkness’ and ‘the very conviction of authenticity’. By adopting the 
distinctive language and vocabulary of existentialist philosophy, he inadvertently 
exposes the difficulty of suppressing these concerns. Paul Stevens senses in 
Greenblatt’s revisions, later works and autobiographical anecdotes the formative 
influence of the existentialism of the 1960s. He finds that his criticism, 
 
even at its most innovative or at its most postmodern, exemplifies the 
persistence of modernism, that the intellectual imperative at the heart of his 
work is largely determined by the legacy of popular existentialism. His 
obsessive struggle with identity, whether explicit in his profoundly moving 
analyses of figures like Thomas More or implicit in his own self-dramatizing 
and telltale acts of name-dropping, does much to explain the breadth of his 
influence. The issues raised by existentialism are alive and well.83 
 
Greenblatt’s resistance to existentialist ideas paradoxically reveals their continuing 
importance for current Shakespearean criticism. His investigation develops from the 
existentialist dialectic between being and nothingness, claims Stevens. In his conclusion 
to Renaissance Self-Fashioning, Greenblatt writes: ‘In our culture to abandon self-
fashioning is to abandon the craving for freedom, and to let go of one’s stubborn hold 
upon selfhood, even selfhood conceived as a fiction, is to die.’84 As Francis Barker 
sums up, Greenblatt concludes ‘with the ambiguities and ambivalences in his 
representation of the relation between autonomy and determination intact.’85 
                                                            
82 Ibid., p. xv. 
83 Paul Stevens, ‘Pretending to be Real: Stephen Greenblatt and the Legacy of Popular Existentialism’, 
New Literary History: A Journal of Theory and Interpretation, 33: 3 (2002), p. 512. 
84 Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, p. 257. 
85 Francis Barker, The Culture of Violence: Essays on Tragedy and History (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1993), p. 153. 
  30 
Greenblatt’s seminal work is not a radical departure from existentialist concepts of 
human subjectivity: it is the continuation of the same crucial concerns in a different 
critical register. 
 Greenblatt’s position with regard to the problematic issue of human agency has 
also wavered in recent years. ‘Human actions’, he writes in Renaissance Self-
Fashioning, ‘must constantly be referred to an inner state that must, nonetheless, be 
experienced as the irresistible operation of a force outside the self, indeed alien to the 
self.’86 As Fernie notes, ‘Greenblatt often seems driven to frustrate and deny the very 
agency he invokes.’87 In Learning to Curse, Greenblatt champions a new, existentially 
resonant commitment to human agency by claiming that ‘even inaction or extreme 
marginality is understood to possess meaning and therefore to imply intention.’88 His 
new insistence on the ‘virtually inescapable’ nature of agency is, of course, tempered by 
an acknowledgement of the inherent ambiguity of human actions: ‘A gesture of dissent 
may be an element in a larger legitimation process, while an attempt to stabilize the 
order of things may turn out to subvert it.’89 Greenblatt’s fluctuating view on human 
agency is symptomatic of his deeper concern with the potential individuals have to 
change the world they live in. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that throughout his 
latest study, Shakespeare’s Freedom, Greenblatt invokes many fundamental 
existentialist ideas. He begins by asserting that ‘Shakespeare . . . is the embodiment of 
human freedom’, but adds that ‘he is also a figure of limits.’90 He clarifies his position 
by suggesting that ‘These limits served as the enabling condition of his particular 
freedom.’91 This is almost identical to Sartre’s paradoxical claim that human beings are 
free by necessity, liberated because they are constrained by their worldly existence. 
Greenblatt highlights the imprisoned yet defiant Barnardine in Measure for Measure as 
the epitome of human freedom. He writes: ‘Radical individuation - the singularity of the 
person who fails or refuses to match the dominant cultural expression and thus is 
marked as irremediably different - is suggestively present throughout the plays.’92  
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 With the existential concepts in Greenblatt’s work becoming apparent and the 
disapproval expressed by some critics of ‘dehumanised history’,93 existentialism is 
making its presence felt again in Shakespearean studies. Several other critics have also 
examined Shakespeare’s plays explicitly through an existentialist lens. Richard A. 
Andretta’s essay ‘Is Iago an Atheistic Existentialist?’ advocates an interpretation of Iago 
based on Sartre’s atheistic existentialism.94 In a recent article, Simon Palfrey traces 
Macbeth’s presence in Kierkegaard’s work.95 Reading Macbeth and Kierkegaard as 
‘mutual illuminators’, he examines how Shakespearean and Kierkegaardian notions of 
inwardness overlap. In a similar way, Michael G. Bielmeier offers a Kierkegaardian 
reading of Hamlet, Troilus and Cressida, and Antony and Cleopatra in Shakespeare, 
Kierkegaard and Existential Tragedy.96 Some critics have isolated key moments in 
Shakespeare’s plays that seem to be anticipating existentialist ideas. In an essay on the 
anticipation of Sartre’s existentialist ethics in Macbeth, John F. Hennedy argues that 
Macduff’s morally ambiguous decision to leave his family unprotected while he solicits 
political support from England dramatises the ethical ultimacy of human choice.97 
Macduff’s dilemma, Hennedy claims, is not dissimilar to Sartre’s recollection of a 
young student who felt compelled to choose between joining the resistance and staying 
at home to comfort his recently bereaved mother. Another interesting recent example of 
the revival of existentialism by Shakespearean critics is Asloob Ahmad Ansari’s The 
Existential Dramaturgy of William Shakespeare.98 The book contains several essays 
that were published between 1981 and 1999, and focuses predominantly on the 
relationship between Shakespeare’s plays and the work of the German existentialist 
Karl Jaspers. Although many of Ansari’s conclusions are anachronistically phrased,99 
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his overarching argument that Shakespeare was fascinated by ‘the concreteness of lived 
experience’100 certainly carries weight.  
 The turn by some Shakespearean critics towards overtly existentialist ideas 
mirrors some theorists’ and philosophers’ revived interest in such issues. In an 
interview, Jacques Derrida concedes that although he did initially attempt to distance his 
work from existentialist conceptions of existence, he has always endeavoured to 
maintain an existential intensity in his work. He writes: ‘My intention was certainly not 
to draw away from the concern for existence itself, from concrete personal commitment, 
or from the existential pathos that, in a sense, I have never lost. . . . In some ways, a 
philosopher without the ethico-existential pathos does not interest me very much.’101 In 
his later work, Derrida draws directly on Kierkegaard’s writings on the opaque and 
absurd nature of ‘the decision’.102 In ‘Force of law’ Derrida speaks of ‘freedom’, 
‘intentionality’ and ‘a sense of responsibility without limits’, all of which are 
fundamentally existentialist notions.103 Michel Foucault’s The Care of the Self shifts the 
emphasis from the productivity of power and the mechanisms of subjection to theories 
of self-constitution. In doing so, he reveals his interest in what R. Schürmann calls 
‘practical subjectivity’.104 Of course, Foucault still focuses on the historical constitution 
of the subject, but he recasts his study in quasi-existentialist terms. Foucault sees 
individuals as constituted and constituting entities and he analyses the ‘forms and 
modalities of the relation to self [rapport à soi] by which the individual constitutes and 
recognises himself qua subject.’105 The emphasis on self-constitution and the particular 
ways in which individuals experience themselves is what Foucault describes as an 
‘exercise of self upon self by which one tries to work out, to transform oneself and to 
attain a certain mode of being.’106 In a recent article, Jürgen Habermas, whose 
philosophy is openly opposed to the notion of monological subjectivity, enlists 
Kierkegaard’s ethical insights and denounces philosophy’s tendency to ‘withdraw to the 
meta-level of an inquiry’ instead of ‘taking a stand on precisely those issues that are 
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most relevant to our personal and communal lives.’107 As Derrida, Foucault and 
Habermas confirm, existentialist ideas continue to have critical currency, and their work 
buttresses Amanda Anderson’s claims that ‘contemporary theory is already pursuing a 
less constrained understanding of first-person experience (singular and plural), one 
which finds expression in ways that consistently exceed the sociological grid.’108  
 Before turning towards an examination of early modern existential ideas, it is 
worth pausing briefly over one other existentially focused study of Shakespeare. 
Jagannath Chakrevorty’s book King Lear: Shakespeare’s Existentialist Hero is useful 
because it highlights the pitfalls of bringing the terminology of a twentieth century 
philosophy to bear on Shakespeare’s plays. Like Ansari’s study, Chakrevorty’s analysis 
is anachronistic and her study shows little concern for the dangers of transhistorical 
assumptions. Her criticism assumes that Shakespeare was already familiar with 
advanced existentialist ideas. In her introduction, she writes: ‘To argue that Shakespeare 
had not read Sartre is as futile as to argue that Sophocles had not read Freud.’109 
Furthermore, the study is careless and philosophically inaccurate. Chakrevorty’s main 
argument is that ‘King Lear, so long immersed in Bad Faith, awakens to the 
consciousness of freedom and decides to assert it.’110 Forcing existentialism onto 
Shakespeare’s plays in this way produces reductive and over-simplified criticism, and 
Chakrevorty’s study reveals the dangers of disregarding historical difference. To read 
Shakespeare through the lens of existentialism, we must heed Palfrey’s advice: ‘If we 
want to traverse such cross-cultural turf, we need to do so tenderly, with due attention 
both to shifting terrain and our own steps upon it.’111 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis does not attempt to re-establish the absurdist or nihilistic existentialist 
readings of Shakespeare offered by Kott, Frye, Kaufmann and Horowitz in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Nor does it arbitrarily impose existentialist ideas and principles upon 
Shakespeare’s work. Instead, it seeks to understand more fully the intellectual and 
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philosophical rapport between Shakespeare and existentialism. Whilst this thesis does 
acknowledge that there are many fascinating prefigurations of specific existentialist 
ideas in Shakespeare’s plays, it aims to treat Shakespeare as an existentialist in a 
broader sense, as a playwright who was fascinated by questions of embodiment and 
enactment, and as a writer who was particularly attentive to the ontological, ethical and 
political aspects of human existence. As I have outlined in this chapter, there are strong 
indications that existentialism is being revived in theory and Shakespearean studies. 
This thesis reads Shakespeare’s drama and existentialism together in order to reveal the 
existential intensities that exist at the heart of his plays. In a dialectical move, it may 
also be possible to read existentialism back through the lens of Shakespeare in order to 
show some of the shortcomings of existentialist thought and demonstrate how, in some 
ways, Shakespeare is more existentially attuned than existentialists themselves. But first 
it is necessary to offer a historical account of the range of existentialist ideas that were 
beginning to emerge in the Renaissance and outline more fully the ways in which we 
can read existentialism historically. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
 
 
 
EARLY MODERN EXISTENTIALIST IDEAS 
 
 
 
What do Shakespearean drama and existentialist philosophy, two fields of interest that 
face each other across radically disparate cultural and intellectual epochs, have in 
common? As a cultural and philosophical movement, existentialism has a specific 
intellectual history which begins with precursors such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and 
Dostoevsky and ends with the fully-fledged philosophies of Sartre, Heidegger, Jaspers, 
and Beauvoir.112 In the mid-twentieth century, existentialism emerged as a popular and 
recognisable academic movement. However, as a philosophical impulse rather than a 
school of thought, existentialist concerns also have an important transhistorical reach. If 
human beings are ‘infinitely interested in existing’113 as Kierkegaard claims, then 
individuals have always been fascinated - to a greater or lesser degree - by what it 
means to be a living, breathing human being interacting with the world. Existentialism 
thus has an important pre- and post-history. This interest in existentialist matters may 
manifest itself in different ways at different historical moments, but the fundamental 
issues, problems and dilemmas that relate to the nature of human existence remain 
crucially important to writers who predate and postdate existentialism’s theoretical 
heyday. Embryonic existentialist ideas can be found in the Renaissance,114 just as the 
existentialist concept of the self as practical, embodied, being-in-the-world continues to 
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inform and enlighten current theories of subjectivity. As I hope to demonstrate in this 
chapter, existentialist preoccupations can transcend and call into question the particular 
social and cultural circumstances of different historical eras.  
 How can we read existentialism historically? In Shame in Shakespeare, Ewan 
Fernie reads the human experience of shame as ‘a variable constant’.115 According to 
Fernie, the universal nature of shame does not necessarily make it a historically 
undifferentiated experience. Its depth, severity and corrosive effect on subjectivity are 
felt more strongly in cultures that cherish individual integrity. As successive epochs 
develop and prize varying conceptions of selfhood, the experience of shame is 
remodelled from one historical period to the next. Andy Mousley observes that Fernie’s 
nuanced and self-conscious historicism treats historical issues ‘as though they are 
inseparable from existential ones’.116 This vital existential awareness, claims Mousley, 
rehumanises history and thus enhances rather than limits an appreciation of 
Shakespeare’s historical specificity. Following Fernie, I want to suggest that modern 
existentialist concerns and issues were prevalent in other terms in the literary, 
philosophical and religious writings of the early modern era. This is not to contend, of 
course, that the proto-existentialism of the Renaissance is identical to later twentieth 
century existentialist philosophies and arguments. But there are many surprising and 
uncanny prefigurations of existentialism in the Renaissance that build a strong case for 
reading Shakespeare and existentialism together. In the work of writers such as Michel 
de Montaigne, Pico della Mirandola, Walter Raleigh and Francis Bacon, and in the 
poetry, drama and prose of some of Shakespeare’s contemporaries, there is evidence 
that existentialist ideas were beginning to emerge and that there are good grounds for 
regarding Shakespeare as being in important respects an existentialist avant la lettre. 
For Shakespeare is not just a writer of his age. His work also possesses an extraordinary 
ability to anticipate the thoughts and ideas that would preoccupy subsequent epochs by 
seizing upon them in their seminal shape and dramatising them as if they were already 
fully formed. As Kiernan Ryan puts it, ‘the poetically encoded texts bequeathed to 
posterity by Shakespeare offer themselves to be construed today as memories of the 
future, as parables not only of the present time, but also of times to come.’117 It is this 
anticipatory quality in his work that prompts A. D. Nuttall to observe that ‘Shakespeare 
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has as much to do with existentialism as with Elizabethan neo-stoicism.’118 Reading 
Shakespeare through existentialism reveals that he was already articulating the 
philosophy’s key concerns in the distinctive theatrical and poetic terms of his plays. 
 By looking specifically at five key areas of existentialist thought - individualism, 
authenticity, angst, self-becoming, and the relationship between self and other - this 
chapter surveys the intriguing anticipation of existentialism in the Renaissance. It draws 
on a range of sources, which include plays, poetry, historical chronicles, religious 
sermons and pamphlets, political works and philosophical theses in order to show how 
existential ideas were materialising in different domains of Renaissance culture. 
 
 
The Self Uncovered: Early Modern Individualism  
 
The age of Shakespeare was a time of tremendous cultural and ideological change. The 
most important of these changes was the seismic shift from the relative stability and 
clearly structured hierarchy of medieval feudalism to the dynamic dispensation of early 
modern capitalism, which demanded the ceaseless transformation of the conditions of 
production and of social relationships. Under capitalism, writes Marx, ‘man does not 
want to wish to remain what he has become, but lives in a constant process of 
becoming.’119 The emergence of early modern merchant-capitalist culture, with its 
emphasis on the primacy and advancement of the individual and on the unleashing of 
the acquisitive self, marked a significant departure from the previously dominant feudal 
system, in which a person’s predetermined place in society was a ‘sacred limit’.120 In 
1577, William Harrison recorded the self-seeking motivations of market traders and 
condemned their ability to manipulate prices and market conditions for their own 
personal gain. In a chapter called ‘Of faires and markets’, he writes: ‘I wish that God 
would once open their eyes that deal thus to see their own errours: for as yet some of 
them little care how manie poore men suffer extremitte, so that they fill their purses, and 
carie awaie the gaine.’121 In this nascent capitalist world, Harrison’s anxieties about 
‘how each one of us indeavoureth to fleece and eat up another’ were symptomatic of a 
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wider concern with the idea and consequences of individual freedom and autonomy.122 
The transformation of the whole social and economic order rendered human relations 
indeterminate and unstable. This transition gave rise to a new conception of man and his 
relationship to his surrounding environment and community. Jacob Burckhardt was the 
first critic to suggest that the Renaissance anticipated modern liberal individualism. In 
The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy (1860) he writes: 
 
In the Middle Ages . . . man was conscious of himself only as a member of a 
race, people, party, family, or corporation - only through some general 
category. In Italy this veil was first melted into air; an objective treatment of 
the state and all the things of this world became possible. The subjective 
side at the same time asserted itself with corresponding emphasis; man 
became a spiritual individual, and recognized himself as such.123 
 
According to Burckhardt, the early modern individual delighted in his new-found 
capacity for self-creation. This iconic image of the self-possessed individual, who is 
empowered by a sense of essential identity and confident of his ability to manipulate 
events and people around him, is nowhere better described than in Niccolò 
Machiavelli’s The Prince. Machiavelli argues in a well-known passage that ‘a wise ruler 
cannot, nor should he, keep his word when doing so would lead to his disadvantage. . . . 
But one must know how to disguise his nature well, and how to be a fine liar and 
hypocrite.’124 Of course, the recognition that early modern writers and thinkers 
simultaneously exulted in and worried about the power of unshackled individualism is 
not new. The dangerous individualism of Iago, Edmund, Faustus and Tamburlaine 
provides the most obvious and vivid testimony to the fact that early modern dramatists 
and their audiences were fascinated by the dark side of human freedom and the thrilling 
expansion of individual agency. The main point is that many thinkers of the time were 
beginning to view the individual as a self-experiencing entity, a being that has a direct 
and intimate awareness of its own existence. They were starting to develop 
‘existentialist’ accounts of what it meant and what it felt like to be a self-conscious 
individual. 
 It is necessary at this junction to comment briefly on the etymological origins of 
words such as ‘individual’, ‘person’ and ‘self’. ‘Individual’ is a word with an 
extraordinarily complex linguistic genealogy. As a word that signifies the special, 
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unique identity of each human being, it is, strictly speaking, a critical term fostered by 
Romanticism. Raymond Williams explains that ‘Individual originally meant 
indivisible.’125 However, although a specific terminology was conspicuously absent 
from the discourse of the period, it does not necessarily follow that thinkers of that time 
had little interest in such ideas. In Shakespeare and Modern Culture, Marjorie Garber 
points out that notions of performativity and selfhood were linked in Renaissance 
thought. She writes: ‘the source word for “person” is “persona,” which means “mask,” 
so that the idea of a person is, in a way, a back-formation from stage performance; the 
performed self, at least etymologically, produces the person and not the other way 
around.’126 Early modern thinkers and writers thus had an advanced understanding of 
the way individuals become the people they are through the process of existing. 
Renaissance writers and dramatists would perhaps not have found the notion that 
‘existence precedes essence’ entirely novel and unfamiliar. Garber also draws attention 
to the fact that when the word ‘self’ is first used as an independent substantive in 1595 
in sonnet XLV of Spenser’s poem Amoretti (‘and in my selfe, my inward selfe I 
meane’127), it already carries the suggestion that the self is something that is divided and 
ruptured. We can begin to appreciate how notions of individuality, selfhood and 
personhood were being developed in Renaissance writings.  
 It is interesting to observe how Renaissance individualism - something that is 
actually articulated in multiple and variegated ways in early modern thought - has 
surreptitiously evolved into the homogeneous idea of a free-standing, self-determining 
and transcendent human subject. In the wake of Romanticism, individualism, humanism 
and essentialism have become mutually reinforcing concepts. J. A. Symonds’s 
celebration of man’s unfettered freedom and independence in the Renaissance is a 
paradigmatic example of how these notions merged in nineteenth-century scholarship. 
He writes: ‘The essence of humanism consisted in a new and vital perception of the 
dignity of man as a rational being apart from theological determinations, and in the 
further perception that classic literature alone displayed human nature in the plenitude 
of intellectual and moral freedom.’128 Dollimore is deeply sceptical of this inflated and 
hubristic view of the individual. In Radical Tragedy, he claims that in such assessments 
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‘the individual is understood in terms of a pre-social essence, nature or identity and on 
that basis s/he is invested with a quasi-spiritual autonomy. The individual becomes the 
origin and focus of meaning - an individuated essence which precedes and - in idealist 
philosophy - transcends history and society.’129 However, although new historicist 
critics may rightly insist that the self is not independent of its social context, we cannot 
overlook the fact that the ideas of human agency, inwardness and autonomy were 
important for early modern thinkers. Katharine Maus notes how a postmodern critique 
that uncovers the socially constituted nature of human identity ‘often seems to assume 
that once this dependence is pointed out, inwardness simply vaporizes’.130 For 
Symonds, the Renaissance witnessed the birth of the modern idea of the self as a self-
invented, self-fashioned site of subjective intensity. Dollimore, on the other hand, sees 
in the Renaissance the glimmerings of the postmodern self and suggests that ‘it seems 
more useful to talk not of the individualism of this period but its self-consciousness, 
especially its sense of the self as flexible, problematic, elusive, dislocated - and, of 
course, contradictory: simultaneously arrogant and masochistic, victim and agent, object 
and effect of power.’131 The strengths and shortcomings of both formulations have been 
debated at length. Louis Adrian Montrose argues that, as a result of historically sensitive 
literary research, the idea ‘the freely self-creating and world-creating individual of so-
called bourgeois humanism is - at least in theory - now defunct.’132 But Francis Barker 
points out that the postmodern self is a remote, impersonal phenomenon which ‘doesn’t 
share with the classical subject the capacity for anguished alienation’ or the power to 
produce ‘acute - often introspective - negativity’.133 The existentialist conception of 
subjectivity synthesises both these views. Like the postmodern self, the unfixed and 
anti-essential existential self is a site of open, fluid potentiality; like the classical 
subject, it retains a certain degree of agency and an ability to shape its own existence. 
Selfhood in many Renaissance texts is often portrayed as deeply unstable and frequently 
contradictory, but something which individuals nevertheless feel responsible for. 
 In their evaluations of Shakespearean and Renaissance subjectivity, some critics 
have started to gesture in an existentialist direction. Harold Bloom argues that 
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Shakespeare’s characters ‘develop because they reconceive themselves.’134 John 
Jefferies Martin claims that the Renaissance ‘relational self’ negotiated a relationship 
between ‘one’s inner experience’ and ‘one’s experience in the world.’135 John Lee 
argues in a similar vein in his investigation of Hamlet’s ‘self-constituting sense of 
self’.136 Perhaps the most significant text that supports the argument for the emerging 
existentialist conception of selfhood in the Renaissance is Montaigne’s Essays.137 As an 
intimate and personal record of the workings of his inner life, Montaigne originally 
intended his Essays to testify to the existence of a stable, immutable core of being. In 
his brief address to the reader, he writes: ‘Here I want to be seen in my simple, natural, 
everyday fashion, without striving or artifice: for it is my own self that I am painting. 
Here, drawn from life, you will read of my defects and my native form’.138 Like many 
works of the period, the Essays were originally designed to provide a traditional, 
humanistic insight into the interiority of the individual self. As Charles Taylor notes: 
‘This is the virtually unanimous direction of ancient thought: beneath the changing and 
shifting desires in the unwise soul . . . our true nature, reason, provides a foundation, 
unwavering and constant.’139 However, what Montaigne discovered instead of a secure 
foundation of being was a fluctuating consciousness fraught with contradiction and 
ambiguity, a landscape of ‘terrifying instability’.140 In his reflections - which we know 
Shakespeare read, in some form and at least in part - Montaigne anticipates Sartre’s 
suggestion that ‘man is . . . something which propels itself forward towards a future and 
is aware that it is doing so.’141 
 In Shakespeare, Machiavelli, and Montaigne, Hugh Grady explains how 
Montaigne presents subjectivity as mediated by socio-historical influences but also as 
something that has the ability to affect those influences in turn. For Montaigne, there is 
a dialectical interplay between self and world. As a result, his private self, Grady 
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claims, is ‘a flux, an inconstancy, not really a subject at all because it cannot fix itself’, 
and this perpetual subjective instability allows for a ‘complex, layered interiority’.142 
There are many passages in the Essays which present selfhood as a process of 
becoming. In ‘An Apology for Raymond Sebond’, Montaigne writes:  
 
To conclude: there is no permanent existence in our being or in that of objects. 
We ourselves, our faculty of judgement and all mortal things are flowing and 
rolling ceaselessly: nothing certain can be established about one from the other, 
since both judge and judging are ever shifting and changing. 
  We have no communication with being, for every human nature is 
wholly situated forever between birth and death, it shows itself only as a dark 
shadowy appearance, an unstable weak opinion. And if you should determine 
to try and grasp what Man’s being is, it would be exactly like trying to hold a 
fistful of water. (p. 680)143 
 
The passage is a radical anti-essentialist depiction of human existence. The 
experiencing mind and the things experienced are not separate and distinct, but part of a 
continual happening. As Antonia Szabari puts it, ‘to read Montaigne’s book - with 
Montaigne - as a painting-in-words is to understand writing as a medium modelled on 
phenomenological consciousness which can only grasp its object in its momentary 
“this-ness” and is forced to change every moment as its object does.’144 It is not enough, 
Montaigne tells us, to rely on origins, supposed universals and generalities to produce 
our knowledge of life: ‘We confuse our thoughts with generalities, universal causes and 
processes which proceed quite well without us, and leave behind our own concerns for 
Michel, which touch us more intimately than Man’ (p. 107). Montaigne’s self-
reflexivity here underlines the passion and profundity of his encounter with his own 
inward sense of self. Grady remarks that in the Essays Montaigne suggests that the self 
is ‘not only immersed in ideology but capable of distantiating itself from it through 
complex, decentred interactions.’145 For Montaigne, Grady continues, ‘the self is 
something that is observed and experienced, something that acts and performs, and 
something that feels and judges. It is both in the world and withdrawn from the 
world.’146 The self, as Montaigne conceives it, is not a thing but a relation to certain 
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dimensions of existence - the world, other human beings, and our own experience of 
ourselves.  
 Montaigne’s use of water imagery to describe his transitory sense of self calls to 
mind Antony’s distressing sense of subjective dissolution at the end of Antony and 
Cleopatra. ‘My good knave Eros, now thy captain is / Even such a body. Here I am 
Antony, / Yet cannot hold this visible shape, my knave’ (IV.xv.12-4) he says, utterly 
bewildered by the experience of pure subjective contingency. Antony’s external identity 
and his inward sense of self have become unhinged from one another, and this makes 
him feel as ‘indistinct / As water is in water’ (IV.xv.10-11). And yet, paradoxically, 
even though his identity has been obliterated and this has produced a painful feeling of 
self-loss and subjective indeterminacy, Antony continues to experience himself as an 
existential intensity. Lee notes that the force and potency of this self-experience are 
‘dominant over his sense of his own corporeality’.147 Antony’s fluid subjectivity is 
expressed rhetorically by Shakespeare’s repetition of the phrase ‘my knave’. In the first 
instance, Antony uses the phrase to refer to his servant Eros. But the phrase is quickly 
employed again ambiguously to designate both Eros and his dissolving sense of self: 
‘here I am Antony, / Yet cannot hold this visible shape, my knave’. By sandwiching this 
moment of subjective unravelling between a clear-cut and an equivocal use of the 
phrase, Shakespeare destabilises its primary meaning. Selfhood was once something 
Antony employed, something he owned: it was his servant. The second usage of ‘my 
knave’, as an appositional phrase qualifying ‘this visible shape’, plays on the term’s 
slippery meaning. In different contexts it can be used to describe someone who is 
deceitful and crafty or someone who is jocular and familiar. Like the word ‘knave’ 
itself, Antony’s insubordinate subjectivity constantly calls itself into question and 
harbours diverse meanings. He no longer coincides with himself. N. K. Sugimura 
rightly notes that in this respect Antony’s speech ‘feels like a description [of] an 
Existentialist crisis straight out of modern literature.’148   
 It is the Kierkegaardian rather than the Machiavellian model of individuality that 
best fits Antony’s perplexing sense of self. In Repetition Kierkegaard argues that 
 
the individual is not an actual shape but a shadow, or, more correctly, the actual 
shape is invisibly present and therefore is not satisfied to cast one shadow, but 
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the individual has a variety of shadows, all of which resemble him and which 
momentarily have equal status as being himself. As yet the personality is not 
discerned, and its energy is betokened only in the passion of possibility . . . each 
of its possibilities is an audible shadow.149 
 
In Kierkegaard’s mind, the self is a site of constant dialectical conflict and 
contradiction. Selfhood can never be achieved or possessed. Simon Palfrey notes that 
the Danish writer was attracted to Shakespearean inwardness because ‘it is a familiarity 
rooted in dispossession, fracture, and above all process’.150 It is evident, then, that the 
Renaissance individual can be viewed as a harbinger of the existential individual. Both 
Renaissance thinkers and existentialist philosophers employ the metaphor of water to 
describe the fluctuating, dynamic, irresolvable nature of human subjectivity. ‘One who 
is existing’, writes Kierkegaard,  
 
is continually in the process of becoming: the actually existing subjective 
thinker, thinking, continually reproduces this in his existence and invests all 
his thinking in becoming. . . . Only he really has style who is never finished 
with something but stirs the water of language whenever he begins, so that 
to him the most ordinary expression comes into expression with newborn 
originality.151 (my italics) 
 
Similarly, Albert Camus asks his reader in The Myth of Sisyphus: ‘Of whom and of what 
indeed can I say: “I know that!” This heart within me I can feel, and I can judge that it 
exists. . . . There ends all my knowledge, and the rest is construction. For if I try to seize 
this self of which I feel sure, if I try to define and to summarise it, it is nothing but water 
slipping through my fingers.’152 The water imagery Shakespeare employs to describe 
Antony’s selfhood is a remarkable forerunner of these later existentialist formulations.  
 Shakespeare’s philosophical engagement with water imagery is also found in The 
Comedy of Errors when the despondent Antipholus of Syracuse describes his 
overwhelming feelings of self-loss:  
 
Antipholus of Syracuse.   I will go lose myself, 
   And wander up and down to view the city. 
Merchant of Ephesus. Sir, I commend you to your own content. Exit 
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Antipholus of Syracuse. He that commends me to mine own content 
   Commends me to the thing I cannot get. 
   I to the world am like a drop of water 
   That in the ocean seeks another drop, 
   Who, falling there to find his fellow forth, 
   Unseen, inquisitive, confounds himself. 
   So I, to find a mother and a brother, 
   In quest of them, unhappy, lose myself. 
        (I.ii.30-40) 
 
Antipholus is intentionally paradoxical in this passage. He must lose himself (in both 
the literal and the metaphorical sense) in order to find his family. But he also implies 
that familial reunion will help him reconnect with his own subjectivity, a suggestion 
that is heightened dramatically and philosophically by the fact that he is searching for 
his identical twin brother. Once again, the image of water is evoked. Lee observes: 
‘Most important and dramatic . . . is the intense fragility conferred upon identity by 
picturing it as a construct of water, as the world as ocean threatens to submerge, or 
render it indistinct.’153 The use of water imagery intensifies the philosophical power of 
the passage. Sartre discusses a similar idea in more recognisably theoretical language: 
‘the individual - questioned questioner, is I, and is no one. . . . We can see clearly how I 
am dissolved [je me dissous] practically in the human adventure.’154 In Camus’ novel 
The Outsider, Meursault notices that during his trial the prosecuting lawyer repeatedly 
uses the first-person pronoun ‘I’ and speaks as if he were Meursault himself. As the trial 
continues, the reduction of Meursault’s significance and the constant discussion of the 
nature of his ‘soul’, leads him to remark: ‘I had the impression I was drowning in some 
colourless liquid.’155 Both Antipholus and Meursault evoke the idea of self-loss and 
subjective dissolution through the imagery of drowning and liquefaction.  
 Ideas about the quest for, or limits of, self-knowledge were prevalent in 
Renaissance writings. The highly charged Delphic injunction ‘Nosce te ipsum’ or ‘know 
thyself’ commonly headed chapters in books on health, ethics, religion, politics, even 
books for school children.156 Although Anne Ferry argues that this was in fact 
straightforward guidance that promoted a limited and one-dimensional form of personal 
sincerity, there is evidence that early modern thinkers were troubled by the problem of 
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self-knowledge. Socrates explains in Plato’s Phaedrus: ‘I am still unable to do as the 
Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it really seems to me ridiculous to look 
into other things before I have understood that. This is why I do not concern myself 
with them. I accept what is generally believed, and I look not into them but into my own 
self.’157 Self-examination, Socrates tells us, is a difficult philosophical project. This 
awareness of the obscure and inaccessible nature of the self is also found in Renaissance 
thought. One particularly illuminating example is found in the Venetian reformer 
Gasparo Contarini’s letter to Tommaso Giustiniani in 1511, where he writes: ‘if you 
were to know me from within [nell’intrinseco], as I really am (but even I do not know 
myself well), you would not make such a judgment about me’.158 Drawing on this 
example, John Martin notes: ‘One of the most striking features of Renaissance notions 
of the self was an explicitly layered quality, which represented a sense not only of 
inwardness or interiority but also of mystery about what Renaissance writers . . . 
imagined as their inner selves.’159 
 Shakespeare’s and Montaigne’s descriptions of the vicissitudes of human 
subjectivity were followed a few years later by John Donne’s depiction of the 
unreliable, mysterious and contingent nature of both self and world in his poem ‘The 
Second Anniversary’:  
 
And what essential joy canst thou expect 
Here upon Earth, what permanent effect 
Of transitory causes? Dost thou love 
Beauty (and beauty worthiest is to move) 
Poor cozened cozener! That she and that thou 
Which did begin to love, are neither now: 
You are both fluid, changed since yesterday. 
Next day repairs (but ill) last dayes decay.  (lines 387-93)160 
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Donne’s poem captures the interdependence of the changing world and the changing 
self. Neither aspect of life can be fixed, and this jeopardises any belief in firm identities. 
Shakespeare, Donne, and Montaigne all present the self as a bewildering and largely 
undefinable ‘feeling’ or ‘sensation’ that is truly experienced but cannot be locked down 
in definite terms.   
 
 
The Authentic Self: The Ideal of Sincerity in the Renaissance 
 
For existentialists and Renaissance thinkers alike, the concepts of ‘individualism’ and 
‘authenticity’ go hand in hand. Of course, these exact words and their modern meanings 
were not available in the Renaissance, but the ideas they signify certainly existed before 
the formulation of such terminology. Peter Holbrook asserts that ‘the drive towards 
authenticity is not only a nineteenth-century or post-Romantic phenomenon. It has a 
Classical and Renaissance dimension.’161 There is plenty of evidence to suggest that 
concerns about sincerity, integrity, self-realisation and authenticity surfaced well before 
such notions were explicitly theorised and critiqued in the Romantic period. Indeed, 
Renaissance writers and thinkers were obsessed with the perilous task of ‘being true to 
oneself’. Hamlet’s claim that he has ‘that within which passes show’ (Hamlet, I.ii.85) 
juxtaposes what Maus calls an ‘inner invisible anguish’ with false indicators of grief.162 
For the existentially intuitive Hamlet, authenticity and inwardness are inextricably 
bound together. He places great importance on the self he feels himself to be. To adopt 
Kierkegaard’s phrase, his authentic self is ‘invisibly present’. This ‘something’ is 
unnamable and even unknowable. Yet he fiercely defends its existence and integrity. 
Maus continues: ‘Hamlet’s conviction that truth is unspeakable implicitly devalues any 
attempts to express or communicate it.’163 His sense of authentic being stands in direct 
contrast to Polonius’ commending of authenticity to Laertes before he leaves for France. 
On the surface, Polonius appears to advocate a strategically straightforward and one-
dimensional form of authenticity. Yet, as Holbrook notes, the lines ‘to thine own self be 
true / And it must follow as the night the day / Thou canst not then be false to any man’ 
(I.iii.79-9) are confusing and even contradictory.164 The Machiavellian circumspection 
that Polonius advises Laertes to adopt jars with his ideal of truthfulness to oneself. 
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Paradoxically, the affirmation of authenticity opens up the possibility of inauthenticity 
and self-betrayal. The famous imperative ‘to thine own self be true’ is challenged in the 
play, not only by Hamlet’s agonised self-consciousness, but also by the hard truth that 
‘there is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so.’165 
 In Renaissance Man, Agnes Heller notes that ‘With the Renaissance . . . the self-
realization and self-enjoyment of the personality became a goal.’166 But she also notes 
that there was a ‘“separating out” of particular aspirations from the general concept of 
self-realization.’167 Many Renaissance writers show a deep sensitivity to the complex 
and multifaceted notion of authenticity. The Puritan moralist Daniell Dyke’s book The 
Mystery Of Selfe-Deceiving. Or A Discovrse and Discouery of the Deceitfullnesse of 
Mans Heart is a particularly good example of the Renaissance awareness of the 
difficulties of self-scrutiny. He claims that 
 
Surely wee neuer beginne to know Diuinitie or Religion, till wee come to know 
our selues : our selues wee cannot know, till wee know our hearts. I but, our 
hearts are deceitfull aboue all things, who can know them? They who with 
diligence shall peruse this present treatise shall with Gods blessing be able in 
some good measure to know them. Here shall they find that dangerous Art of 
Selfe-Sophistry displayed, by which millions of soules are enwrapped in the 
snares of Satan. And so by seeing their selfe-deceit, shall come to selfe-
knowledge. A knowledge never more neglected.168 
 
Echoing John Calvin’s assertion that ‘the human heart has so many crannies where 
vanity hides, so many holes where falsehood lurks, is so decked out with deceiving 
hypocrisy, that it often dupes itself’,169 Dyke proceeds to catalogue the forms and 
varieties of self-deception. But what is most interesting in this Renaissance text is the 
anticipation of the existentialist distinction between different modes of authenticity. In 
existentialist philosophy, sincerity is actually a more subtle and inconspicuous form of 
inauthenticity that operates under the veil of idiosyncrasy.170 Lionel Trilling explains 
that in a state of sincerity ‘we play the role of being ourselves, we sincerely act the part 
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of the sincere person, with the result that a judgement may be passed upon our sincerity 
that it is not authentic.’171 Dyke distinguishes sincerity or being true to oneself from 
self-sophistry. But perhaps even more striking is Dyke’s suggestion that an individual 
‘by seeing their selfe-deceit, shall come to self-knowledge’. The path to genuine self-
knowledge requires a recognition of one’s inauthentic and self-deceiving ways. This is 
an idea not entirely dissimilar to the dialectic of authenticity set out by Heidegger. In 
Being and Time Heidegger suggests that Verfallenheit or ‘fallenness’ is a necessary 
precondition for the struggle towards self-actualised subjectivity. He writes: ‘Authentic 
existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is 
only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon.’172 A loss of self is a 
necessary precondition for the repossession of self. This idea is also hinted at in Biron’s 
‘Let us once lose our oaths to find ourselves, / Or else we lose ourselves to keep our 
oaths’ in Love’s Labour’s Lost (IV.iii.335-6). Mousley observes that this sentiment 
‘nudges the play into becoming an existential quest narrative, whereby an inauthentic 
self is shed in favour of a more authentic one.’173 Even Shakespeare’s tight 
manipulation of line-structure suggests that the acts of losing oneself and finding 
oneself are symbiotically related. But John D. Cox reminds us that the play deliberately 
sets the issue of authenticity in quotation marks. He writes: ‘What is comically doubted 
in Love’s Labor’s Lost, then, is not knowledge itself, as in skepticism, but human 
beings’ (especially young men’s) ability to know themselves – that is, to understand 
their fallibility, the restrictions of their social perspective, . . . [and] their obligations to 
others.’174 In successive scenes, claims Cox, the lovers in the play fail to realise their 
own deficiencies and shortcomings, and thus reveal the ease with which human beings 
indulge in acts of self-deception. 
  Discovering and preserving individual sincerity in the Renaissance was as much 
about being alert to simulation and hypocrisy as it was about speaking truthfully from 
the soul. The complexity of the issue of sincerity is documented in the work of Francis 
Bacon. He writes: ‘The discovery of a man’s self by the tracts of his countenance is a 
great weakness and betraying.’175 He continues to argue that inauthentic feigning is 
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dangerous because ‘it depriveth a man of one of the principal instruments for action; 
which is trust and belief.’176 He outlines three main forms of self-deception:    
 
There be three degrees of this hiding and veiling of a man’s self. The first: 
closeness, reservation, and secrecy, when a man leaveth himself without 
observation or without hold to be taken what he is. The second: dissimulation, 
in the negative, when a man lets fall signs and arguments that he is not that he 
is. And the third: simulation, in the affirmative, when a man industriously and 
expressly feigns and pretends to be that he is not.177 
 
An individual may slide between all three categories, Bacon explains. It is not just 
conscious dissemblers or individuals deliberately manipulating their identities who are 
recognised as being insincere. Bacon also notes the different gradations of 
inauthenticity, from a lack of self-awareness to total self-feigning. As Heller notes, 
Bacon shows that ‘if we constantly adjust our principles and practices to “other people”, 
without ever asking whether they are right and without ever seeking to realize ourselves 
in our principles and practice, then the separation of appearance and essence must 
follow.’178 This gap between inward self and outward identity produces a number of 
ontological and epistemological anxieties, so much so that it becomes almost impossible 
to determine the boundaries of authenticity. Once again, the mingling of authenticity 
and inauthenticity is stressed when Bacon writes: ‘it is a good shrewd proverb of the 
Spaniard, Tell a lie and find a troth; as if there were no way of discovery but by 
simulation.’179  
 Montaigne is also deeply interested in the notion of authenticity and, like Dyke, 
he is aware of the complexity of the issue. Montaigne’s idea of ‘authentic’ selfhood 
does not equate to straightforward integrity or self-truthfulness. He acknowledges that 
genuine self-understanding does not involve resorting to a fixed or immutable identity. 
In ‘On Three Kinds of Social Discourse’ he writes: ‘Life is a rough, irregular process 
with a multitude of forms. It is to be no friend of yourself - and even less master of 
yourself - to be a slave endlessly following yourself, so beholden to your 
predispositions that you cannot stray from them or bend them’ (pp. 922-3). Montaigne 
stresses this difference even more intently when he writes: ‘To keep ourselves to the 
bonds of necessity to one single way of life is to be, but not to live’ (p. 922). The kind 
of authentic ‘living’ that Montaigne endorses is precarious and vulnerable because it 
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involves being true to oneself in a deeper and more profound sense. It also involves an 
acceptance of the ambiguities and messy inconsistencies that form human existence. 
Montaigne’s understanding of the baffling changeability of men’s choices, desires and 
qualities allows him to be radically self-reflective in his own writing: ‘I, who am 
monarch of the subject which I treat and not accountable for it to anyone, do not for all 
that believe everything I say. Sometimes my mind launches out with paradoxes which I 
mistrust and with verbal subtleties that make me shake my head’ (p. 1068). And yet, in 
spite of subjective ‘dissension and discord’ (p. 979), Montaigne repeatedly emphasises 
the importance of authentically becoming oneself. In an astonishing prefiguration of 
Nietzsche’s idea of eternal recurrence,180 Montaigne writes: ‘If had to live again, I 
would live as I have done; I neither regret the past nor fear the future’ (p. 920). 
According to Nietzsche, an individual’s willed succession of each moment of time is the 
only way to overcome the scattered possibilities of human existence. Zarathustra 
declares: ‘To redeem that which has passed away and to re-create all “It was” into a 
“Thus I willed it!” – that alone should I call redemption.’181 Montaigne’s penetrating 
grasp of the particularities of his existence strikes a chord with Zarathustra’s wilful 
desire to relive every moment of being. 
 The authenticity that Montaigne champions in the Essays had important 
consequences for his thoughts on human ethics. Montaigne suggests that personal and 
ethical direction comes from within: ‘Provided that he listen to himself there is no one 
who does not discover in himself a form entirely his own, a master form which 
struggles against his education’ (p. 914). In his essay ‘Montaigne on Moral Philosophy 
and the Good Life’, J. B. Scheenwind argues that ‘[Montaigne] constructed an indirect 
and quite novel mode of exemplarity. Its key feature is that each person can and should 
find his own guidance within himself.’182 For existentialists, to live ethically and 
authentically, human beings must assume the ambiguity of their existence. Montaigne 
too is suspicious of normative ethics and prescriptive morality, and instead posits a 
more open and personal notion of self-governance: ‘We must establish an inner model 
to serve as a touchstone of our actions, by which we at times favour ourselves or flog 
ourselves’ (p. 911). Human beings, according to Montaigne, are endowed with a 
personal, intuitive grasp of morality. This idea develops more fully in the eighteenth 
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century, especially in the work of Rousseau. But the Renaissance is also an important 
intellectual source for what Taylor dubs ‘the ethic of authenticity’.183 With heavy 
existential overtones, Taylor offers a definition of this ethic: ‘Being true to myself 
means being true to my own originality, and that is something only I can articulate and 
discover. In articulating it, I am also defining myself. I am realising a potentiality that is 
properly my own.’184 Montaigne’s reflexive self-awareness and explicit suggestion that 
morality is inwardly anchored proves that these ideas were very much part of early 
modern thinking. In what sounds like an extremely modern ethic of the self, he writes: 
‘I live from day to day; and, saving your reverence, I live only for myself’ (p. 934). The 
culture of authenticity was as important in the Renaissance as it is to our current debates 
about subjectivity and selfhood.  
 
 
The Self in Crisis: Early Modern Versions of Existential Angst 
 
The experience of angst has a pivotal place in existentialist thought. Heidegger refers to 
it as a mental state which ‘provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping 
Dasein’s primordial totality of being.’185  By this he means that in a state of angst man 
recognises the nothingness that is at the heart of being. He becomes aware that there is 
no essential core of being, no ontological safe-ground. The experience is agonising and 
traumatic and often pushes an individual to the point of self-destruction. As a result, a 
person will endeavour to avoid the feeling of angst by fleeing into bad faith. But, at the 
same time, angst has a capacity to make man feel ‘individualised’. In a strange and 
paradoxical way, the experience of self-crisis produced by angst is also vivifying and   
exhilarating because it is a condition which discloses an individual’s existential 
potentiality. In moments of angst, one’s public persona or socially identified self melts 
away and leaves behind pure, contingent, subjective possibility - an ultimate freedom to 
shape the significance of one’s own life. George Goodwin’s Automachia, or the Self-
Conflict of a Christian is an extremely important early modern prefiguration of 
existential angst: 
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My Selfe at-once I both displease and please: 
Without my Selfe my Selfe I faine would sease: 
For, my too-much of Mee, mee much annoyes; 
And my Selfe’s Plentie my poore Selfe destroyes. 
Who seeks mee in Mee, in mee shall not finde 
Mee as my Selfe: Hermaphrodite, in minde 
I am at-once Male, Female, Neuter: yet 
What e’er  I am, I am not Mine (I weet):  
I am not with my Selfe (as I conceive) 
Wretch that I am; my Selfe my Selfe deceive: 
Unto my Selfe, my Selfe my Selfe betray: 
I from my Selfe banish my Selfe away: 
My Selfe agree not with my Selfe a iot: 
Know not my Selfe; I have my Selfe forgot: . . . 
I can not live with nor without my Selfe.186  
 
Eric Langley observes that Goodwin is ‘not simply making manifest an internal 
discordance, but allowing geminative rhetoric to structure ontological awareness and 
provide structure for formative reflexivity.’187 The manically anaphoric phrase ‘my 
Selfe’ that punctuates almost every line not only mirrors the poet’s obsessive self-
absorption, but also creates a ‘paradoxical dynamic of oscillatory presence and 
absence’.188 The crucial lines are: ‘Who seeks mee in Mee, in mee shall not finde / Mee 
as my Selfe’. Goodwin’s hermaphroditic self is neither total presence nor total absence. 
When Sartre writes that angst ‘means that man is always separated by a nothingness 
from his essence and that ‘the self . . . exists in the perpetual mode of detachment from 
what is,’ he suggests that, at its most profound level, angst reveals the self to be an 
ultimate nothingness.189 Yet it is at this point of realisation that an individual feels most 
himself. Goodwin’s chronic self-reflexivity discloses the ontological nothingness at the 
heart of being. He is like a Renaissance version of Dostoevsky’s Underground Man. ‘To 
be excessively conscious is a disease, a real, full-blown disease,’ cries the Underground 
Man as he battles with his volatile and deeply conflicting emotions.190 For both 
Goodwin and Dostoevsky’s notorious malcontent, self-laceration is perversely 
enjoyable, because it has an individualising power. In both texts, genuine existential 
                                                            
186 George Goodwin, Automachia, or the Self-Conflict of a Christian, trans. Josuah Sylvester (London: 
Printed by Melch Bradwood for Edward Blovnt, 1607), n. pag. 
187 Eric Langley, Narcissism and Suicide in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 239. 
188 Ibid., p. 245. 
189 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 59. 
190 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from the Underground and The Double, trans. Ronald Wilks (London: 
Penguin, 2009), p.  6. 
  54 
trauma and disingenuous histrionics seem to cancel one another out at one moment, and 
to intensify each other’s effect at the next. In his extreme self-reflexivity, Goodwin’s 
interiority mingles real suffering and melodramatic self-indulgence. 
 Like Goodwin, Shakespeare was fascinated by the dramatisation of the self in 
crisis. According to Barker, rather than fixing selfhood in conventional models, 
Shakespeare’s characters enact ‘a dispersal of self among patterns of likeness – 
comparison – and representation’.191 Barker draws attention to the deeply troubling 
deracination of selfhood in Macbeth’s reflection, ‘To know my deed ’twere best not 
know myself’ (II.ii.71). With action no longer functioning as a way of affirming 
identity, Macbeth’s deed splits off the knowing self from the self that is known. There is 
a whole range of other examples in Shakespeare’s plays where subjectivity and social 
identity seem to be torn away from each other. Despairing over Rosaline, Romeo says: 
‘I have lost myself. I am not here. / This is not Romeo; he’s some other where’ (Romeo 
and Juliet, I.i.190-1). As Troilus watches Cressida’s betrayal, he declares: ‘I will not be 
myself, nor have cognition / Of what I feel. I am all patience’ (Troilus and Cressida, 
V.ii.62-3). This total rejection of selfhood is a very unsettling statement, which ramifies 
Cressida’s earlier question: ‘Who shall be true to us, / When we are so unsecret to 
ourselves?’ (III.ii.113-4). Again and again, Shakespeare challenges and rejects 
normative structures of identity. Reflecting on the character of Kent in King Lear, 
Barker argues that  
 
disguise is more than a convention here; it is a necessity and, paradoxically, a 
form of being, both more and less than usual. He can only be what, as it were, 
he truly is, by not being himself . . . . Simulation and dissimulation are 
structural to Lear’s representations, and especially to its thus damaged capacity 
to represent the authentic and the individual.192  
 
With characters such as Kent or the Duke in Measure for Measure suspending the 
revelation of their identity for as long as possible, and with others uttering such aporetic 
remarks as ‘I am not what I am’ (Othello, I.i.65; Twelfth Night, III.i.132), we are 
repeatedly confronted with selves which are dislocated from what they are. In short, for 
Shakespeare, selfhood is more accurately articulated as the displacement of identity. 
Two stanzas of this enigmatic poem ‘The Phoenix and Turtle’ provide an even more 
succinct confirmation of Shakespeare’s interest in anguished subjectivity: 
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Property was thus appalled 
That the self was not the same. 
Single nature’s double name 
Neither two nor one was called. 
 
Reason, in itself confounded, 
Saw division grow together 
To themselves, yet either neither, 
Simple were so well compounded  
     (‘The Phoenix and the Turtle’, lines 37-44) 
 
Ryan argues that these lines imply that ‘the self, far from possessing a “single nature”, 
is a diverse, discontinuous entity, and thus a scandalous affront to the belief that a 
person’s distinctive quality - what makes them different - is a fixed, inalienable 
“property” that they own.’193 For Shakespeare and existentialists, the existing self 
struggles in the gap between subjective loss and subjective realisation. At moments of 
crisis, Shakespeare’s characters become ‘unidentical’ with themselves, radically split 
off from the singular social identity they had previously thought of as their ‘true’ self.  
 As well as angst, existentialist writers have devoted much attention to other 
liminal human experiences such as death, nausea and boredom. Our moods and 
intuitions, they claim, are more accurate and revealing than conceptual knowledge. But 
long before Sartre asserted that individuals have an intuitive knowledge of ‘the 
phenomenon of being’ or that ‘being will be disclosed to us by some kind of immediate 
access’,194 Renaissance writers were experimenting with the same ideas. In Spira 
Respirans: Or, The Way to the Kingdom of Heaven by the Gates of Hell; In an 
Extraordinary Example, Francesco Spira describes his near-death experience: 
 
Then was I struck with an exceeding Agony and Terror on my Soul, by the 
fearful Apprehension of Imminent Death, my Conscience being awakned, 
and I seeing my unpreparedness for it. Then was I seized with pale Despair, 
then was I filled with that Anguish, which I think it impossible for me to 
make the unexperienced conceive the like of. . . . [I] have suffered a total 
Dissolution, my Mind being then capable of nothing but my Sorrow.195 
 
With great candour, Spira documents how his experience of ‘the greatness of the 
                                                            
193 Kiernan Ryan, Shakespeare’s Comedies (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 263. 
194 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 4.  
195 Francesco Spira, Spira Respirans: Or, The Way to the Kingdom of Heaven by the Gates of Hell; In an 
Extraordinary Example (London: T. Stowe, 1695), p. 9. 
  56 
affections of the mind’ finally lead to a religious epiphany.196 In Heidegger’s mind, 
death is ‘one’s ownmost possibility’.197 As the ultimate limit of human existence, death 
thus functions as a means of individuation and becomes the very stuff of existential 
authenticity. Like Isabella’s observation that ‘The sense of death is most in 
apprehension’ (Measure for Measure, III.i.76), Spira’s explanation of how he comes to 
live in relation to the prospect of his own death strikes an important chord with 
existentialism. But perhaps even more striking is the fact that Spira’s writing provides 
evidence of an emerging existentialist vocabulary in the Renaissance. Words and 
phrases like ‘despair’, ‘anguish’, ‘the apprehension of death’, and ‘the manners of 
being’ punctuate the whole of his text. The wording and vocabulary of this early 
modern work thus undermine Ferry’s argument that ‘If . . . some poets of the period 
held conceptions of internal experience comparable to those implied by our language 
about an inner life or a real self, they did not have our ways of phrasing them.’198 On 
the contrary, early modern thinkers and writers were using the same existentialist 
language to describe their most intimate existential experiences. ‘There can be no 
doubt’, writes Udo Thiel, ‘that self-consciousness and personal identity in the form in 
which they are so widely discussed today originate in the rich debates of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’.199 Anthony Low goes even further, provocatively 
arguing that ‘there was nothing altogether new in the stunning early-modernist sense of 
a vast, inner world of the self that is exemplified most famously in Hamlet’, because 
‘consciousness of an inner self has always been an aspect of human experience.’200  
 There is more evidence of an early modern understanding of death in a 
philosophical sense in Montaigne’s essay, ‘To philosophize is to learn how to die’. 
Montaigne is frank about the realities of human finitude: ‘The end of the course is 
death. It is the objective necessarily within our sights. If death frightens us how can we 
go one step forward without anguish? For ordinary people the remedy is not to think 
about it; but what brutish insensitivity can produce so gross a blindness?’ (p. 92). He 
asks: ‘How can we ever rid ourselves of thoughts of death or stop imagining that death 
has us by the scruff of the neck at every moment?’ (p. 95). Death, Montaigne reasons, is 
an unavoidable part of life, and although human beings may try to flee from the anguish 
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produced by death, they must realise that ‘To practise death is to practise freedom’ (p. 
96). This argument put forward by Montaigne and his association of death with freedom 
is almost identical to Heidegger’s later theory. Indeed, it is perhaps Montaigne who 
articulates the notion more succinctly. He writes: ‘Death is one of the attributes you 
were created with; death is a part of you; you are running away from yourself; this 
being you enjoy is equally divided between death and life’ (p. 103). Montaigne’s 
thoughts in this essay constitute another compelling example of early modern interest in 
the notion of existential angst. 
 Montaigne has a skill for lucidly expressing difficult existential ideas. Take, for 
example, the following passage from the essay, ‘Our emotions get carried away 
beyond us’: 
 
We are never ‘at home’: we are always outside ourselves. . . . Whoever 
would do what he has to do would see that the first thing he must learn is to 
know what he is and what is properly his. And whoever does know himself 
never considers external things to be his; above all other things, he loves 
and cultivates himself. (p. 11)  
 
Montaigne is describing here the inherent self-alienation human beings experience 
when they reflect on their own subjectivity. Heidegger’s describes a similar sensation 
and employs the same terminology in Being in Time: ‘In anxiety one feels “uncanny”. 
Here the particular indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, 
comes proximally to expression: the “nothing and nowhere”. But here “uncanniness” 
also means “not being at home” [das Nichtzuhause-sein].’201 It seems that, in some 
cases, Renaissance thinkers articulate their thoughts on fundamental existentialist ideas 
in a more accurate and more intelligible way than existentialists themselves. As I shall 
argue in the next chapter, an awareness of the form and language of philosophy is an 
area of common interest in both Renaissance and existentialist thought.  
 
 
The Self as a Project: Renaissance Self-Becoming 
 
Pico della Mirandola’s On the Dignity of Man (1486) has often been regarded as the 
manifesto of Renaissance humanism. Stevie Davies, like many critics, has concluded 
that ‘it pours out the philosopher’s delight in his conclusion that man is free as air to be 
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whatever he likes, making him potentially not just the equal but the superior of any 
other created being.’202 This is one of the memorable passages from the text, and one 
many critics cite as evidence of Pico’s humanistic philosophy: 
 
Therefore [God] took up man, a work of indeterminate form; and placing 
him at the midpoint of the world, He spoke to him as follows:  
 ‘We have given to thee, Adam, no fixed seat, no form of thy very own, 
no gift particularly thine, that thou mayest feel as thine own, have as thine 
own, possess thine own the seat, the form, the gifts which thou thyself shalt 
desire. A limited nature in other creatures is confined within the laws 
written down by Us. In conformity with thy free judgement, in whose hands 
I have placed thee, thou art confined by no bounds; and thou wilt fix limits 
of nature for thyself. I have placed thee at the center of the world, that from 
there thou mayest more conveniently look around and see whatsoever is in 
the world. Neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal have 
We made thee. Thou, like a judge appointed for being honourable, art the 
moulder and maker of thyself; thou mayest sculpt thyself into whatever 
shape thou dost prefer.203   
 
Pico’s intellectual and philosophical curiosity in this text is much more complex and 
radical than many critics have suggested. Ernst Cassirer argues that for Pico ‘It is not 
being that prescribes once and for all the lasting direction which the mode of action will 
take; rather, the original direction of action determines and places being’, and therefore 
On the Dignity of Man constitutes a prefiguration of the existentialist mantra ‘existence 
precedes essence’.204 According to Dollimore, Pico’s work is important because it is 
evidence of anti-essentialist thought in the Renaissance, proof that Renaissance thinkers 
understood that man is made ‘without a fixed identity’.205 But Pico is not an anti-
essentialist: he is a proto-existentialist. In this passage, he emphasises the individual’s 
capacity to ‘sculpt’ and ‘mould’ their own existence. Paul J. W. Miller accurately 
observes that there is an uncanny resemblance to modern theories of subjectivity in 
Pico’s work: ‘The most remarkable contribution he makes is the notion that the root of 
man’s excellence and dignity lies in the fact that man is the maker of his own nature. 
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Man may be what he wishes to be; he makes himself what he chooses.’206 He goes on to 
argue that in Pico’s philosophy ‘[Man] gives himself his nature, as a sculptor gives form 
to a statue. This does not mean that man is an absolute creator of himself, for the 
making activity of man operates upon potencies which are already given.’207 Pico 
suggests that an individual must negotiate the creation of his own existential self. It is 
not surprising, then, that Pico’s iconic text resonates profoundly with Sartre’s 
Existentialism and Humanism, in which the twentieth-century philosopher claims: ‘Man 
simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills, 
and as he conceives himself after already existing - as he wills to be after that leap 
towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself.’208 Of 
course, although the passage from Pico quoted above certainly seems to promote an 
anti-essentialist view of man, it would be misleading to suggest that Pico was part of a 
subversive, anti-essentialist tradition. He still thinks of man, society and the cosmos in 
statified terms, as specifically positioned in the Renaissance chain of being. In many 
ways, he is still a conventional essentialist thinker. But he anticipates the existentialist 
view that human subjectivity is realised through action and interaction with the world. 
Referring directly to the passage from Pico above, Taylor observes that it ‘seems to 
prepare the way, even while remaining within the Renaissance Platonic order of ontic 
logos, for a later decisive break with it. It seems to prepare a way for a stage where the 
ends of human life will no longer be defined in relation to a cosmic order at all, but 
must be discovered (or chosen) within.’209 
 As we saw in his explanation of the way man must ‘cultivate himself’ (p. 11), 
Montaigne was clearly another early modern thinker interested in the idea of self-
becoming. Although Grady implicitly recognises the ‘existential’ subjectivity that lies at 
the heart of the Essays, his analysis does not extend far enough to show how Montaigne 
is specifically interested in the idea of self-becoming, which can be seen in Montaigne’s 
famous description of his frustratingly fluctuating self: 
 
I am unable to stabilise my subject: it staggers confusedly along with a natural 
drunkenness. I grasp it as it is now, at this moment when I am lingering over it. I 
am not portraying being but becoming: not a passage from one age to another . . 
. but from day to day, from minute to minute. I must adapt this account of 
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myself to the passing hour. I shall perhaps change soon, not accidentally but 
intentionally. (pp. 907-8) 
 
Montaigne’s selfhood is precariously in flux because it is subject to the volatilities of 
the external world. Yet it is also something which he has the power to change 
‘intentionally’. Montaigne thus regards himself as an active participant in the process of 
existing. He recognises his own individual power to shape his subjectivity. As Holbrook 
observes, ‘Montaigne repeatedly insists on the preeminent importance of this project of 
becoming oneself. It is a project . . . because of the array and tenacity of the forces 
seeking to draw one away from one’s true self - to tempt one into the sin of self-
forgetting.’210  Selfhood, according to Montaigne, is a constant and turbulent striving.  
 In Being and Nothingness, Sartre claims that ‘each person is an absolute choice of 
self from the standpoint of a world of knowledges and techniques which this choice 
both assumes and illumines.’211 Human beings can surpass and reformulate these 
‘knowledges and techniques’ by realising their existential freedom. This is the core of 
Sartre’s concept of human agency: individuals can make the world mean something to 
them. This is an idea that is also absolutely crucial in the Renaissance. Again and again, 
early modern thinkers and writers implore their readers to engage actively in the process 
of self-becoming. Sugimura observes that there is a special correlation between 
Renaissance Stoicism and ‘its modern cousin, existentialism.’212 In Stoicism, as in 
existentialism, selfhood and identity are constructed through choice, through an active 
engagement with the surrounding world. Edmund Calamy’s The Monster of Sinful Self-
Seeking; Anatomized., Together with A Description of the Heavenly and Blessed Selfe-
Seeking is an excellent example of this. He writes: 
 
Qu. What is this heavenly and blessed selfe-seeking?  
Ans. To understand this aright, is a point of great concernment. For the more 
we know of this Divine selfe-seeking, the more we will shun and abhor the 
sinfull self-seeking. . . . He that denyeth his sinfull selfe most, seeketh himselfe 
most. He that hates himselfe as corrupted by Adams fall, and seeketh the utter 
ruine and extirpation of the old Adam within him, this man doth truly love 
himself. This is divine self-seeking, to kill thy sins, that thy sins may not kill 
thy soule.213 
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The phrase ‘selfe-seeking’ sounds like a contradiction. How can you seek yourself? For 
this to be possible, there must be a dimension of consciousness that makes one capable 
of self-differentiation. True ‘selfe-seeking’ is presented by Calamy not as aggressive or 
heroic individualism but as something which needs to be asserted against such forces. 
Those human beings, he tells us, who deny and reject their inauthentic sinful ways, in so 
doing actualise their authentic inner self.  
 Jacques Abbadie’s religious treaty The Art of Knowing One-Self: or, An Enquiry 
into the Sources of Morality (first English translation published in 1695) is another 
example of a Renaissance text which considers self-creation, self-stylisation and self-
experimentation to be ethical imperatives. By claiming that man must be ‘a Lover of 
himself’,214 Abbadie saw how moral behaviour could stem from a realisation of one’s 
existential responsibilities. Like Calamy and Donne, he was also aware that dangerous 
and corrupted forms of self-love threaten the process of authentic self-becoming. He 
recognised and denounced the dark side of individualism and its tendency to devalue 
human life by making it narrower and poorer in meaning. Nevertheless, Abbadie 
continues to see the benefits of taking care of oneself, writing: ‘as Self-love is the 
general Source of those Motives which determine our Heart, so ’tis Self-love, as it looks 
towards Eternity, that makes all the strength we have to raise ourselves above the 
Confines of the World.’215 Consciousness, as a way of relating to one’s own self, was 
deeply imbedded in the idea of ethics in the early modern period. Thiel points out that 
the words ‘consciousness’ and ‘conscience’ are etymologically related (deriving from 
the Latin ‘conscientia’). In the seventeenth century, the term ‘conscience’ shifted from 
meaning knowledge shared with someone else (God) and ‘came to be understood in a 
self-relating sense.’216 Early modern thinkers such as Abbadie recognised that human 
beings have the capacity to ethically assess their selves and their actions, and their 
writings support Donald R. Wehrs’ claims that early modern individuals demonstrated 
‘an ethical responsiveness to lived, felt experience.’217 
 It is worth commenting on another of Pico’s texts in order to assess how 
important the ideas of self-becoming and Christian self-becoming were in the 
Renaissance. In Being and the One Pico attempts to show that the distinction between 
God and human beings hinges on the difference between the transitive and the 
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predicative senses of the verb ‘to be’. Pico revises the neoplatonist view that God is an 
entity that is prior to being and is therefore incompatible with being. Instead, Pico 
argues that God is pure being: he is a mode of existence that does not participate in the 
process of being. He uses the relationship between being and non-being to explain his 
point:  
 
Being has the aspect of a concrete noun. Being, and that which is, are the 
same in meaning. This word existence [esse] seems to be the abstract form 
of the preceding terms. That which participates existence is called being 
[ens], just as that which light [lux] is called luminous, and that which has the 
act of seeing [ipsum videre] is called seeing [videns]. If we should look at 
this exact signification of being, we shall deny being not only to what is not, 
and to what is nothing, but to that which is to such a degree that it is 
existence [ipsum esse], which is of itself and from itself, and by 
participation in which all things are.218 
 
Pico here articulates a distinction between being and existence. God is different from 
human beings because human beings exist only by virtue of their own act of existing. 
They actualise their existence by participating in it. Being is thus an achievement: it is 
something that is brought about by man himself and involves the full realisation of his 
formal nature, which has been bestowed on him by God. So Pico radically reverses the 
neoplatonist contention that God is beyond the realms of human understanding. God is 
not unknowable because he is beyond being. On the contrary, Pico asserts that 
individuals’ thoughts and actions are expressions of God. 
 Pico’s philosophical/theological writings strike a chord with Christian 
existentialism and most notably with the work of Søren Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard, 
becoming ‘religious’ or the quest for a profound relationship with God is intimately 
bound up with the difficult task of becoming an authentic individual. For Pico, man 
participates in and is drawn to the life of God through divine grace. It is not surprising, 
then, that both Pico and Kierkegaard celebrate the figure of Abraham as the father of 
true Christian faith. Reflecting on how Abraham transcends conventional morality, Pico 
writes: ‘The wise Abraham was the first founder of the true religion, the first to free 
himself from the law of nature and to meditate upon the divine law, the first to urge men 
to worship one God, the first to try to drive away the darkness and error and to declare 
war upon the evil demons who are called the princes of darkness.’219 Likewise, 
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Kierkegaard claims that Abraham’s decision to sacrifice his only son to God epitomises 
the wholehearted, passionate commitment to a singular cause that is required for true 
religious experience. He achieves what Kierkegaard calls ‘a teleological suspension of 
the ethical’.220 But Abraham’s position is paradoxical, because justifying and taking 
responsibility for one’s actions is inextricably tied to the moral expectations of the 
public. Kierkegaard argues that Abraham’s existential singularity at the moment he 
makes the decision to sacrifice his son means that he achieves a kind of absolute 
responsibility that transcends normative ethics. This new existential responsibility 
allows Abraham to enter into a deeper and more spiritually intense relationship with 
God. Of course, Pico and Kierkegaard do not offer identical theological arguments. 
However, both thinkers suggest that the experience of divinity, and the ethical 
implications of this experience, are integral to of the subjective experience of being 
human.  
 
 
The Self and Others: The Ethical Dimension of Existence  
 
With individualism emerging as a new phenomenon in the Renaissance, many writers 
began to express concerns about the effect of changing human relations on society. 
William Harrison chronicled these changes, writing: ‘euerie function and seuerall 
vocation striueth with other, which of them should have all the water of commoditie run 
into hir owne cesterne.’221 He later adds: ‘the ground of the parish is gotton vp into a 
few mens hands, yea sometimes into the tenure of one, two or three, whereby the rest 
are compelled, either to be hired seruants vnto the other, or else to beg their bread in 
miserie from doore to doore.’222 The pamphleteer Robert Crowley raises similar 
concerns: 
 
. . . this is a Citye  
in name, but, in dede, 
It is a packe of people  
that seke after meede;  
For Officers and al 
do seek their own gaine, 
But for the wealth of the commons  
not one taketh pain. 
An hell with out order, 
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I maye it well call, 
Where euerye man is for him selfe, 
And no manne for all.223 
 
Robert Weimann uses these examples to show the dominance of the new model of 
individuality. He writes: ‘The point that has to be made is not, of course, that acquisitive 
and competitive attitudes had already displaced the communal spirit but that the latter - 
existing side by side with the new - became increasingly vulnerable to the pressures of 
the former’.224 John Stow’s worries about the way the civic ethos was being threatened 
by the commercialisation of communal life and the rise of the urban environment are 
clearly apparent in A Survey of London. In one passage, Stow vividly describes the 
repeated desecration of a statue of the Virgin Mary on one of London’s bustling 
thoroughfares. He notes that although ‘proclamation was made, that whoso would 
betray the doers, should have forty crowns’, the city authorities struggled to prevent 
further acts of vandalism.225 In another chapter, Stow criticises the greed of private 
land-owners keen to fence off common land for their own purposes. He cites Edward 
Hall’s recollection of the social action taken by a group of citizens in response to such 
practices. The erection of tall hedges around sections of land on the outskirts of the city, 
claims Hall,  
 
so grieved the Londoners, that suddenly . . . a great number of the city 
assembled themselves in a morning, and a turner, in a fool’s coat, came 
crying through the city, ‘Shovels and spades! Shovels and spades!’ So many 
of the people followed, that it was a wonder to behold; and within a short 
space all the hedges about the city were cast down, and the ditches filled up, 
and everything made plain, such was the diligence of these workmen. The 
King’s council hearing of this assembly, came to the Gray Friars, and sent 
for the mayor and council of the city to know the cause, which declared to 
them the injury and annoying done to the citizens and to their liberties, 
which though they would not seek disorderly to redress, yet the commonalty 
and young persons could not be stayed thus to remedy the same.226  
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Angela Stock observes that ‘both the Survey and London drama sought to make 
Londoners self-conscious: conscious of their civic heritage and of ancient rights as well 
as responsibilities, but also conscious of the nature of their collective relationships.’227 
But for Stow, ‘stage-playing had become tainted by the habits of an emergent consumer 
culture . . . it was evidence of the lamentable decline of citizens’ participation in 
communal civic culture.’228 This nostalgic longing for a sense of community was often 
matched with a deep distrust of man’s individualistic and self-seeking behaviour. This 
idea is also articulated by David Abercromby in A Moral Discourse of the Power of 
Interest (1690), in which he argues: 
 
We have to rid our selves of the Tyranny and Slavery of self-interest, which yet 
we endeavour to clear our selves of before men, by a thousand protestations of 
our just and fair dealings, being asham’d to be thought concern’d for our selves 
in what we pretend to do meerly for others. This is the Vizard we put on in all 
our specious pretences to Honesty and Justice, left we are at last discovered to 
be what we really are, and will by no means own.229 
 
Abercromby urges his readers to reconsider the ‘specious pretences’ they use to 
disguise their individualistic ways. This mode of being, he argues, threatens to destroy 
the network of human relations which constitute society. Abercromby’s work supports 
Low’s claim that many early modern texts ‘illustrate significant turns in the history of 
individuality and subjectivity and their relations to community and society.’230  
 Touching on the tension between the individual and the absorbing social world in 
existentialist thought, John Macquarrie asks: ‘How do we reconcile the fact that 
existential analysis reveals the fundamentally communal character of existence with the 
equally plain fact that existentialist philosophers are in many cases individualists?’231 
The relationship between self and other is an important aspect of existential thinking. 
Whilst some writers such as Sartre suggest that the relationship is a site of conflict and 
claim that the objectifying power of other people’s perceptions renders human 
subjectivity problematic, others such as de Beauvoir and Buber argue that authentic and 
mutually respectful human relations are possible. The conflict between the 
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individualistic and the communal imperatives of human existence was also being 
debated at length in the Renaissance. Donne famously writes: ‘No man is an Iland, 
intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine; . . . Any 
mans death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde’.232 The well-known 
passage is freshly illuminated when considered alongside one of Sartre’s existentialist 
propositions: 
  
What we choose is always the better; and nothing can be better for us unless it 
is better for all. If, moreover, existence precedes essence and we will to exist at 
the same time that we fashion our image, that image is valid for all and for the 
entire epoch in which we find ourselves. Our responsibility is thus much 
greater than we had supposed, for it concerns mankind as a whole.233 
 
In existentialist thought - particularly in its Marxist variations - individualism has an 
important ethical dimension. Every human choice, Sartre tells us, is a choice for all. In 
Donne’s work we can discern an earlier prefiguration of the same idea. 
 Whilst some Renaissance thinkers were expressing concerns about the dangers of 
individualism, others were finding reason to mistrust public life. Montaigne repeatedly 
expresses a desire to protect his authentic individuality from the disingenuous lure of 
what existentialists would call the ‘They-Self’. Urging himself and his reader to break 
free from everyday entanglements, he writes: ‘let us loosen ourselves from the bonds 
that tie us to others’, and ‘let us disentangle ourselves from those violent traps which 
pledge us to other things and which distance us from ourselves’ (p. 269). The same 
indignant disapproval is found in Kierkegaard’s description of ‘the Public’ as ‘an 
abstract void which is everything and nothing . . . the most dangerous of powers. . . . 
More and more individuals, owing to their bloodless indolence will aspire to being 
nothing at all in order to become the public’.234 For both Montaigne and the 
existentialists, individuals lose their individualising sense of self when they become 
fixated with the abstractions, routines and common ideals of the public. But Montaigne 
also prefigures a very specific aspect of existentialist theory. In ‘On Solitude’ he writes: 
‘It is not enough to withdraw from the mob, not enough to go to another place: we have 
to withdraw from such attributes of the mob as are within us. It is our own self we have 
to isolate and take back into possession’ (p. 269). A mere withdrawal from society will 
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not suffice: individuals must rid themselves of their mental shackles and reaffirm their 
existential responsibilities. In another essay, Montaigne explicitly outlines the issue at 
stake: ‘I have enough to do to attend to matters which by nature belong to my own 
being without inviting in outsiders. Those who realise what they owe to themselves, and 
the great duties which bind themselves to themselves, discover that nature has made an 
ample enough charge’ (p. 1135). A similar concern is voiced by Ben Jonson in 
Discoveries, where he suggests that ‘Our whole life is like a Play: Wherein every man 
forgetfull of himselfe, is in travaile with expression of another. Nay, wee so insist in 
imitating others, as wee cannot (where it is necessary) returne to our selves . . . [we] 
make the habit of another nature, as it is never forgotten.’235 This criticism of human 
mimicry and imitation is echoed by William Hazlitt, when he writes: ‘We are something 
in ourselves, nothing when we try to ape others.’236 There is strong evidence that early 
modern thinkers were considering at length the social and existential ramifications of a 
new emphasis on the individual. Their concerns were diverse and divergent, but when 
they are placed alongside key passages from existentialist texts, their radically modern 
elements come to light.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The extent to which existentialism brought about a radical change in academic 
philosophy has been a key area of debate for both the movement’s original contributors 
and its subsequent commentators. John Wild argues that existentialist writers ‘engaged 
in a radical venture of reconstruction rendered necessary by the breakdown of modern 
philosophy.’237 Walter Kaufmann similarly describes existentialism as a revolutionary 
departure from previous modes of thought: ‘The refusal to belong to any school of 
thought, the repudiation of the adequacy of any body of beliefs whatever, and especially 
of systems, and a marked dissatisfaction with traditional philosophy as superficial, 
academic, and remote from life – that is the heart of existentialism.’238 These 
paradigmatic accounts show how existentialism has often been perceived as a 
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reactionary revolt against the traditional, institutionalised methods of philosophy. Such 
views are misleading for, as this chapter has shown, the origins of existentialism can be 
traced back to an important group of precursors, which include Socrates, Pico, 
Montaigne, and Shakespeare. 
 Renaissance writers were fascinated by the profoundly complex existentialist 
question: what does it mean to exist and live as a human being in the world? This 
question, of course, encompasses a whole range of other interrelated issues, such as the 
quest for authenticity, the problem of self-neglect, the loss of selfhood in public life, 
and the radical reflexivity of consciousness, all of which were of interest to various 
early modern thinkers. However, although the Renaissance pioneered many modern 
existentialist ideas about subjectivity and inwardness, it would be historically inaccurate 
to regard the proto-existentialism of the Renaissance and formally theorised 
existentialism of the twentieth century as identical. Taylor warns against the temptation 
to read writers like Montaigne anachronistically and prefers to refer to the early modern 
thinker as ‘a paradigm figure’.239 This passing reference to Thomas Kuhn’s theory of 
paradigm shifts helps us to reconsider the dialogue between fully-fledged existentialism 
and the emergence of embryonic existentialist ideas in the Renaissance. Kuhn’s work 
helped to explain why the scientific community experiences periodic changes when 
anomalies and inconsistencies challenge established assumptions.240 Instead of linear 
and continuous progression, he argued, paradigm shifts radically alter previously 
acquired knowledge and force scientists to think about antecedent information in 
completely different ways. Hugh Grady has used Kuhn’s work as a blueprint for a 
reconsideration of the way critical and aesthetic domains are formulated.241 The 
immediate advantage of thinking in terms of paradigms is that it allows for an 
understanding and appreciation of the flexible development of concepts and ideas. An 
understanding of the paradigmatic changes in human knowledge encourages a re-
examination of some of the more forward-looking aspects of Renaissance texts. When 
we look at the work of Shakespeare from our present-day perspective, we can recognise 
that it clearly resonates with existentialism in significant respects without aggressively 
or anachronistically appropriating him as a modern theorist of subjectivity.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LITERATURE AS PHILOSOPHY; PHILOSOPHY AS LITERATURE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the previous chapter has demonstrated, existentialism has important early modern 
roots. Fundamental existentialist ideas were beginning to take shape in the rapidly 
evolving intellectual culture of the Renaissance. Shakespeare, I contend, was a pivotal 
contributor to this emerging existentialist discourse. Building on this argument, this 
chapter will suggest that existentialist thinkers and Shakespeare share an interest in the 
intimate relationship between philosophy and literature or, to put it more precisely, 
Shakespeare and existentialists are attracted to the idea that philosophy and literature 
can be articulated together in a way that intensifies both forms of thought. 
Shakespeare’s manipulation of the terms ‘philosophy’ and ‘philosopher’, and his deep 
skepticism towards any single or strongly held point of view means that, in a broad and 
general sense, Shakespeare’s plays are philosophically charged. Of course, throughout 
his plays, he poses – implicitly and explicitly - many important philosophical questions, 
which include one of the most basic of all: ‘What is philosophy?’. But the polyphonic 
quality of dramatic form, the way Shakespeare’s plays give voice to a range of 
competing ideas, propositions and attitudes, ensures that not only does he dramatise 
fundamental philosophical questions, but he also indirectly questions the nature and 
validity of philosophical reflection itself. This element of Shakespeare’s drama 
resonates with existentialists’ concerns about the form of philosophy. One of the most 
innovative elements of existentialism was the way it brought to light the literariness of 
philosophical writing - its textuality, its manipulation of language, and its interest in 
metaphor and narrative. By breaking down traditional boundaries between the two, 
existentialists such as Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Camus, Beauvoir and Sartre explore the 
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mutually illuminating relationship between literature and philosophy. They use 
literature not just as a vehicle for philosophy, but also as a way to articulate more 
precisely the existential immediacy and sensuous experience of human beings as they 
live and act in the world. Engaging directly with Shakespeare’s work, many 
existentialists regard their Renaissance precursor as the master of intuitive existential 
drama. Shakespeare is an exceptionally important writer for many existentialist thinkers 
and his plays have had a tremendous influence on the development of key existentialist 
ideas. This chapter will argue that in their practical employment of philosophy in 
literature and the way their work brings to light the literary nature of philosophical ideas 
themselves, Shakespeare and existentialists allow the two forms of thinking to fuse, and 
thus produce an impact whose intensity is not apparent in either form alone.242  
 
 
Shakespeare as a Philosophical Thinker 
 
How profitable is it to read Shakespeare’s plays as sources of philosophical insight? The 
plays are undeniably full of probing ontological, metaphysical, epistemological and 
ethical questions. Many commentators have suggested that Shakespeare’s philosophical 
prowess is a fundamental reason for his continuing appeal. William Hazlitt finds in the 
dramatic life-force of the plays ‘the spirit of a poet and the acuteness of a 
philosopher.’243 Harold Bloom speaks of Shakespeare’s ‘cognitive acuity’.244 However, 
as Agnes Heller points out, the ‘dubious honorary title of philosopher’ cannot be 
conferred on Shakespeare simply because some of his characters express 
philosophically couched sentiments or because there is sufficient evidence to suggest 
that he engaged directly with the philosophical work of Machiavelli, Plato and 
Montaigne.245 Of course, Shakespeare does not dramatise a consistent or explicit 
philosophical creed or method; there is no clear-cut intellectual system underpinning his 
plays and poems. As John D. Cox puts it: ‘While Shakespeare’s esthetic thinking is not 
dogmatic, it is extraordinarily suggestive, and it enters fully into contemporary debate 
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about art, theater, illusion, how we know, and the enigmatic nature of being.’246 There is 
a philosophical impulse at work in his plays that can be broadly understood as 
‘existential’ in character. Instead of conceptual or propositional knowledge, 
Shakespeare investigates what Leon Harold Craig calls ‘experiential’ knowledge, a 
form of understanding gained through the experience of the existential intensities of 
human life.247 Shakespeare’s philosophical views or ideas are always concretely situated 
and expressed by characters embodied in the process of existing. It is his manipulation 
of dramatic form and poetic phrasing that creates and enhances his plays’ philosophical 
implications.  
 Before examining Shakespeare’s semantic expansion of the word ‘philosophy,’ it 
is worth briefly commenting on the principal meanings of the term in the Renaissance. 
In its strictest sense, the word ‘philosophy’ meant ‘natural philosophy’ or ‘science’ in 
early modern England.248 The Oxford English Dictionary explains that it originally 
referred to ‘a branch of knowledge that deals with the principles governing the material 
universe and perception of physical phenomena.’ Hamlet invokes this rational 
empiricism when he uses the term ‘philosophy’. As he swears his oath to the ghost, he 
says: ‘There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, / Than are dreamt of in your 
philosophy’ (I.v.165-6), and later in the play, just before the players arrive, he says: 
‘there is something in this more than natural if philosophy could find it out’ (II.ii.303-
5). However, Kiernan Ryan notes that Hamlet’s use of the term ‘is a gentle rebuke to 
those who believe that the phenomenal world can be rationally explained’, adding that 
‘the phrase “dreamt of” allows philosophy more imaginative and speculative scope than 
the rebuke entails.’249 This suggestion that Renaissance thinkers were pressing for a 
more expansive sense of the term ‘philosophy’ is supported by some of Montaigne’s 
reflections. In ‘An apology for Raymond Sebond’, Montaigne writes: ‘Philosophers can 
hardly be serious when they try to introduce certainty into Law by asserting that there 
are so-called Natural Laws, perpetual and immutable, whose essential characteristic 
consists in their being imprinted upon the human race.’250 He proposes a broader 
understanding of the term: ‘philosophy is the art which teaches us how to live’ (p. 183), 
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he suggests in an essay on the practices of educating children. This definition clearly 
resonates with a more modern and far-reaching sense of the word. By expanding the 
significance of the term, Montaigne implicitly suggests that it could also include other 
subdivisions of philosophy such as morality and ethics. This renegotiation of the 
boundaries of ‘philosophy’ is critical for Montaigne’s own philosophical project in The 
Essays, and one particular passage on the subject is worth quoting at length: 
 
Here is a pleasant thought: when the passions bring dislocation to our reason, 
we become virtuous; when reason is driven out by frenzy or by sleep, that 
image of death, we become prophets and seers. I have never been more 
inclined to believe Philosophy! It was pure enthusiasm - breathed into the spirit 
of philosophy by Truth herself - which wrenched from her, against her normal 
teaching, that the tranquil state of our soul, the quiet state, the sanest state that 
Philosophy can obtain for her, is not her best state. Our waking sleeps more 
than our sleeping; our wisdom is less wise than our folly; our dreams are worth 
more than our discourse; and to remain inside ourselves is to adopt the worst 
place of all. (p. 640) 
 
Madness has a particular aptitude for discovering truth. ‘Though this be madness yet 
there is method in’t’ (Hamlet, II.ii.202-3), says Polonius in an aside, echoing a similar 
idea to Montaigne’s. He continues: ‘a happiness that often madness hits on, which 
reason and sanity could not so prosperously be delivered of’ (II.ii.206-8).  Shakespeare, 
like Montaigne, saw that knowledge about the world could be uncovered by paradoxical 
or unconventional means. In philosophy, to borrow another of Polonius’ phrases, 
sometimes ‘indirections find directions out’ (II.i.63).  
 In the Renaissance, many writers expressed concerns about the dangers of 
philosophical abstraction. Montaigne writes: ‘even among men of intelligence 
philosophy means something fantastical and vain, without value or usefulness, both in 
opinions and practice. . . . It is a great mistake to portray Philosophy with a haughty, 
frowning, terrifying face, or as inaccessible to the young’ (p. 180). In Erasmus’s Praise 
of Folly, the narrator Folly mocks scholastic practices and speaks disparagingly of 
‘those soured individuals who are so wrapped up in their philosophic studies or some 
other serious, exacting affairs that they are old before they were ever young.’251 
Centuries after Montaigne and Erasmus, existentialist thinkers would similarly 
denounce dense theoreticism and recognise the gulf between philosophical abstractions 
and real, existential problems. Erasmus was particularly attracted to the idea of ethical, 
embodied subjectivity. In his work, as Donald R. Wehrs notes, ‘The reader is forced to 
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grasp ethical significance emerging naturally, spontaneously, “plainly visible to the 
eye” from evocations of lived experience.’252 Camus believed that any attempt to 
systematise the sensuous, particular, concrete realities of human existence jeopardised 
the ethical obligations that accompany a human being’s active involvement in the 
world. He wanted philosophy to be a personal, self-engaging endeavour that stems from 
a writer’s immediate experiences.253 Celebrating Aristotle’s work, Camus writes: ‘We 
know that the system, when it is worthwhile, cannot be separated from its author. The 
Ethics itself, in one of its aspects, is but a long and reasoned personal confession. 
Abstract thought returns at last to its prop of flesh.’254 Like existentialists, Montaigne 
preferred practical, personal philosophy, remarking that ‘When reason fails us, we make 
use of experience’ (p. 1207). Philosophy, in the form of abstract or generalised 
argument, is not fit for purpose.  
 In several plays, Shakespeare experiments with similar ideas. When Friar 
Laurence relays Romeo’s sentence of banishment, his response exemplifies 
Shakespeare’s scepticism about easy rationality and systematic thought: 
 
Friar. I’ll give thee armour to keep off that word— 
   Adversity’s sweet milk, philosophy, 
   To comfort thee though thou art banishèd. 
 Romeo.  Yet ‘banishèd’? Hang up philosophy! 
   Unless philosophy can make a Juliet, 
   Displant a town, reverse a prince’s doom, 
   It helps not, it prevails not. Talk no more.  
        (Romeo and Juliet, III.iii.54-60) 
 
Outraged by Claudio’s allegations of his daughter’s sexual infidelity, Leonato similarly 
reacts against stoic ideals in Much Ado About Nothing. Rejecting his brother’s 
‘counsel’, he says:  
 
 
I pray thee peace, I will be flesh and blood, 
For there was never yet philosopher 
That could endure the toothache patiently, 
However they have writ the style of gods, 
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And made a pish at chance and sufferance.   
(Much Ado About Nothing, V.i.34-8) 
 
Leonato and Romeo use the word philosophy as a synonym for stoic consolation, and 
this clearly illustrates the semantic slippage of the term in Shakespeare’s work. For 
Leonato and Romeo, philosophical patience is an unsustainable response to genuine 
human adversity.  
 In a number of his plays, Shakespeare brings to the fore the tension between 
philosophising and living. Concerns about the uses of philosophical reasoning arise in 
The Winter’s Tale when Polixenes and Perdita discuss the ‘streaked gillyvors, / Which 
some call nature’s bastards’ (IV.iv.82-3). Polixenes eloquently argues that art is a means 
of improving nature but, in doing so, his philosophising leads to abstraction. As Charles 
Martindale writes: ‘Polixenes neatly “deconstructs” the distinction between nature and 
art, but at the cost of making nature a concept too all-embracing to be of much 
philosophical use; Perdita gamefully defends the undeconstructed distinction by an 
appeal to common sense and common linguistic usage, and to her own values and 
experiences of life.’255 Layers of dramatic irony are deliberately built into the scene, but 
Stephen Orgel observes that in Polixenes’ violent response to his son’s fiancé 
Shakespeare makes the more quotidian point that ‘our opinions, even philosophical 
ones, are not invariably consistent . . . what we believe to be right for flowers we need 
not necessarily believe to be right for our children.’256 Neat philosophies and abstract 
generalisations, Shakespeare’s plays tell us, do not always respond adequately to the 
vicissitudes of real life.  
This renegotiation of the meaning of philosophy is also found in King Lear. 
Lear famously mistakes the madman Poor Tom for a philosopher and this dramatic 
technique usually elicits laughter from an audience. Once again, there is a shift in the 
meaning of the term ‘philosopher’. Lear first addresses Poor Tom as a natural 
philosopher by asking him: ‘What is the cause of thunder’ (xi.140). But when Lear then 
says ‘I’ll talk a word with this most learnèd Theban. / What is your study?’ (xi.142-3), 
he signals his wider understanding of Poor Tom as a philosopher of life to whom 
profound ethical and ontological questions can be addressed. In his essay 
‘Shakespeare’s Foolosophy’, Jonathan Bate claims that King Lear ‘moves from a 
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theoretical and philosophical inquiry into deep causes to a practical faith in the surface 
truth of human actions and a trust in the wisdom to be gained from immediate 
experience.’257 Lear finds a more readily accessible form of ‘philosophy’ in the 
ramblings and visceral torments of Poor Tom. As Bate notes, Shakespeare ‘always finds 
theory wanting in the face of action. He is more interested in how people perform than 
in what they profess. He was, after all, a performer himself.’258  
 Shakespeare’s apparent preference for real experience over theoretical 
propositions can also be discerned in Corin and Touchstone’s conversation about what 
constitutes ‘a good life’:   
 
Touchstone. Truly, shepherd, in respect of itself, it is a good life; but in 
respect that it is a shepherd's life, it is naught. In respect 
that it is solitary, I like it very well; but in respect that it is 
private, it is a very vile life. Now in respect it is in the 
fields, it pleaseth me well; but in respect it is not in the 
court, it is tedious. As it is a spare life, look you, it fits my 
humour well; but as there is no more plenty in it, it goes 
much against my stomach. Hast any philosophy in thee, 
shepherd? 
Corin. No more but that I know the more one sickens the worse 
at ease he is, and that he that wants money, means, and 
content is without three good friends; that the property of 
rain is to wet and fire to burn; that good pasture makes fat 
sheep; and that a great cause of the night is lack of the sun; 
that he that hath learned no wit by nature nor art may 
complain of good breeding or comes of a very dull 
kindred. 
Touchstone.   Such a one is a natural philosopher. 
      (As You Like It, III.ii.12-27) 
 
Touchstone’s punning use of the phrase ‘natural philosopher’ to refer to Corin as an 
imbecile - and poke fun at contemporary scientists in the process - suggests that 
Shakespeare was keen to challenge and deconstruct the traditional meaning of the word 
‘philosophy’. Touchstone’s philosophy is the equivocal, punning, paradoxical wisdom 
of the fool; Corin’s is the ‘natural’ wisdom of the uneducated but pragmatic common 
man. But Corin’s down-to-earth view of life is not entirely undermined by Touchstone’s 
sceptical relativism. Shakespeare implicitly suggests that there is something to be 
valued in Corin’s simple and unpretentious philosophy of life. Touchstone and Corin’s 
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exchange suggests that Shakespeare was not only sceptical about abstract philosophical 
contention, but also intrigued by different forms of thinking and reasoning.   
 Philosophy, whether it is in the form of natural science, stoic consolation or a 
more generalised approach to life, is treated sceptically by Shakespeare in his plays. He 
directly questions the validity of certain philosophical modes of thinking because of 
their tendency to abstract from existential experience. As Ryan explains, ‘it’s the 
creative aesthetic intelligence at work in the sensuous immediacies of form and phrase 
that forges the subsuming vision of the play, which defies accurate or complete 
translation into philosophical terms past or present.’259 This is a crucial point, for 
Shakespeare is an existential dramatist, not an existential philosopher. But the way his 
plays resist philosophical reduction may in fact render them all the more philosophically 
powerful. Quoting Stanley Cavell, John Joughin writes: 
 
Rather than regarding Shakespeare as a poor unwitting adjunct of reason or as 
somehow subsumed within its project, the dramatist’s open-ended resistance to 
conceptual control might finally turn out to be a far more crucial resource for 
critical thought. In this sense, we might say that Shakespeare unwittingly 
provides access to the ‘literary conditions of philosophical questioning 
itself’.260  
 
In a way that anticipates existentialists such as Camus and Sartre, Shakespeare’s use of 
dramatic form and language probes into the nature of philosophical enquiry. In 
Philosophers and Thespians, Freddie Rokem examines ‘how philosophers have tried to 
embrace thespian modes of expression, appropriating theatrical practices, within their 
own discursive fields’ and ‘how the philosophers’ thespian partners have frequently 
applied philosophical tools and modes of thinking in their own work.’261 Rokem argues 
that Shakespeare is attuned to the mutually illuminating relationship between the worlds 
of theatre and philosophy. Hamlet, Shakespeare’s most philosophically sensitive 
protagonist, is placed in a liminal position between both discourses: ‘He relies on the 
theatre to solve existential philosophical issues, whereas his own subjective meditations 
and thoughts about the meaning of life are frequently highly theatricalized.’262 The 
theatrum mundi trope is not ornamental for Shakespeare: it is a metaphor imbued with 
philosophical possibility.  
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 Shakespeare’s use of drama to explore the existential dimensions and dilemmas of 
human existence is complemented by Sartre’s interest in the way subjectivity is 
galvanised in the immediate moment of action. Drama, Sartre argues, shows how being 
is not rooted in essence but is created through an individual’s direct engagement with 
the world. The theatrical stage is the perfect place for demonstrating a microcosmic 
world of human freedom. As Sartre explains: 
 
Action, in the true sense of the word, is that of the character; there are no images 
in the theatre but the image of the act, and if one seeks the definition of the 
theatre one must ask what an act is, because the theatre can represent nothing but 
the act. Sculpture represents the form of the body; the theatre the act of this 
body. Consequently, what we want to recover when we go to the theatre is 
evidently ourselves, but ourselves, not as we are, more or less poor, more or less 
proud of our youth and our beauty; rather to discover ourselves as we act, as we 
work, as we meet difficulties, as we are men who have rules for these actions.263  
 
In What is Literature? Sartre speaks of his preference for ‘a theatre of situations’ rather 
than ‘a theatre of characters’.264 J. S. R. Goodlad’s claims that the objective of Sartre’s 
drama is to show ‘that there is no sense in life a priori. Life is nothing until it is lived. 
The individual must make sense of life by choosing what he will do and how he will 
live. The whole approach to existence, to “reality”, is an approach from inside – an 
approach from the point of view of the actor as opposed to that of the observer from 
without.’265 Camus similarly argues that the fleeting creation of character on stage is 
full of existential vitality and dynamism. The unfolding of dramatic action reveals how 
human existence moves from endless potentiality to immediate, embodied form. To 
demonstrate his point, Camus turns to Shakespeare. He observes that Shakespeare’s 
‘impulsive drama’ shows human existence actualised in the moment. The role of the 
actor fascinates Camus. The actor, he writes, ‘outlines or sculptures [his characters] and 
slips into their imaginary form, transfusing his blood into their phantoms.’266 Actor and 
character cannot be readily separated. Always and explicitly a human being in a state of 
flux, the actor epitomises the absurd by illustrating on stage ‘the suggestive truth that 
there is no frontier between what a man wants to be and what he is’.267 When an actor 
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finishes his performance, he may later reach for a glass and become Hamlet raising his 
cup once again. This leads Camus to a particularly arresting conclusion. He claims: ‘I 
should never really understand Iago unless I played his part’.268 Camus suggests that 
Iago, Shakespeare’s greatest enigma, can only be understood inwardly by the actor who 
takes up the role. ‘Knowing’ the character of Iago is an ontological rather than an 
epistemological problem.  
 Sartre’s and Camus’s emphasis on the philosophical dimension of theatrical 
performance helps shed light on the existential nature of Shakespeare’s plays. In 
Shakespearean Metaphysics, Michael Witmore argues that ‘Shakespeare valued 
immanence as a way of thinking about the very nature of being - locating the actor in 
the action, the player in the play.’269 He adds that this dramatisation of immanence is 
‘not an exercise in transcendence, but an attempt to unearth a new and different kind of 
materialism, one that is grounded in bodies but is emphatic in asserting the reality of 
their dynamic interrelations.’270 The argument that philosophical propositions, lemmas 
or dialogues cannot function in the same immediate way as the actions of real human 
bodies on stage is also put forward by Philip Davis. He writes:  
 
Shakespeare’s drama is indeed an original text or background script for the 
creation of life - an argument made not in the spirit of bardolatry, but on behalf 
of recognizing in the plays a genuine mental template for evolutionary 
creation, a linguistic equivalent to DNA. For, like DNA, the original text 
hidden within the workings of Shakespeare is a text not so much to be read or 
to be explained as to be activated in life form.271  
 
Existentialists found in Shakespeare an intuitive existential thinker and a master of 
instinctive philosophical literature. There is no tightly configured network of existential 
ideas underpinning Shakespeare’s plays - although there are some intriguing 
prefigurations of key concepts and ideas - but rather a more general existential impulse 
that draws out the ontological, ethical and political ramifications of human existence.  
 In her extensive work on the relationship between literature and philosophy, Iris 
Murdoch repeatedly refers to Shakespeare as a brilliant thinker. In an interview with 
Bryan Magee she remarks: ‘Think how much original thought there is in Shakespeare 
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and how divinely inconspicuous it is.’272 She makes a similar point in a later essay: ‘The 
pages of Shakespeare abound in free and eccentric personalities whose realities 
Shakespeare had apprehended and displayed as something quite separate from himself. 
He is the most invisible of writers, and in my sense of the word the most un-Romantic 
of writers.’273 By ‘un-Romantic’ Murdoch means that Shakespeare presents ‘a plurality 
of real persons more or less naturalistically presented in a large social scene, and 
representing mutually independent centres of significance which are those of real 
individuals.’274 Shakespeare’s drama gestures towards a real world inhabited by real 
people. It is on the border between theatre and reality that the political dimension of his 
work begins to unfold.  
 Shakespeare is an existentialist, not just because of the existential ideas he 
explores, but also as a writer who is always philosophically engaged in his drama and 
poetry. D. Nuttall neatly sums up the relationship between Shakespeare and philosophy. 
He writes: ‘Of course he is not a systematic philosopher; he is a dramatist. But the very 
avoidance of system may be shrewd - even, perhaps, philosophically shrewd. He shares 
with the major philosophers a knack of asking fundamental (sometimes very simple) 
questions. . . . Because Shakespeare will question anything, he treads on the toes of 
later theorists.’275  
 
 
Existentialist Literature: Philosophy in a Different Key 
 
Existentialist thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre and Camus are 
particularly conscious of the problems of philosophical form. Because they are 
interested in issues such as inwardness, interiority and introspection, problematic 
notions that conflate the examining subject (“I”) with the subject examined (“me”), they 
consider at length the implications of their philosophical approach and mode of 
expression. The form and language of philosophy are as crucial as the issues and ideas 
at stake. Steven Earnshaw notes that for existentialist writers, ‘to speak with a “received 
language” would be to speak inauthentically. It would be natural then, for each 
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existential philosopher to create a way of speaking which can be considered unique’.276 
Imaginative literature offered existentialists a new way to explore philosophical ideas 
and raise fundamental questions about the relationship between philosophy and form.  
 On the surface, the deliberate merging of philosophy and literature seems 
contradictory, even disingenuous. How can literature, which thrives on opacity, 
ambiguity and illusion, fulfil philosophy’s demand for transparency, precision and 
truthfulness? Murdoch clarifies the differences between the two forms of writing:  
 
Philosophical writing is not self-expression, it involves a disciplined 
removal of the personal voice. Some philosophers maintain a sort of 
personal presence in their work. . . . But the philosophy has a plain 
impersonal hardness none the less. Of course, literature too involves a 
control of the personal voice and its transformation. One might even set up 
an analogy between philosophy and poetry, which is the hardest kind of 
literature. Both involve a special and difficult purification of one’s 
sentiments, of thought emerging in language. But there is a kind of self-
expression, together with all the playfulness and mystification of art. The 
literary writer deliberately leaves a space for his reader to play in. The 
philosopher must not leave any space.277  
 
As part of their philosophical project, existentialists endeavour to deconstruct this 
polarisation of literature and philosophy.  The entwining of literature and philosophy in 
existentialist thought is not a superficial or stylistic quirk; it is absolutely crucial to their 
philosophical project. Existentialists seek to destabilise the category of ‘philosophy’ and 
challenge the view that there is a fixed philosophical method. We saw earlier how, like 
Montaigne, Camus actively encouraged a more personal approach to philosophy. In a 
similar way, Simone de Beauvoir presents a form of philosophy that is rooted in 
personal experience. In The Second Sex, the only answer she can find to the question 
‘What is a woman?’ is ‘I am a woman’.278 Her subjective self remains at the heart of her 
philosophical questioning. She writes: ‘To state the question is, to me, to suggest, at 
once, a preliminary answer. The fact that I ask it is itself significant. . . . If I want to 
define myself, I must first of all say: ‘I am a woman’; on this truth must be based all 
further discussion.’279 By tethering her philosophical enquiry to her ordinary, everyday 
experience of herself as a woman, Beauvoir’s approach signals an attempt to engage 
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with philosophy in a different way. Michèle Le Doeuff argues that Beauvoir transforms 
existentialism ‘from the status of a system (necessarily returning back on itself) to that 
of a point of view oriented to a theoretical intent by being trained on a determinate and 
partial field of experience.’280 In The Prime of Life, Beauvoir recalls her reaction to 
reading Hegel. Despite admiring the sophistication of Hegel’s methods and ambitions, 
she insists that there can be no philosophical system that can ‘upset the living certainty 
of “I am, I exist, here and now, I am myself.”’281 
 As we can begin to appreciate, ‘personal presence’ is actively encouraged by 
existentialists and this element of their work ignites the debate about the relationship 
between philosophy and form. For existentialists, truth is always subjective and 
particular because it is a matter of inwardness. They adopt a radically anti-systematic 
and anti-disciplinary approach to philosophy in order to resist narrowing their work to a 
set body of ideas. Disciplinary consolidation goes against existentialists’ understanding 
of human existence. For existentialists, there can be no definitive formula for existence: 
it is not fixed, not conceivable as a proper noun. Instead, it is rooted in contingency and 
process. The self is constantly and actively involved in the task of self-becoming. For 
this reason, existentialists are attracted to the idea of philosophically resonant literature, 
a form of writing they believe more fully demonstrates the ontological, ethical and 
political complexities of human existence. Camus says that ‘the great philosophical 
novelists’ prefer ‘writing in images rather than in reasoned arguments,’ because they 
‘are convinced of the uselessness of any principle of explanation and sure of the 
educative message of perceptible appearance.’282 Literature lets us get closer to the truth 
about human existence, Camus insists. The style and form of philosophy are crucially 
important considerations for existentialists, as they were for existentialism’s two great 
precursors, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. 
 Kierkegaard, perhaps one of the most passionate advocates of ‘anti-systematic’ 
philosophy, is deliberately ambiguous about the poetical nature of philosophy. In Fear 
and Trembling, he claims: ‘I am not a poet, I practice dialectics.’283 There is a deliberate 
note of irony here, as Kierkegaard is well aware of the distinctive poetic attributes of his 
work. In The Point of View for My Work as an Author, he discusses his personal 
engagement with his writing and states: ‘I am a poet, but a very special kind, for I am 
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by nature dialectical, and as a rule dialectic is precisely what is alien to the poet.’284 In 
his study of Kierkegaard’s philosophical method, Theodor W. Adorno rejects the idea 
of interpreting philosophy as poetry: ‘All attempts to comprehend the writings of 
philosophers as poetry have missed their truth content. Philosophical form requires the 
interpretation of the real as the binding nexus of concepts.’285 For Adorno, 
Kierkegaard’s flirtation with poetry undermines his important dialectical concepts. He 
argues that as soon as philosophy ‘is tolerantly accepted as poetry, the strangeness of its 
ideas, in which its power over reality manifests itself, is neutralized along with the 
seriousness of its claim. Its dialectical concepts then serve as metaphorical decorative 
additions that may be arbitrarily dismissed by scientific rigor.’286 However, 
Kierkegaard’s contradictory statements on his status as a poet is a crucial part of his 
maieutic method of communication. Adorno undervalues this self-conscious element of 
play in Kierkegaard’s reflections on the nature of his own philosophy. In his pervasive 
use of pseudonyms, Kierkegaard spins an argumentative web of radically diverse 
viewpoints and injects his work with ‘the immanental forward thrust of 
contradiction.’287 His aim is ‘to deceive into the truth’, to find direct communication 
through indirection, reflection and multiple layers of irony.288 A true philosopher, he 
contends, must be able to manipulate language and use it poetically as a tool of 
philosophy: 
 
The subjective thinker’s form, the form of his communication, is his style. . . 
. But just as he himself is not a poet, not an ethicist, not a dialectician, so 
also his form is none of theirs directly. His form must first and last be 
related to existence, and in this regard he must have at his disposal the 
poetic, the ethical, the dialectical, the religious.289  
 
Kierkegaard’s paradoxical claim that he is and is not a poet is a fundamental part of his 
equivocal, dialectical and conflicted passage to existential inwardness. In his essay ‘Art 
in an Age of Reflection’, George Pattison remarks that ‘[Kierkegaard’s] own writing 
has a powerful imaginative and poetic character, continually challenging the 
                                                            
284 Søren Kierkegaard, The Point of View, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 162. 
285 Theodor W. Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, trans. and ed. Rovert Hullot-Kentor 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 3. 
286 Ibid., p. 4. 
287 Søren Kierkegaard , ‘Concluding Unscientific Postscript’, in The Essential Kierkegaard, trans. 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 226. 
288 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, p. 7. 
289 Kierkegaard, ‘Concluding Unscientific Postscript’, p. 228. 
  83 
conventional boundaries between philosophy and poetry.’290 This is absolutely crucial 
for Kierkegaard because, like all existentialists, the journey to philosophical conclusions 
is considered as important as the conclusions themselves. 
 Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche demonstrates an awareness of the way certain 
philosophical presuppositions - such as the idea that philosophy must aim towards 
definitive, transcendental truth - are built into the very structures of philosophical 
questioning. Alexander Nehamas argues that Nietzsche 
 
looks at the world in general as if it were a sort of artwork; in particular, he 
looks at it as if it were a literary text. And he arrives at many of his views of 
the world and the things within it, including the view of human beings, by 
generalizing to them ideas and principles that apply almost intuitively to the 
literary situation, to the creation and interpretation of literary texts and 
characters. . . . The most obvious connection, of course, is supplied by our 
common view that literary texts can be interpreted in vastly different and 
deeply incompatible ways. Nietzsche, to whom this popular idea can in fact be 
traced, also holds that exactly the same is true of the world itself and all the 
things within it.291 
 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism, Nehamas claims, is the product of his interest in the 
literariness of the world, its status as a text-like thing that yields a range of perspectives 
and viewpoints. The literariness of Nietzsche’s writing (or ‘aestheticism’ as Nehamas 
calls it) is a method of communication which is radically distinct from conventional 
philosophical investigations. Like a permanent qualifying footnote to any claim or 
argument, this literary approach to philosophy means that there is a constant possibility 
that things could be otherwise. One philosophical thesis never reigns supreme; there is 
always the possibility of another perspective. 
 Existentialist thinkers have a deep interest in the creative fusion of fiction and 
philosophy. They regard literature as the most faithful means of articulating the 
existentialist immediacy of experience and the philosophical quandaries that existence 
as a human being entails. Sartre writes in Search for a Method that ‘a life develops in 
spirals; it passes again and again by the same points but at different levels of integration 
and complexity.’292 He finds that only literature can convey the existential intensity of 
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this process. Like Kenneth Burke, he regards literature as ‘equipment for living’.293 But 
by employing the techniques of another form of writing, existentialists find they can 
also extend and strengthen their critical approach to philosophy. Their deconstruction of 
the polarisation of literature and philosophy enables existentialists to also say something 
about philosophy’s form, language, style and textuality. As Berel Lang asserts, in such 
projects, ‘The relation between philosophy and the means of its representation thus 
emerges as a philosophical as well as a literary issue.’294 This productive 
interdisciplinarity benefits both fields, because it demonstrates how literature can 
intensify certain philosophical ideas, and how the literariness of philosophy is a 
significant and unavoidable philosophical concern.  
 In the wake of the existentialist movement, Jacques Derrida explored the 
relationship between literature and philosophy further. In an interview, he remarks: 
‘Some texts called “literary” “question” (let us not say “critique” or “deconstruct”) 
philosophy in a sharper, or more thematic, or better informed way than others. 
Sometimes this questioning occurs more effectively via the actual practice of writing, 
the staging, the composition, the treatment of language, rhetoric, than via speculative 
arguments.’295 Like existentialists, Derrida is attracted to the destabilising and arresting 
power of literature, its ability to question its own territory as well as that of other 
disciplines. That is not to say that he favours the literary over the philosophical: 
Derrida, like Sartre, is committed to an investigation into literature and philosophy’s 
mutual dependency. When reading Derrida’s work, claims Derek Attridge, it is 
necessary ‘to make the attempt to grasp together the literature/philosophy couple, to 
gain a sense of their co-implication - which is also the double bind in which both are 
caught - as well as their distinctiveness.’296 The form of philosophy is both a 
philosophical and a literary matter. Derrida’s attentiveness to the nature of philosophical 
form originated in the writings of existentialists. He recalls that in his adolescence 
“Existentialism, Sartre, Camus were present everywhere’,297 which inevitably brought 
to the fore critical debates about the relationship between philosophy and literature. He 
later observes that  
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at the moment when I was beginning to discover this strange institution called 
literature, the question ‘What is literature?’ imposed itself upon me in its most 
naive form. Only a little later, this was to be the title of one of the first texts by 
Sartre I think I read after La Nausée (which had made a strong impression on 
me, no doubt provoking some mimetic movements in me; briefly, here was a 
literary fiction grounded on a philosophical ‘emotion,’ the feeling of existence 
as excess, ‘being-superfluous,’ the very beyond of meaning giving rise to 
writing).298 
 
Like Sartre, Derrida is attracted to the destabilising and arresting power of literature, but 
that is not to say that he favours the literary over the philosophical. Instead, Derrida is 
committed to an investigation into the interdependence of literature and philosophy. The 
question ‘what is philosophy?’ cannot be prised apart from the question ‘what is 
literature?’, Derrida tells us. ‘Philosophical’ novels such as Sartre’s Nausea demonstrate 
this linkage especially well. 
 At the end of Nausea, after a number of confrontations with the radical 
contingency of existence, the novel’s narrator, Roquentin, decides to write ‘another kind 
of book’, one that he hopes will be ‘beautiful and hard as steel and make people 
ashamed of their existence.’299 In Nausea, it is impossible to tell whether the philosophy 
produces the literature or the literature produces the philosophy. Furthermore, the crisis 
of language revealed by a sudden experience of absurdity is presented as both a literary 
and a philosophical problem. When Roquentin apprehends the radical contingency of 
the chestnut tree, he remarks: ‘I was thinking without words, about things, with things’; 
‘I am struggling against the words’; ‘Oh, how can I put it into words’.300 Dominick 
LaCapra observes that in this existentialist novel ‘An enigmatic philosophical prose 
comes close to a strangely inverted lyricism in “representing” the workings of alienated 
consciousness. . . . language seems almost to go on holiday from the job-centred, work-
a-day world of referential usage. It becomes what Sartre would call “poetic.”’301 When 
Roquentin begins writing a diary, he intends to document the way things change and 
‘fix the exact extent and nature of this change.’302 His approach is that of a philosopher 
who must not embellish, exaggerate, or ‘put strangeness where there is nothing.’303 But 
his project fails almost immediately, as he finds that, instead of fixing the 
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transcendental, univocal meaning of things, he can only pile up metaphors. Staring at 
the chestnut root, he remarks: ‘Absurdity was not an idea in my head, or the sound of a 
voice, but that long dead snake at my feet, that wooden snake. Snake or claw or root or 
vulture’s talon, it doesn’t matter.’304 The proliferation of metaphors in this episode takes 
the descriptive power of language to its limits. When Roquentin stares at objects and 
apprehends their brute existence, signifier and signified are ripped apart: ‘Things have 
broken free from their names. . . . I am in the midst of Things, which cannot be given 
name. Alone, wordless, defenceless, they surround me, under me, behind me, above me. 
They demand nothing, they don’t impose themselves, they are there.’305 There is a 
constant battle between meaning and contingency. Zahi Zalloua asserts that instead of 
being a ‘traditional philosopher’, Roquentin ‘resembles more an artist, for whom 
language is not something to master and efficiently use but to manipulate and poetically 
express. That is to say, semantic play - far from being a detriment to self-expression - 
reflects for Roquentin the artist the textual richness of language, the open-endness of 
words.’306 
 Sartre fuses philosophy and literature in Nausea to reveal the inextricable 
relationship between literary and philosophical issues. However, as Rhiannon 
Goldthorpe warns, ‘this should not be taken to imply a closed circuit of mutual 
confirmation. Sartre’s philosophy rejects stability and closure. His literary writing prises 
apart forms that on the surface may seem traditional. The interaction of literature and 
theory generates new questions which are themselves open-ended.’307 Nausea reveals 
that in a philosophical novel, the dialectical interplay between literature and philosophy 
is always taking place, always asking new questions about the way disciplines interact. 
As Bernard-Henri Lévy puts it: ‘[Sartre] was an original novelist; an inventor of forms 
and styles; and an inventor of forms and styles because he was a philosopher and his 
philosophy impacted on his literary art.’308 Like Derrida, Sartre is attracted to the power 
of the literary text to undo philosophy: to challenge, subvert and deconstruct philosophy 
in a way that remains potently productive for philosophy. Discussing the influence of 
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pre-war France on the production of literary-philosophical novels such as Nausea, he 
writes: 
 
Since we were situated, the only novels we could dream of were novels of 
situation, without internal narrators or all-knowing witnesses. . . . [W]e had to 
people our books with minds that were half lucid and half overcast, some of 
which we might consider with more sympathy than others, but none of which 
would have a privileged point of view either upon the event or upon himself. 
We had to present creatures whose reality would be the tangled and 
contradictory tissue of each one’s evaluations of all the other characters - 
himself included - and the evaluations by all the others of himself.309 
 
For Sartre, the philosophical power of literature lies in its polyphonic nature, its ability 
to present a bewildering multiplicity of perspectives. The challenge of fiction, he 
claims, is ‘to find an orchestration of consciousness which may permit us to render the 
multidimensionality of the event.’310 Of course, philosophical concerns moulded into 
literature do not necessarily make successful philosophy or literature. As Camus writes: 
‘A novel is never anything but a philosophy expressed in images. And in a good novel 
the philosophy has disappeared into the images. But the philosophy need only spill over 
into the characters and action for it to stick out like a sore thumb, the plot to lose its 
authenticity, and the novel its life.’311 According to Camus, philosophical energy in a 
literary work must be implicit and unobtrusive.  Heavy-handed treatment of the images 
in the novel will damage the subtle and sensitive expression of human experience and 
the philosophical nuances that those images articulate. Murdoch is also aware of the 
potential dangers of existential philosophical literature, warning that ‘as soon as the 
“existentialist voice” is switched on, the work of art rigidifies.’312  
 As we have seen, Shakespeare and existentialists are attracted to literature’s 
philosophical power. We must also be aware that these examples of philosophical 
literature also give rise to a literary criticism that is imbued with philosophical energy. 
Cavell makes this clear: ‘If philosophy can be thought of as the world of a particular 
culture brought to consciousness of itself, then one mode of criticism (call it 
philosophical criticism) can be thought of as the world of a particular work brought to 
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consciousness of itself.’313 This is the primary aim of this thesis – to draw out the 
existentialism in three of Shakespeare’s great tragedies. It also seeks to prove how 
instrumental Shakespeare was in the development of existentialist thought. 
Existentialists looked to literary precursors such as Shakespeare for examples of 
intuitive philosophical literature. As the subsequent section of this chapter will outline, 
Shakespeare played a crucial role in the development of existentialist theories. 
 
 
Early Existentialists on Shakespeare: Kierkegaard and Nietzsche 
 
Many existentialist writers find a kindred spirit in Shakespeare. His power to confront 
questions of subjective inwardness and self-understanding is a privileged point of 
reference in existentialist writings. It is remarkable how often existentialist thinkers use 
Shakespeare’s plays as evidence of what Nietzsche calls ‘the countless forms of 
existence which crowd and push their way into life’.314 Stanley Stewart argues that it is 
misleading to overstress Shakespeare’s influence on the development of western 
philosophy, because ‘for a century after Shakespeare achieved fame on the literary 
scene . . . philosophy paid no attention to him.’315 But whilst Stewart uses this historical 
fact to deflate excessive statements about Shakespeare’s philosophical import - like 
Allan Bloom’s claim that ‘Shakespeare was the first philosopher of history’316 or 
Emmanuel Levinas’ assertion that ‘the whole of philosophy is only a meditation on 
Shakespeare’317 - other critics recognise the profundity of many philosophers’ critical 
encounters and direct engagement with Shakespeare and his work. In the preface to the 
1997 edition of The Anxiety of Influence, Harold Bloom comments on the shaping 
power of Shakespeare’s work: ‘We are in an era of so-called “cultural criticism,” which 
devalues all imaginative literature, and which particularly demotes and debases 
Shakespeare. . . . Shakespeare has influenced the world far more than it initially 
influenced Shakespeare.’318 Marjorie Garber offers a similar line of reasoning when she 
observes that many philosophers feel an ‘irresistible impulse to speak in and through 
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Shakespeare.’319 Shakespeare’s plays have shaped our modern world, she argues, 
because time and again, philosophical thinkers draw on his work. There is a critical 
reciprocity between Shakespeare and modern theorists and philosophers. In many ways, 
Shakespeare was unzeitgemäss: an untimely thinker working beyond the hegemonic 
cultural institutions of his day and experimenting with philosophical ideas that had yet 
to be fully developed intellectually. Equally, there are many significant references to 
Shakespeare in existentialist philosophy. In recent years, the postmodern emphasis on 
intertextuality has eclipsed the more basic idea of literary influence. Existentialist 
writers do not just voice their indebtedness to Shakespeare, nor do they solely 
appropriate him into their own camp. Rather Shakespeare frequently emerges in 
existentialist thought as a source of philosophical intensity.  
 In The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard recommends a full engagement with 
Shakespeare’s work: ‘Tax thy brain, tear off every wrapping and lay bare the viscera of 
feeling in your breast, demolish every fortification that separates you from the one of 
whom you are reading, and then read Shakespeare – you will shudder at the 
collisions.’320 Shakespeare’s dramatisation of existential ‘collisions’, the perplexing 
paradoxes, ambiguities and complexities of human life, helps Kierkegaard elucidate his 
own philosophical direction: 
 
Verily, we do not need Hegel, to tell us that relative contradictions can be 
mediated, since the fact that they can be separated is found in the ancients; 
and personality will protest in all eternity against the proposition that 
absolute contradictions can be mediated. . . . It will repeat its immortal 
dilemma through all eternity: ‘to be or not to be, that is the question’.321 
 
Simon Palfrey notes that Kierkegaard finds in the plays ‘the bare forked thing of true 
self-exposure’, which encourages him to read Shakespeare ‘without protection or 
evasion, with a hyper-allergic sensitivity to his drama’s inward intimacy.’322 At crucial 
moments in his writing, Kierkegaard resorts to lines from Shakespeare’s plays in order 
to find a better way to express his thoughts and ideas. Shakespeare offers him a new 
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language, a different - and perhaps more accurate - way of articulating philosophical 
thought.323  
 Kierkegaard’s proclivity for Shakespeare’s work is demonstrated throughout his 
writings. In Fear and Trembling he commends Shakespeare’s dramatisation of the 
transition from intense existential despair to demoniacal self-reliance in Richard III. He 
quotes directly Richard’s opening address: 
 
I that am rudely stamped and want love’s majesty 
To strut before a wanton ambling nymph, 
I that am curtailed of this fair proportion, 
Cheated of feature by dissembling nature, 
Deformed, unfinished, sent before my time 
Into this breathing world scarce half made up— 
And that so lamely and unfashionable 
That dogs bark at me as I halt by them—  (Richard III, I.i.16-23) 
 
Kierkegaard regards Richard’s famous monologue as ‘worth more than all moral 
systems, none of which bears a hint of the terrors of existence and of their nature’.324 In 
King Lear, Kierkegaard is struck not by Lear’s turbulent outpourings of grief and pain, 
but by Cordelia’s passionate and defiant composure in the opening scene. Her silence 
and staunch conviction of her own authenticity, he argues, expresses an inward agony 
which transcends heroism and tragedy. For Kierkegaard, Cordelia’s declaration, ‘I 
cannot heave / My heart into my mouth’ (i.82-3), constitutes the most existentially 
compelling moment of the play. Reticence is the only authentic expression of 
inwardness and Cordelia’s terse answers stand in marked contrast to her sisters’ empty 
chatter. For Kierkegaard, Cordelia’s ‘lips were mute when her heart was full’ and this 
convinces us of her existential integrity.325 As Stewart explains, ‘Kierkegaard affirms 
the mystery of Cordelia’s silence; she remains a mystery only as long as her innermost 
self remains in silent repose, which is its true nature. It is in her serene silence that 
Cordelia imparts the paradoxical sense of a mystery that is, in essence, also the solution 
to the mystery.’326 In Kierkegaard’s idiosyncratic sense of the word, Shakespeare’s play 
is ‘ethical’, because it does not envision the realm of true, transcendental religious 
experience and remains resolutely focused on the immanent concerns of Lear’s earthly 
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world. He regards Shakespeare’s unwillingness to move beyond the domain of the 
ethical into the domain of the religious as a limitation of the play. But perhaps it is 
Shakespeare’s decision to keep Cordelia’s defiance of social values within the 
boundaries of immanent, everyday reality that makes the play so ethically compelling. 
Joughin suggests that ‘if Shakespeare’s texts are philosophical dramas, then it is 
because they retain an ethical dimension without transcending those social, historical 
and linguistic limitations, which simultaneously remain in need of redress, and actually 
conjure an ethical situation into being.’327 Shakespeare generates existential intensities 
by constructing dramatic circumstances that give rise to existential and ethical concerns.   
 Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche celebrates Shakespeare’s philosophical 
receptiveness. He appropriates Shakespeare into his own philosophical discussions and 
closely associates himself with the Renaissance playwright. In Ecce Homo he writes: 
‘When I seek my highest formula for Shakespeare, I find it always in that he conceived 
the type of Caesar. One cannot guess at things like this - one is it or one is not. The 
great poet creates only out of his reality - to the point at which he is afterwards unable to 
endure his own work.’328 He then says that when he looks at his own ‘Zarathustra’, he 
is ‘unable to master an unendurable spasm of sobbing’.329 Employing Gilles Deleuze 
and Peter Klossowski’s work, Scott Wilson argues that Nietzsche’s slippage between 
the names Shakespeare, Caesar, Zarathustra and Lord Bacon in Ecce Homo ‘betrays the 
traces of an impulsive intensity, the fluctuations or vacillations of the will to power.’330 
Nietzsche’s oscillation between each identity is an experience of pleasure so intense that 
it is transformed into pain. This intensity or jouissance is the intensity of difference and, 
as Nietzsche moves through a process of displacement from one name or image to 
another, he marks the zone of an intense, painful experience that is linguistically 
irreducible. Wilson explains: ‘At each point these proper names function as metaphors 
or, to use Klossowski’s vocabulary, “simulacra”: the imitative “actualization of 
something in itself incommunicable and nonrepresentable.”’331 The perpetual, impulsive 
shifting of intensity in the Ecce Homo passage suggests that the agonising experience of 
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reading Shakespeare ‘marks the limit of Nietzsche and himself, or at least his work.’332 
Nietzsche’s various responses to Shakespeare are complex and multi-levelled but, like 
Kierkegaard, his engagement with Shakespeare is always personal and philosophically 
enlightening.  
 According to Nietzsche, human beings must embrace the intensifying 
contradictions of existence in order to achieve authentic existential fulfilment. He finds 
the affirmation of this life force perfectly articulated in Shakespearean drama. 
Macbeth’s ‘demonic attraction’ is his dangerous assertion of forces that have been 
repressed by conventional morality. Thus Nietzsche finds it absurd to think that 
Shakespeare conforms to black and white moral criteria. To the contrary, he argues that 
the energy of the plays is produced when characters affirm and indulge the ‘black and 
deep desires’ (Macbeth, I.iv.51) that lurk at the heart of human nature. He writes: ‘Do 
you suppose Tristan and Isolde are preaching against adultery when they both perish by 
it? This would be to stand the poets on their head: they, and especially Shakespeare, are 
enamoured of the passions as such and not least of their death-welcoming moods.’333 
Shakespeare’s dramatisation of the suffering, self-destructive state of Dionysian man is 
extremely important for Nietzsche. Jonathan Dollimore explains how Nietzsche finds in 
Shakespeare ‘another kind of knowledge, one which does not consolidate civilisation, 
but threatens it’, and this knowledge exposes the terrible truth ‘that civilisation is at 
heart illusory’.334 This is the essence of Nietzsche’s reading of Hamlet. Hamlet is 
allowed to ‘cast a true glance into the essence of things’ and this lifting of ‘the veil of 
illusion’ kills the impetus of action and leaves Hamlet tormented by depression and 
inertia.335 For Nietzsche, Shakespeare is an irreligious and anti-systematic thinker.  
 
 
French Existentialists and Shakespeare: Gide, Camus and Sartre 
 
The history of Shakespeare's French reception is long and varied. John Pemble notes 
how, for the first half of the twentieth century, ‘The French habitually either 
automatically prostrated themselves before Shakespeare, or automatically recoiled’ but 
after the Second World War, ‘they became fully involved in the interpretation and 
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interrogation of his work.’336 Pemble cites François Mauriac’s description of 
Shakespeare as ‘terriblement actuel’, ‘a poet and dramatist not of periods but of epochs’ 
whose drama spoke directly to the ‘survivors struggling on the surface of a Europe 
three-quarters destroyed’337 as evidence of a new French understanding of Shakespeare 
as modern and culturally relevant. Since then, as Richard Wilson notes, the Bard has 
exerted tremendous influence on the development of French theory, particularly on the 
work of Bourdieu, Foucault and Kristeva. The use of Shakespeare as a repeated point of 
departure in French thought, however, does not mean that we must think of ‘French 
theories as mere shadows of Shakespeare’.338 Not only has Shakespeare creatively and 
surprisingly informed French theory, but the French attraction to Shakespeare’s 
‘emancipatory promise’ has also freed Shakespeare from ‘the Anglo-Saxon prison-
house’ and allowed for new, revitalised readings of the plays themselves.339 This 
dialectical rapport has positively benefited both fields of research, claims Wilson. As 
theoretically and philosophically fertile texts, Shakespeare’s plays open themselves up 
to an assortment of ‘French’ interpretations and this receptive variety produces ‘a 
Bardolatry ironically at odds with the iconoclasm of those Anglo-American critics who 
do apply “French theory” to the Works.’340 Wilson’s argument can be extended to 
include French existentialist thinkers such as Gide, Camus and Sartre. 
 In his research into the appropriation of Shakespeare by antinomian rebels and 
sexual non-conformists like Wilde, Swinburne and Emerson, Peter Holbrook also 
includes André Gide. As a thinker who promoted an ethic of authenticity and 
individuality, Gide was also an important contributor to French existentialism. 
Holbrook notes that, like other existentialists, Gide objected to theoreticism. Speaking 
of Marxism, Gide writes in his journals: ‘There is something lacking, some ozone layer 
or other that is essential to keep my mind breathing. . . . I think that what especially 
bothers me is the very theory, with everything, if not exactly irrational, at least artificial, 
. . . fallacious and inhuman it contains’.341 The existential intensity of real life is lost in 
theoretical abstraction. Instead, Gide turns to ‘the vigorous writers and especially the 
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most virile: Aristophanes, Shakespeare, Rabelais.’342 Like Nietzsche and Kierkegaard 
before him, Gide saw Shakespeare as an anti-didactic writer, a playwright who instead 
presented the variety and vitality of human life. Holbrook suggests that for these 
thinkers ‘Shakespeare is on the side of existence rather than (to put the case in 
Nietzschean terms) moral slanders of it; on the side of individuality . . . as against 
universal norms.’343 But individuality, for Gide as well as for Shakespeare, is a 
troubling aspect of any existential dilemma. Both writers are interested in the way 
human beings persistently and inexplicably act against their own interests. In All’s Well 
that Ends Well, when Bertram chooses to flee his new wife and attempts to corrupt a 
young woman in Florence, the First Lord is bemused by his behaviour. He exclaims: 
‘As we are ourselves, what things we are’, to which the second Lord replies: ‘Merely 
are own traitors’ (All’s Well that Ends Well, IV.iii.19-21). As human beings, we are 
constantly betraying ourselves and our intentions. In a similar way, Troilus wonders 
why ‘sometimes we are devils to ourselves’ (Troilus and Cressida, IV.v.95). Gide’s 
life-long admiration for Shakespeare was ‘a means of subtly justifying dissident and 
non-conformist identities’, writes Holbrook.344 His bardolatry is born of his 
understanding and appreciation of Shakespeare as a particular type of philosophical 
thinker: a thinker who chooses life over theory.  
 Shakespeare was also an important influence on Camus’ philosophical thought 
and intellectual development.345 Like Gide, Camus is less interested in traditional, 
clearly explained readings or interpretations of the plays and far more enthusiastic about 
the way Shakespearean drama offers a particular fusion of literature and philosophical 
thought. Sometimes something as fleeting as a single line or scene ignites Camus’ 
thinking; at other times, the content of Shakespeare’s plays feeds subtly into his 
questions about the nature of human existence. The opening of a chapter entitled 
‘Drama’ in The Myth of Sisyphus is a good example of his passing references to 
Shakespeare. Camus writes: 
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‘The play’s the thing,’ says Hamlet, ‘wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the 
king.’ Catch is indeed the word. For conscience moves swiftly or withdraws 
within itself. It has to be caught on the wing, at the barely perceptible 
moment when it glances fleetingly at itself. The everyday man does not 
enjoy tarrying. Everything, on the contrary, hurries him onward. But at the 
same time nothing interests him more than himself, especially his 
potentialities. Whence his interest in the theatre, in the show, where so 
many fates are offered him.346 
 
This reading of one line from Hamlet leads on to a more general consideration of the 
nature of theatre. Camus comes to the conclusion that tragedy represents the absurdity 
of human existence. He contends: ‘The actor has three hours to be Iago or Alceste, 
Phèdre or Gloucester. In that short space of time he makes them come to life and die on 
fifty square yards of board. Never has the absurd ever been so well illustrated or at such 
length’.347 Camus allows his imagination to dwell on Shakespeare’s work and allows 
his literary reflections to penetrate his own philosophical perspective.  
 Another instance of Shakespeare’s strange, contagious power can be found in a 
collection of essays entitled ‘Nuptials’. Camus notes that during a visit to Pisa he 
experienced human life swarming around him at a busy railway station. For some time 
he lingered in the town. Eventually, the shops and cafés closed and everyone returned 
home, leaving Camus wandering the silent, empty streets alone. Struck by a sudden 
feeling of absurdity, he writes: 
 
‘In such a night as this, Jessica!’ Here, on this singular stage, gods appear 
with the voices of Shakespeare’s lovers. We must learn how to lend 
ourselves to dreams when dreams lend themselves to us. . . . But this 
evening I am a god among gods, and as Jessica flies off ‘on the swift steps 
of love’, I mingle my voice with that of Lorenzo. But Jessica is only a 
pretext, and this upsurge of love goes beyond her. Yes, I believe that 
Lorenzo is less in love with her than grateful to her for allowing him to love. 
But why should I dream this evening of the lovers of Venice and forget 
Verona? Because there is nothing here to invite us to cherish unhappy 
lovers. Nothing is vainer than to die for love. What we ought to do is live. 
And a living Lorenzo is better than a Romeo in his grave.348 
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This passage shows the intensity of Camus’ personal appropriation of Shakespeare.349 
He lives out this passion, speaking and thinking as if he were Lorenzo himself. 
Shakespeare’s play allows him to come to the conclusion that an authentic apprehension 
of the absurd enables an individual to affirm life. Moreover, there is also something 
remarkably ‘Shakespearean’ about the energy, intensity and immediacy of Camus’ 
sudden turn to Shakespeare because, like Camus, Shakespeare is fascinated by the way 
‘thought and consciousness arise amidst the tight configurations of the world.’350 As 
Philip Davis notes, Shakespeare ‘thinks quickly and powerfully and intuitively because 
he thinks in terms of spaces and places and shapes, long before he thinks of humans or 
morals or principles.’351 Consequently, claims Davis, Shakespearean drama is a ‘form 
of creative thinking’ that is ‘deeply involved in the processes of life’.352 In Camus’ brief 
reflection, there is a consciously felt affinity between the philosophical power of 
Shakespeare and the literary form of existentialist thought. Camus’s intention is not to 
examine Shakespeare methodologically or to achieve specific interpretive ends but to 
extract and employ the force and passion that emerges from the plays in his own work.  
 In contrast to Camus, Sartre rarely refers to Shakespeare in his philosophical or 
literary works, and when he does, the comments are fleeting and incidental rather than 
sustained and penetrating.353 But there is one key existentialist concept that Sartre finds 
brilliantly dramatised in numerous Shakespeare plays: the degrading and disintegrating 
effect of the gaze of other people on individual subjectivity. According to Sartre, our 
view of ourselves is mediated by the consciousness of others: ‘The Other is the 
indispensable mediator between myself and me. . . . I am put in the position of passing 
judgement on myself as an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other. . . . 
But at the same time, I need the Other in order to fully realise the structures of my 
being.’354 The look of the other is subjectively corrosive but also ontologically 
necessary. This means that selfhood ‘is like a shadow which is projected on a moving 
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and unpredictable material such that no table of reference can be provided for 
calculating the distortions resulting from these movements’.355  
 In Kean, a play which delves into the deeply ambiguous relationship between 
man, actor and social role, Sartre draws directly on Shakespeare in order to examine the 
idea of existential otherness in greater detail. Kean is a famous Shakespearean actor, a 
man who is unable to detach his perception of himself from other people’s opinions 
about him. He discovers that selfhood is an illusory entity, something dependent on and 
alienated by the consciousness of others. Sartre makes the connection to Shakespeare 
obvious in Kean’s conversation with his female counterpart, Elena: 
 
Kean. We are three victims. You, because you were born a woman - [the 
Prince] because he was too highly born, and I, because I was a 
bastard. The result is you enjoy your beauty through the eyes of 
others, and I discover my genius through their applause. As for 
him, he is a flower. For him to feel he is a prince he has to be 
admired. . . . We all three live on the love of others, and we are all 
three incapable of loving ourselves. . . . Why do you laugh? 
Elena. Because I was thinking of Shakespeare.356 
 
According to Sartre, this objectifying gaze of another person, which takes an individual 
beyond the limits of their world, is an ‘internal haemorrhage’ of being.357 But even 
though the judgements of others are often passionately interiorized, ‘objective’ social 
values such as bravery, intelligence or beauty cannot function as intrinsic, independent 
values. Human beings are thus forever troubled by a limited and estranged form of self-
knowledge, because the other’s view of them dwells deep within their consciousness. 
 At the end of the play, during the botched performance of Desdemona’s death 
scene, both Kean and his fellow actress forget their lines and are forced to extemporise. 
The result is a strange concoction of Shakespearean verse and Sartrean philosophy. 
Kean asks the audience: ‘Who calls me Othello? Who thinks I am Othello? (Pointing to 
himself.) Is this Othello?’358 Louise Fiber Luce observes how Sartre ‘inserts segments of 
Shakespearean dialogue throughout his entire script in such a manner that the bard’s 
discourse now erupts into Sartre’s.’359 Sartre appropriates Shakespeare, but the resulting 
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356 Jean-Paul Sartre, Kean; or, Disorder and Genius, trans. Kitty Black (London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1954), p. 134. 
357 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 285. 
358 Sartre, Kean, p. 114. 
359 Louise Luce, ‘Alex Dumas’s Kean: An Adaptation by Jean-Paul Sartre’, Modern Drama, 28:3 (1985), 
p. 359. 
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drama is damaged by his obtrusive philosophical agenda. His ‘existentialist voice’, to 
borrow Murdoch’s phrase, is too loud. However, Sartre does begin to tease out an 
important existentialist idea in Shakespeare’s drama. Shakespeare is fascinated by the 
way human beings view themselves obliquely, by how their perception of themselves is 
always tainted by or confused with the judgements of others. Brutus says in Julius 
Caesar, ‘the eye sees not itself / But by reflection, by some other things’ (I.ii.54-5). The 
Sartrean idea is duplicated even more precisely a few lines later, when Cassius retorts: 
‘since you know you cannot see yourself / So well as by reflection, I, your glass, / Will 
modestly discover to yourself / That of yourself which you yet know not of’ (I.ii.69-72). 
Cassius knows that he is not a mirror that simply reflects back Brutus’ self-image. As a 
mediating other, he also actively dictates what Brutus will become. Cassius’ eye is the 
portal through which Brutus grasps his own self-objectified appearance. Shakespeare’s 
Roman plays, plays that constantly contest the idea that the self possesses an intrinsic 
value, lend themselves particularly well to this element of Sartrean ontology.360 
Antony’s sense of self is almost entirely constructed through his inward appropriation 
of external or outward influences. ‘If I lose my honour, / I lose myself’ (Antony and 
Cleopatra, III.iv.22-3), he declares to Octavia, anticipating the dissolution of his 
identity at the end of the play. N. K. Sugimura observes that ‘Shakespeare grants 
Anthony a psychological, “free-floating ego”, which is able to observe the bifurcation 
between the objective and subjective “I”. . . [I]t is precisely this role of consciousness in 
relation to being - which is so important to Sartre - that Shakespeare puts on stage.’361 In 
Troilus and Cressida, Shakespeare also intensifies this element of his drama by making 
his characters aware of their dependence on the views of other people. Achilles 
recognises that his self-worth is ‘read in the eyes of others’ (III.iii.71), and that ‘not a 
man, for being simply man, / Hath any honour, but honour for those honours / That are 
without him’ (III.iii.74-6). Human beings exert a tremendous influence on each other’s 
subjectivity, says Achilles: 
 
The beauty that is borne here in the face 
The bearer knows not, but commends itself 
                                                            
360 Other early modern dramatists show an interest in this aspect of human existence. In John Webster’s 
play, Appius and Virginia, when Icilius is showered with praise, he says: ‘You give me (noble Lord) that 
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To others’ eyes. Nor doth the eye itself, 
That most pure spirit of sense, behold itself, 
Not going from itself; but eye to eye opposed 
Salutes each other with each other’s form. 
For speculation turns not to itself 
Till it hath travelled and is mirrored there 
Where it may see itself.  
    (Troilus and Cressida, III.iii.98-106) 
 
Throughout this play, Shakespeare is fascinated by how an individual’s subjectivity is 
shaped by the objectifying subjectivity of other beings. In Nausea, Roquentin observes 
that ‘people who live in society have learnt how to see themselves in mirrors, as they 
appear to their friends.’362 We can see the same complex ontological arguments being 
anticipated by Shakespeare.363  
 Advancing a similar argument, Joel Fineman observes that ‘Sartre developed a 
psychology of imagination whose logic and figurality very much resemble the paranoiac 
visionary thematics of at least some of Shakespeare’s young man sonnets.’364 Fineman 
finds in tightly structured formations like ‘thou mine, I thine’ (Sonnet 108, 7) an 
anticipation of the ‘subjective optics of the Sartrian “gaze” and its melodrama of 
mutually persecutory master-slave relations.’365 ‘Look in thy glass, and tell the face 
thou viewest / Now is the time that face should form another’ (Sonnet 3, 1-2), says 
Shakespeare’s poetic persona as he conflates visual imagery with the imagery of vision. 
The effect is even more apparent in the first Quarto, which instead of ‘another’ reads 
‘an other’ and thus allows the line to signify not just a new face, but also a distinct 
‘other’ person. The ethical relationship between self and other is foregrounded 
throughout Shakespeare’s sonnets. Sonnet 121 is another excellent example of 
Shakespeare’s attentiveness to the ontologically disturbing power of the Other’s gaze:  
 
’Tis better to be vile than vile esteemed, 
When not to be receives reproach of being, 
And the just pleasure lost, which is so deemed  
                                                            
362 Sartre, Nausea, p. 32. 
363 In his Lacanian psychoanalytic reading, Philip Armstrong argues that Shakespeare’s plays ‘typify the 
conflicted and emergent nature of the geometrical visual order and of the subjectivity associated with it’ 
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Being-for-Others.  
364 Joel Fineman, Shakespeare’s Perjured Eye: The Invention of Poetic Subjectivity in the Sonnets 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 45. 
365 Ibid., p. 45. 
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Not by our feeling but by others’ seeing.  
For why should others’ false adulterate eyes  
Give salutation to my sportive blood?  
Or on my frailties why are frailer spies,  
Which in their wills count bad what I think good? 
No, I am that I am, and they that level  
At my abuses reckon up their own;    (Sonnet 121, 1-10) 
 
In light of Sartre’s theory of being-for-others, the crucial lines ‘the just pleasure lost 
which is so deemed / Not by our feeling, but by others’ seeing’ suggest that the integrity 
of an individual’s inward feeling is jeopardised and corrupted by observers who project 
their judgements upon it. A legitimate, pleasurable feeling of vileness is denied when 
the term is applied by others.  
 Shakespeare’s playful exploration of paranoiac optics and Sartre’s theory of 
being-for-others are, of course, not one and the same. It would be reckless to disregard 
the historical difference between Renaissance England and post-war France. However, 
by highlighting the critically neglected relationship between Sartrean existentialism and 
Shakespeare’s poetry, the mutually illuminating aspects of both become apparent. We 
can trace the imprint of Shakespeare in existentialist thought; we can read Shakespeare 
through the lens of existentialism. And it may also be possible to read existentialism 
back through Shakespeare, and thus allow Shakespeare’s dramatisation of existential 
ideas to shed new light on the movement. Through this dialectical process, Shakespeare 
may reinvigorate key existentialist ideas as well as freshly illuminate some of the 
debates within existentialism.  
 
 
Existentialism and Tragedy 
 
Before I present three existentialist readings of Shakespearean tragedies, it is worth 
considering more generally the relationship between existentialism and tragedy. 
Existentialists have long been fascinated by the idea of tragedy. The two discourses are 
mutually compatible, with one often employed to illuminate the other. Existentialist 
philosophy marries well with the ontological seriousness and intensity of tragedy. The 
agonies of the individual, the conflict between self and society, the relationship between 
freedom and necessity, the ethics of action: these are just a few of the broadly 
existentialist themes and issues that arise from critical debates about the nature of 
tragedy. But a superficial coupling of these two forms of writing cannot do justice to  
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the way existentialism - for better and for worse - has filtered into seminal studies on 
tragic form. 
 In his contribution to a volume of essays entitled Rethinking Tragedy, George 
Steiner stands by his original assertion in The Death of Tragedy that the art form is 
primarily concerned with man’s primordial ontological homelessness, his ‘alienation or 
ostracism from the safeguard of licensed being’.366 Steiner contends that 
 
the concept of alienation has acquired a specific gravity, an ontological weight 
illustrated by absolute or pure tragedy. A legacy of guilt, the paradoxical, 
unpardonable guilt of being alive, of attaching rights and aspirations to that 
condition, condemns the human species to frustration and suffering, to be tied 
to ‘a wheel of fire’. Our existence is not so much a ‘tale told by an idiot’ as it is 
a chastisement from which early death is the only logical deliverance.367 
 
Steiner’s gloomy vision of tragedy is essentially second-rate existentialism. In his view 
of tragedy’s profound metaphysical pessimism, Steiner echoes the popular 
‘existentialist’ conception of man as a being inexplicably cast into the midst of a brutal, 
meaningless universe. His conception of tragedy is almost identical to M. A. Gillespie’s 
description of existentialism as ‘nothing other than radical nihilism . . . the absolute 
negation of everything, which leaves only a chaotic and meaningless activity.’368 
Tragedy insists that man’s existence is fatally doomed, argues Steiner, and this world-
view thus eradicates any potential for political or social change. ‘More pliant divorce 
laws could not alter the fate of Agamemnon,’ he claims; ‘social psychiatry is no answer 
to Oedipus.’369  
 In recent years, critics and theorists of tragedy have begun to reconsider and 
renegotiate the relationship between tragedy and politics. Terry Eagleton turns Steiner’s 
argument on its head and argues that ‘The ontological homelessness which George 
Steiner sees as the curse of our condition is also the source of our creativity.’370 He 
elaborates his point by claiming that ‘it is the lesson of a good deal of tragedy that only 
by an unutterably painful openness to our frailty and finitude - to the material limits of 
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our condition - can we have any hope of transcending it.’371 Eagleton implicitly invokes 
a more nuanced and politically perceptive version of existentialism. In Sweet Violence, 
he explains his theory of tragedy in more detail. He writes: 
 
It is true that there is much about our species-being which is passive, 
constrained and inert. But this may be a source of radical politics, not an 
obstacle to it. Our passivity, for example, is closely bound up with our frailty 
and vulnerability, in which any authentic politics must be anchored. Tragedy 
can be among other things a symbolic coming to terms with our finitude and 
fragility, without which any political project is likely to founder. . . . If we can 
successfully confront death-dealing, oppressive forces, it is not because history 
is mere cultural clay in our hands, . . . [i]t is because the impulse to freedom 
from oppression, however that goal is culturally framed, seems as obdurate and 
implacable as the drive to material survival.372 
 
If a recognition of the frailty, finitude and vulnerability of human beings is to lay the 
foundations for ‘authentic politics’, as Eagleton claims, then tragedy must be capable of 
revealing certain ontological truths. In an existentially resonant way, he implies that 
human beings can overcome absurdity, pessimism and nihilism when they recognise 
and accept the ambiguous and volatile nature of their own existence. Eagleton’s concept 
of the tragic thus chimes with some of Camus’ reflections in The Myth of Sisyphus. 
Sisyphus was condemned by the gods to roll a rock ceaselessly to the top of a mountain. 
However, for Camus, it is not this senseless, repetitive task that epitomises the tragic, 
but rather the moment when Sisyphus’ consciousness becomes heightened and he 
deliberately chooses to repeat the task once again. As Camus puts it, the absurd 
becomes tragic ‘only at the rare moments it becomes conscious’, and for Sisyphus, ‘The 
lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory.’373 
Tragedy shows how the transcendent dimension of consciousness can project itself 
beyond the materiality of human existence. Political potentiality exists in the gap 
between what human beings are, the historical and social limits of their existence, and 
what they could be, the constant possibility that they can actively change those 
historical and social limits. Individuals can always reconfigure their human situations 
by thinking about them in radically new ways. When Eagleton asserts that ‘Only by 
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grasping our constraints can we act constructively’,374 he echoes some of 
existentialism’s paradoxical statements about the correlation between historical 
situatedness and self-liberating choice. Sartre contends that ‘Man is condemned to be 
free’;375 Camus states that ‘the only conception of freedom’ he has, ‘is that of the 
prisoner or the individual in the midst of the state.’376 Shakespeare also attempts to 
articulate the close connection between individual freedom and the social and historical 
conditions in which individuals find themselves. In Antony and Cleopatra, Enobarbus 
reflects: 
 
 I see men’s judgements are 
A parcel of their fortunes, and things outward 
Do draw the inward quality after them 
To suffer all alike.   
    (Antony and Cleopatra, III.xiii.30-3) 
 
The Player King expresses a similar idea when he says: ‘Our thoughts are ours, their 
ends none of our own’ (Hamlet: III.ii.207). In their own ways, Sartre, Camus and 
Shakespeare all stress the inextricable intertwining of agency and circumstance, and as 
Eagleton asserts, the inseparable relationship between these two forces is an essential 
element of tragedy.    
 By bringing some of Eagleton’s arguments openly into dialogue with 
existentialism, a renegotiation of tragedy’s existentialist ethics and politics may be 
possible. Eagleton commends tragedy’s ‘revolutionary universalism’, arguing that 
modernity’s democratisation of the art form now means that ‘any old body can be a 
tragic protagonist.’377 Contrary to Steiner’s assessment of tragedy as defunct and 
obsolete in our modern world, tragedy’s existential depth continues to appeal to the 
masses. In the wake of the Second World War, existentialists such as Camus and Sartre 
fervently defended tragedy as an essential dramatic form.378 They aspired to a new 
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modern sense of the tragic, one politically attuned to their own historical moment. 
‘Today, tragedy is collective’, wrote Camus in 1945.379 The political dimension of 
tragedy inheres in the way it mediates between a focus on the claims of the individual 
and its concern for the collective, communal needs of society. In existentialist thought, 
individual authenticity and the emancipation of society go hand in hand. If tragedy is 
pessimistic or nihilistic, it is not in the sense that it indulges in irrevocable despair. 
Camus writes: ‘The very idea that a pessimistic philosophy is necessarily one of 
discouragement, is a puerile idea, but one that needs too long a refutation.’380 Joshua 
Foa Dienstag picks up on this remark in his reassessment of tragedy and pessimism and 
claims that ‘The very fact that Camus, a radical egalitarian, would defend pessimism, 
gives some indication of its potential to unsettle, rather than confirm, existing political 
arrangements.’381 Drawing on the work of Nietzsche, Dienstag argues against the 
association of pessimism with quietism and antidemocratic political values and suggests 
that tragedy’s pessimism can produce ‘an energizing and even liberating ethic.’382 This 
important idea is shared by existentialism and tragedy: nihilism and pessimism must be 
confronted, in order to be ultimately transcended, even if this is a painful and self-
shattering experience.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As the first three chapters of this thesis have established, there are many important ways 
in which Shakespearean drama and existentialism identify with one another. One of the 
most important, as this chapter has shown, is the way both Shakespeare and 
existentialists regard philosophy and literature not as intellectual opponents or 
adversaries, but as forms of thinking that should be considered productively together. 
The existential philosophical impulse in Shakespeare’s plays is created out of his 
imaginative dramatisation of action and character on stage. When his characters ponder 
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complex philosophical ideas, they do so ‘in character’, as embodied human beings 
concretely situated in the world. By using drama and poetry, Shakespeare does 
philosophy in another way, one which existentialists would later choose themselves. As 
Shakespeare’s Renaissance contemporary, Philip Sidney, writes in A Defence of Poetry: 
‘the philosopher teacheth, but he teacheth obscurely, so as the learned only can 
understand him, that is to say, he teacheth them that are already taught; but the Poet is 
food for the tenderest stomachs, the Poet is, indeed, the right popular Philosopher’.383 
Existentialists would wholeheartedly agree.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 
 
 
‘A KIND OF FIGHTING’ (V.II.4): SUBJECTIVE LIFE IN HAMLET 
 
 
 
 
As an angst-ridden malcontent dressed in black and troubled by a lacerating self-
consciousness, Hamlet has often been characterised as the archetypal existentialist. 
Critical of the rise of popular existentialist fiction, Charles I. Glicksberg remarked in 
1953 that ‘the Existentialist novelist is the philosophical Hamlet of our age, suffering 
from spells of nihilistic “madness,” metaphysical “nausea,” ontological dolour.’384 
Christine Gomez argues that Hamlet can ‘be seen as an anticipation of the existential 
hero,’ because he is ‘an individual who reflects on human existence and his own 
predicament in the universe and becomes aware of his alienation from the human 
condition.’385 Such assessments of Hamlet and existentialism as synonymous reduce 
and simplify both the powerful philosophical insights of existentialism and Hamlet’s 
confrontation with complex existential issues and problems. These kinds of ‘existential’ 
assessments echo Nietzsche’s problematic reading of Hamlet. According to Nietzsche, 
Hamlet gains an ‘insight into the horrific truth’,386 which reveals that the world is 
irreparably out of joint. ‘Conscious of the truth once glimpsed,’ Nietzsche continues, 
‘man now sees all around him only the horrific or absurd aspects of existence, . . . it 
disgusts him.’387 To be sure, Hamlet’s corrosive lucidity allows him to see through the 
hypocrisy, insincerity and scheming ways of other people, but he does not experience a 
Schopenhauerian epiphany which shows him the way things really are. Hamlet is 
obsessed with the way things appear to him and with the way his consciousness 
attributes meaning to the world.  
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 As many critics have observed, the existential richness of the play is created by 
Hamlet’s intense awareness of the baffling, contradictory and volatile nature of his own 
subjectivity. John Lee writes: ‘what [Hamlet] values especially, and what he feels 
crucially defines his identity, is his relationship with his inner world. . . . [I]t is the “I”’s 
unique separateness, and its ability to be its own source of value, that the Prince 
asserts.’388 But what function of human consciousness makes this inner self-relation 
possible? We can only properly assess the dimensions of Hamlet’s subjectivity by 
reading the play in light of existentialism’s theories of consciousness. After all, what is 
Hamlet if not a study in the motives and the movements of the human mind? When 
Horatio arrives to inform Hamlet of the numerous sightings of his father’s ghost, 
Hamlet strangely pre-empts the conversation: 
 
Ham.  My father, methinks I see my father. 
Hor.  Where, my lord? 
Ham.  In my mind’s eye, Horatio.  (I.ii.183-5) 
 
Horatio and the audience have already seen Hamlet Senior’s ghost, and, for a brief 
moment, Horatio is startled to think it has returned. When Hamlet explains that he sees 
his father in his ‘mind’s eye’, there is a disconcerting interplay between absence and 
presence. Hamlet is presented as a perceiving subject trying to reconcile the powers of 
his consciousness with the surrounding world. His apprehensions of the world are 
always mediated by his first-person phenomenological standpoint, his ‘mind’s eye’. 
Shakespeare is very particular about the importance of this phenomenological impulse, 
because he deliberately uses the phrase ‘mind’s eye’ in two consecutive scenes. ‘A mote 
it is to trouble the mind’s eye’ (I.i.111), says Horatio as he explains how the 
supernatural presence of the ghost disturbs and perplexes human judgement. Hamlet’s 
use of the same phrase echoes Horatio’s notion of irritated consciousness and draws 
attention to the way his ‘mind’s eye’ structures the world. 
 There is a rapport here between Shakespeare’s dramatisation of consciousness and 
Sartre’s phenomenological ontology. Hamlet experiences himself as an individual 
whose sense of self is shaped by his immediate apprehensions of the world. But he also 
recognises that his consciousness imparts meaning to the world, and this is what allows 
him to have a degree of power over his own subjectivity. Shakespeare affords Hamlet 
this phenomenological space in order to dramatise the dialectical exchange between a 
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self that is clearly mediated by the world, and a self which is an actively mediating 
force, striving to make the world its own.  
 
 
Subjectivity and Nothingness 
 
‘I have that within which passes show’ (I.ii.85): Hamlet’s troublesome interiority, the 
invisible inner anguish that he insists on in his first extended speech of the play, has 
confused and concerned critics for decades. In their investigations into the socially 
constructed nature of subjectivity, many new historicist and cultural materialist critics 
have concluded that Hamlet’s self is literally ‘a thing . . . / Of nothing’ (IV.ii.26-8). In a 
much-quoted passage, Terry Eagleton suggests that ‘Hamlet has no “essence” of being 
whatsoever, no inner sanctum to be safeguarded: he is pure deferral and diffusion, a 
hollow void which offers nothing determinate to be known.’389 A gap, a vacant space, a 
lack, an emptiness, a void, a nothingness - these terms have become synonymous with 
Hamlet’s subjectivity in particular and Shakespearean subjectivity in general. But could 
a more philosophically and existentially specific understanding of nothingness offer a 
fresh way of reading Hamlet’s feelings of inwardness? Francis Barker inadvertently gets 
closer to the nub of the matter in The Tremulous Private Body when he writes: ‘At the 
centre of Hamlet, in the interior of his mystery, there is, in short, nothing. A lack of 
subjectivity or a lack at the heart of subjectivity.’390 ‘A lack at the heart of subjectivity’ 
does not preclude an inner relation to one’s self: it is, in fact, the necessary part of 
consciousness that makes subjective reflection possible, existentialists tell us.  
 Following Husserl, existentialists such as Sartre insist that consciousness cannot 
be reduced to a solid, definite essence, quality or attribute. It is not a substantive entity; 
it is a nothingness. In Nausea, Roquentin remarks: ‘Lucid, motionless, empty, the 
consciousness is situated between the walls; it perpetuates itself. Nobody inhabits it 
anymore. . . .This is what there is: walls, and between the walls, a small living and 
impersonal transparency . . . little ephemeral existences populate it like birds in 
branches. Populate it and disappear.’391 Because consciousness has no innate ‘ego’ and 
exists only by virtue of the way it is directed intentionally towards the world, it 
constructs itself negatively. ‘Nothingness’, writes Sartre, ‘lies coiled in the heart of 
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being - like a worm.’392 In order for human beings to question being at all, they must 
have an ability to negate or ‘nihilate’ things around them. This power of negation, 
claims Sartre, refers us back to a more basic, foundational nothingness that can be seen 
to ‘haunt being.’393 Nothingness, then, is not an abstract notion, nor does it exist outside 
of being: ‘Nothingness must be given at the heart of Being, in order for us to be able to 
apprehend particular types of realities which we have called négatités.’394 Négatité is 
the word Sartre gives to human activities and judgements that involve negativity, such 
as experiences involving absence, interrogation, variation and destruction (experiences 
that are also especially pertinent to Hamlet). Consciousness constantly creates itself by 
negating aspects of the world it comes into contact with. It demarcates being by 
differentiating what it is from what it is not. David Sherman explains that   
 
because consciousness does not contain the ego or any other substance that 
would cause it to be determined by the laws of nature, but is rather 
characterised by intentionality . . . it is ‘nothing,’ or, to be more precise, a 
‘nothingness’ that perpetually transcends itself. And, in the process of 
transcending itself, consciousness is a ‘nihilating nothingness’ that gives rise to 
‘négatités.’ In other words, this ‘nothingness’ is active.395  
 
The example Sartre uses of looking for his friend Pierre in a café helps clarify this 
explanation. Because he expects to locate the presence of Pierre, says Sartre, he 
nihilates the fullness of the café. But if his friend does not appear, his friend’s absence 
becomes as real and vivid as the other physical features of the café. The room becomes 
haunted by negation.396 An absence was found because a presence was expected, and 
this is a crucial point for Sartre. The expectation of presence bonds nothingness to 
being.  
 Nothingness, Sartre claims, is the structuring principle of consciousness and this 
is what allows human beings to have a relationship with their self. Roquentin explains 
that consciousness ‘dilutes itself, it scatters itself, it tries to lose itself on the brown wall, 
up the lamp-post, or over there in the evening mist. But it never forgets itself; it is a 
consciousness of being a consciousness which forgets itself.’397 As Roquentin makes 
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clear, consciousness is never passively aware. Another subterranean, unreflective and 
non-positional dimension of consciousness functions at the same time as intentional 
consciousness. This ‘pre-reflective cogito’398 is a sort of persistent self-consciousness 
that means that human beings are always conscious of their acts, their intentions and 
their selves. This non-positional consciousness yields an intuitive, immediate 
‘knowledge’ of positional consciousness. These two modes of consciousness fuse 
together to create ‘an immediate non-cognitive relation of the self to itself’.399 To put it 
in other terms, human beings are aware of themselves and aware of their self-awareness. 
Francis Jeanson neatly explains the irreparability of Sartre’s decentred subject: ‘If my 
consciousness can grasp itself only by becoming distinct from itself, if I cannot be 
conscious of myself without making myself double, then there must be an irreducible 
duality between the “I” that I am as reflecting subject and the “me” I also am as the 
unreflecting subject who acts and lives.’400 
 With Sartre’s ideas about the nothingness of consciousness in mind, it is worth re-
examining Hamlet’s first extended speech. When his mother asks why his grief seems 
‘so particular’ (I.ii.75), Hamlet replies: 
 
‘Seems’, madam - nay it is, I know not ‘seems’. 
’Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother, 
Nor customary suits of solemn black, 
Nor windy suspiration of forced breath, 
No, nor the fruitful river in the eye, 
Nor the dejected havior of the visage, 
Together with all forms, moods, shapes of grief, 
That can denote me truly. These indeed ‘seem’, 
For they are actions that a man might play, 
But I have that within which passes show, 
These but the trappings and the suits of woe.  (I.ii.76-86) 
 
James L. Calderwood, one of the first critics to acknowledge Hamlet’s idiosyncratic 
fondness for negatives and negation, writes: ‘In the first 46 lines he speaks . . . one finds 
18 instances of the negatives “no,” “not,” “nor,” and “nothing”’, which means that they 
occur in nearly forty per cent of his lines.401 Hamlet’s use of negatives is extremely 
significant in his first speech. At first glance, the speech seems to be a straightforward 
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assertion of an inward authenticity that stands opposed to ‘actions that a man might 
play’. But by piling up negatives and double negatives, Hamlet asserts what he is by 
determining what he is not. He ‘nihilates’ elements of the external world which either 
do or do not ‘denote [him] truly’ in order to assert another dimension of being, ‘that 
within which passes show’. Hamlet does not think of his self as a positive entity, as a 
‘something’; rather, his self is a ‘nothingness’ perpetually compelled to establish itself 
in the world. Colin McGinn notes how Hamlet finds ‘a mysterious chasm, a gap where 
the simple self ought to be - a kind of throbbing nothingness.’402 Hamlet’s self is akin to 
the nothingness Richard feels when he is dethroned by Bolingbroke: 
 
  my grief lies all within, 
And these external manner of laments 
Are merely shadows to the unseen grief 
That swells with silence in the tortured soul. 
There lies the substance  
      (Richard II, IV.i.285-9) 
 
Like Sartre, Shakespeare is interested in the negating effect of human absence. 
However, in some respects, Shakespeare offers a more complicated and arresting notion 
of ontological nothingness than Sartre, because in Hamlet, the supernatural presence (or 
non-presence) of the ghost dramatically heightens and intensifies the suggestion that 
nothingness and being are inextricably linked. The play begins with Barnardo’s call 
‘Who’s there?’ and Francisco’s response ‘Nay, answer me. Stand and unfold yourself’ 
(I.i.i-2), which immediately focus an audience’s attention on the relationship between 
presence and absence. But when Barnardo asks: ‘Say, what, is Horatio there?’, and 
Horatio replies: ‘A piece of him’ (I.i.18), the neat distinction between absence and 
presence or being and non-being is instantly compromised. Horatio is so cold that he is 
not entirely present, and this foreshadows the ontological liminality of the ghost. When 
asked ‘has this thing appeared again tonight?’, Barnardo replies: ‘I have seen nothing’ 
(I.i.20-1). Of course, Barnardo means that he has not seen the ghost or anything 
unusual. But taken literally, the remark sounds like a contradiction in terms. The notion 
of ‘seeing nothing’ implies the prior expectation of ‘seeing something’, and treats 
‘nothing’ as if it were visible. From the moment the play begins, the stage is filled with 
the palpable absence of the ghost, much like Sartre’s café when his friend is not there. 
But when the party encounter the spectral figure of Hamlet Senior, its presence does not 
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produce a plenitude or fullness of being, because the imprint of the ghost’s absence 
remains. Ewan Fernie observes that ‘Shakespeare’s ghost is in being but also beyond . . 
. the spectral hovers uncannily between presence and absence as embodied spirit. . . . It 
is a question not of “to be” and “not to be”, then, but of being-in-between.’403 This ‘in-
betweenness’ not only refers to the ghost’s spiritual liminality: it also exemplifies ‘our 
own “lack-in-being”’, writes Fernie, and therefore ‘Hamlet comes face to face with the 
ghastliness of his own self.’404 By placing a supernatural entity on stage, Shakespeare 
shows how being is literally haunted by non-being.  
 The first critic to be struck by Shakespeare’s uncanny prefiguration of the 
existentialist theory of subjectivity as nothingness was A. D. Nuttall. In Shakespeare the 
Thinker, he writes:  
 
The basic notion of a walking negation that seeks a more substantial identity 
through role-playing is obviously close to Jean-Paul Sartre’s Existentialism, as 
set out in L’Être et le néant. This is a chronologically scandalous thing to say, 
but I claim similarity only, not influence. Shakespeare has probably read 
Seneca and has certainly not read Sartre. But Hamlet is more like Sartre’s man 
than he is like Seneca’s.405 
 
Nuttall is astonished to find such a full and precise understanding of the human self as 
absence or negation in a piece of drama written over three hundred years before the 
development of existentialist philosophy. But evidence for such a historically 
preposterous claim abounds in the play. Shakespeare provides another interesting 
portrayal of the ontological lack or nothingness at the heart of being in the closet scene. 
By staging the scene so that Hamlet sees the ghost but Gertrude does not, Shakespeare 
further intensifies the coexistence of being and nothingness: 
  
Ghost.  Speak to her, Hamlet. 
Ham.  How is it with you, lady? 
Gert.  Alas, how is’t with you, 
That you do bend your eye on vacancy 
And with th’incorporal air do hold discourse? 
Forth at your eyes your spirits wildly peep, 
And as the sleeping soldiers in th’alarm 
Your bedded hair like life in excrements 
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Start up and stands an end. O gentle son, 
Upon the heat and flame of thy distemper 
Sprinkle cool patience. Whereon do you look? 
Ham.  On him, on him! Look you, how pale he glares! 
His form and cause conjoined, preaching to stones 
Would make them capable. [to Ghost] Do not look upon me 
Lest with this piteous action you convert 
My stern effects! Then what I have to do 
Will want true colour, tears perchance for blood. 
Gert.  To whom do you speak this? 
Ham.  Do you see nothing there? 
Gert.  Nothing at all, yet all that is I see. 
Ham.  Nor did you nothing hear? 
Gert.  No, nothing but ourselves.  (III.iv.111-31) 
 
Howard Caygill argues that ‘The role played by nothing in Shakespeare’s dramas is far 
more equivocal than anything dreamt of in philosophy; in them Shakespeare “monsters” 
the equivocal spectacle of nothing, but without arriving at an affirmation of being.’406 In 
the passage above, there is certainly a philosophical richness in Shakespeare’s playful 
dramatisation of ‘seeing’ nothing. Caygill continues: ‘Rather than convert nothing into 
being, Shakespeare opens an in-between state - not-nothing - which is neither being nor 
nothing. The negation of nothing is intrinsically equivocal, appearing at the same time 
as a nothing that is a thing, and a thing that is a nothing.’407  
 ‘To be, or not to be - that is the question’ (III.i.55): Hamlet’s contemplation of the 
difference between being and non-being is one of the most existentially intense 
moments of the play. But Shakespeare’s famous line is perhaps more existentially 
sophisticated than it appears on the surface. Douglas Bruster deconstructs Hamlet’s 
soliloquy in order to reveal the verbal ambiguity and multiple contradictions that arise 
from the seemingly simple opposition of being and not being. He argues that ‘Rather 
than only a balanced alternative, this famous phrase could be read as combining as well 
as separating its items.’408 Shakespeare’s play thus poses a richer philosophical 
question: ‘Is being all that different from not being? Can we be more certain about one 
than the other?’409 The idea that nothingness is secreted at the heart of being strikes a 
chord with existentialist theories of consciousness. Sartre argues that ‘consciousness 
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does not have by itself any sufficiency of being as an absolute subjectivity.’410 For 
existentialists, there is no essential, pre-social self that exists before consciousness. To 
put it in Shakespearean terms, the human self has a ‘glassy essence’ (Measure for 
Measure, II.ii.123), an ontological nothingness, which must establish itself in the world.  
 The suggestion that subjectivity and nothingness are intimately related is repeated 
and developed in a number of Shakespeare’s plays. As Holbrook observes, Shakespeare 
‘figures the human self as a bottomless gulf.’411 In King Lear, Shakespeare’s interest in 
the notion that the human self is made of nothing is clearly apparent. The fool says to 
Lear: ‘Thou hast pared thy wit o’ both sides and left nothing in the middle’, and later: 
‘thou art an O without a figure. I am better than thou art, now. I am a fool; thou art 
nothing’ (iv.177-9, 184-6). The fool’s teasing carries serious philosophical weight, for 
the idea of nothing in King Lear does not only relate to worldly nihilism: Shakespeare 
suggests that nothingness is important inwardly as well as externally. ‘Nothing, my 
Lord’ (i.80): This is Cordelia’s simple response to her father when he asks what she has 
to say to show how much she loves him. In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus writes:  
 
In certain situations, replying ‘nothing’ when asked what one is thinking 
about may well be pretence in a man. . . . But if that reply is sincere, if it 
symbolises the odd state of soul in which the void becomes eloquent, in 
which the chain of daily expressions is broken, in which the heart vainly 
seeks the link that will connect it again, then it is as it were the first sign of 
absurdity.412  
 
‘Nothing’ ignites the action of King Lear. It is the word that precipitates Lear’s descent 
into madness and his recognition of the terrible absurdity of the world. Lear asks: ‘Who 
is it that can tell me who I am? / Lear’s shadow?’ (iv.222-3) A human shadow is a 
silhouette of the self, and if we recall Kierkegaard’s suggestion that ‘the individual is 
not an actual shape but a shadow,’413 we can see here that the idea that the self is 
nothing is far more philosophically complex than the idea that the self is absolute 
vacancy. John Lee notes the inadequacy of certain new historicist and cultural 
materialist readings of Renaissance subjectivity as fictions; according to these readings, 
‘Identity, . . . whether produced in the Renaissance or in the present, is always and 
everywhere expressive of the external factors which created it, and into which it always 
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threatens to bring it down; the answer to “who’s there” is always either “no body” or 
“everything”.’414 But, as we see in the Fool’s understanding of Lear’s ‘shadowy’ self or 
in Edgar’s unsettling deracination of selfhood, ‘Edgar I nothing am’ (xii.21), 
Shakespeare fuses being and nothingness in a way that suggests that his thoughts about 
subjectivity are philosophically far more advanced than that. Lee later explains that in 
Shakespeare’s drama, ‘the answer to “who’s there” is not “no one” or “every one” or 
even “power”, but versions of “I am”.’415 Versions of ‘I am’, it would seem, but also 
versions of ‘I am not’. 
 This negation of being can also be found when a shamed and disgraced Othello 
stages his own suicide. ‘Speak of me as I am’ (Othello, V.ii.351), he says before trying 
to determine exactly what sort of individual he should be faithfully remembered as:  
 
  Then must you speak  
Of one that loved not wisely but too well, 
Of one not easily jealous but, being wrought, 
Perplexed in the extreme; of one whose hand, 
Like the base Indian, threw a pearl away 
Richer than all his tribe; of one whose subdued eyes, 
Albeit unusèd to the melting mood, 
Drops tears as fast as the Arabian trees 
Their medicinable gum. Set you down this, 
And say besides that in Aleppo once, 
Where a malignant and a turbaned Turk 
Beat a Venetian and traduced the state, 
I took by th’ throat the circumcisèd dog 
And smote him thus.   He stabs himself   
       (Othello, V.ii.352-65) 
 
Othello moves through a series of displaced identities - ‘the base Indian, ‘a turbaned 
Turk’, ‘a Venetian’, ‘the circumcisèd dog’. It is an experience of unbearable agony: 
Othello casts himself implicitly as all these metaphorical figures and this prevents him 
from forming a definitive, unambiguous self. Like the tears of his ‘melting mood’, his 
contradictory identities mingle together in a way that is existentially traumatic. And yet, 
when Othello uses the first-person pronoun before killing himself, there is a sense that 
the ‘I’ has been emptied of all its previous identities and has left behind some other 
pure, contingent intensity, not a self in any formal or recognisable sense, but a kind of 
intuitive pre-self or non-self. Debora Kuller Shuger hints at something similar when she 
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suggests that the Renaissance self is ‘not a “thing” or agent or individuality but the 
locus of presence . . . not a bounded ego but a space - a void, if you like.’416 When 
Lodovico asks, ‘Where is this rash and most unfortunate man?’, Othello answers: 
‘That’s he that was Othello. Here I am’ (V.ii.290). Othello, at this point in the play, is 
something else. The potentiality of this severed stream of consciousness, revealed only 
when all other familiar ideas of selfhood have been abandoned, is both tragic and 
heroic. As soon as the original potential of Othello’s intuitive sense of self is brought 
into the social world, it becomes shaped and circumscribed by social structures, values, 
assumptions and ideologies.  
 In Coriolanus, when Cominius returns to Rome after his failed attempts to appeal 
to his former general, he reports: 
 
   ‘Coriolanus’ 
He would not answer to, forbade all names; 
He was a kind of nothing, titleless, 
Till he had forged himself a name o’th’ fire 
Of burning Rome.     (Coriolanus, V.i.11-15)  
 
Nuttall writes: ‘Coriolanus’ character is one of great pathos. The pathos lies in the fact 
that he has no inside . . . what existentialists say of man in general is certainly true of 
Coriolanus in particular - namely, that in himself he is a kind of nothing and acquires 
what positive nature he possesses by adventurous role-adoption.’417 Shakespeare’s 
character is thus a precursor, claims Nuttall, of ‘the existentialist idea that man’s 
original nature lies in the negation of all essence’.418 Philip Davis argues in a similar 
vein when he suggests that ‘the kind of nothing which Coriolanus feels himself to be 
when he is existentially off duty is still - as the Hamlet part of Shakespeare’s twisting 
and turning mind would be quick to realise - something that does exist.’419 Coriolanus 
spends most of the play trying to define himself through action. But in the fifth act, 
subjectivity tears away from social identity and produces in Coriolanus an experience of 
pure nothingness.  
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 Incarcerated in prison, Richard II employs a similar rhetoric of nothingness when 
he considers the possibility of a subjectivity made up of several identities: 
 
Thus play I in one person many people, 
And none contented. Sometimes am I king; 
Then treason makes me wish myself a beggar, 
And so I am. Then crushing penury 
Persuades me I was better when a king. 
Then am I kinged again, and by and by 
Think that I am unkinged by Bolingbroke, 
And straight am nothing. But whate’er I be, 
Nor I, nor any man that but man is, 
With nothing shall be pleased till he be eased  
With being nothing.    (Richard II, V.v.31-41) 
 
Hugh Grady notes that the last lines of this speech hints at ‘the hitherto unthinkable idea 
that nothingness (the possibilities of a self freed from its original insertion into a social 
order) could become easeful, no longer a crisis of non-being but a precondition for 
personal and societal change.’420 Richard’s subjectivity is still anchored in the world 
and confined by its ideological boundaries. But, once again, Shakespeare also suggests 
that there is a dimension of human consciousness that allows individuals to loosen 
themselves from their social identities but still be self-aware, an aspect of selfhood that 
is ‘eased / With being nothing’. Grady suggests that in such moments ‘“nothing” turns 
out to have suggestive positive coloration, once the initial disorientation of the identity 
crisis is overcome.’421 Can there be a subjectivity of absence?  Shakespeare seems to 
point in this direction, and suggest that human beings are literally things ‘Of nothing’ 
(Hamlet, IV.ii.25). At the close of many of Shakespeare’s great tragedies, there is a 
sense that being nothing is acceptable and perhaps even preferable to identifying oneself 
solely with a formal social identity. As Shakespeare’s tragic heroes show, an 
apprehension of the nothingness at the heart of being can give rise to considerable 
existential anxiety, but it can also be the source of great existential strength. 
The idea that consciousness is a nothingness that persistently establishes its 
existence in the world is an important philosophical premise for a great deal of 
subsequent existential thought. Shakespeare too is clearly interested in the relationship 
between consciousness and self, thought and subjectivity. Part of the energy and 
excitement of Hamlet is generated by Shakespeare’s dramatisation of the movements of 
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consciousness. Nowhere is this better seen than in Hamlet’s speech to Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern in Act II: 
 
I have of late, but wherefore I know not, lost all my mirth, forgone all 
custom of exercises and, indeed, it goes so heavily with my disposition that 
this goodly frame the earth seems to me a sterile promontory, this most 
excellent canopy the air, look you, this brave o’erhanging firmament, this 
majestical roof fretted with golden fire, why it appeareth nothing to me but a 
foul and pestilent congregation of vapours. What a piece of work is a man - 
how noble in reason; how infinite in faculties, in form and moving; how 
express and admirable in action; how like an angel in apprehension; how 
like a god; the beauty of the world; the paragon of animals. And yet to me 
what is this quintessence of dust?     (II.ii.261-74) 
 
Shakespeare draws attention here to the immediate, existential nature of human thought. 
Davis’s suggestion that there is ‘a bursting feeling about [Shakespeare’s] plays’ is 
powerfully demonstrated in this speech.422 The sense that so much is going on even 
when the action is paused is largely created by the explosive resonance of certain 
phrases, and ‘the tacit thought-movements’ between words.423 At one point in Nausea, 
Roquentin observes: ‘My thought is me: that is why I can’t stop. I exist by what I think . 
. . and I can’t prevent myself from thinking . . . If I give way, they’ll come here in front, 
between my eyes - and I go on giving way, the thought grows and grows and here it is, 
huge, filling me completely and renewing my existence.’424 There is a parallel here with 
Hamlet. His mind wanders in different directions and almost surprises itself with the 
connections it makes and the conclusions it draws. His consciousness has an intuitive, 
impulsive quality about it, which gives the impression that his self, like his thoughts, 
springs into being and changes from moment to moment. Macbeth tells us that it is ‘the 
torture of the mind to lie / In restless ecstasy’ (III.ii.23-4). Harvey Birenhaum argues 
that Macbeth is a ‘devastating study of the restless world within and the indifferent 
world without, for this is a tragedy of consciousness . . . the struggle between the 
spontaneous consciousness - the life that erupts of itself - and the reflective 
consciousness - the mind observing feelings, confounded by the eruptive energy driving 
against it.’425 The same could be said of Hamlet, whose mind never stays still and 
whose sense of self remains vulnerable to the ebb and flow of consciousness. 
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 Hamlet is one of the most self-aware and self-questioning characters in the whole 
of Shakespeare’s canon. When he is alone with the audience for the first time, he 
expresses a desire for bodily disintegration: ‘O that this too too solid flesh would melt, / 
Thaw and resolve itself into a dew’ (I.ii.129-30). Once again, Shakespeare uses aqueous 
imagery as an existentially powerful metaphor. But unlike Antony, whose subjective 
dissolution, the feeling of being as ‘indistinct / As water is in water’ (Antony and 
Cleopatra, IV.xv.10-1), is the painful result of a series of identity crises, Hamlet eagerly 
yearns for such an experience. If Antony ‘cannot hold [his] visible shape’ (IV.xv.13) at 
the end of the play, Hamlet cannot do so from the outset. He would rather think of his 
self as condensed vapour than as any kind of hardened substance. He sees the 
boundaries of the self as permeable and fluid. Andy Mousley writes: ‘Rather than acting 
as sources of identification, human nature and human existence become the site, for 
Hamlet, of uncertainties and questions. He is exposed to a variety of beliefs and 
behaviours, each with its own assumptions about what it is to be a human, but as a 
disengaged, disenchanted sceptic he remains at a critical distance from them.’426 But 
Hamlet also deliberately distances himself from himself in order to investigate how his 
consciousness and self-consciousness function. He is fascinated by the experiences of 
self-forgetting and self-estrangement. ‘Horatio, or I do forget myself’ (I.ii.161), he says 
as his friends arrive. After his furious confrontation with Laertes in the graveyard, he 
speaks of his so-called ‘madness’ as if it were another self: 
 
Was’t Hamlet wronged Laertes? Never Hamlet.  
If Hamlet from himself be ta’en away 
And when he’s not himself does wrong Laertes, 
Then Hamlet does it not; Hamlet denies it.  
Who does it then? His madness. If’t be so, 
Hamlet is of the faction that is wronged – 
His madness is poor Hamlet’s enemy.  (V.ii.211-17) 
 
While Claudius wonders ‘What it should be, /  . . . that thus hath put him / So much 
from th’understanding of himself’ (II.ii.7-9), the audience is aware that Hamlet’s self-
distancing is, at least, partially intentional. His ‘madness’ is designed as a conscious act 
of self-estrangement. The purpose of ‘such ambiguous giving out’ is that others ‘know 
aught of [him]’ (I.v.176-7). But the erratic, disjointed nature of Hamlet’s ‘antic 
disposition’ speech, the excessive repetition of ‘doubtful’ phrases, and the unusual 
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choice of words and grammar suggest that he is also genuinely overwhelmed with 
passion. His strange, eccentric behaviour is not entirely a sham: it hovers somewhere 
between authenticity and inauthenticity. Hamlet’s parting gesture, ‘I do commend me to 
you’ (I.v.181), at the end of the scene is a standard expression of devotion that means ‘I 
entrust myself to you’, yet the phrase also harbours the sense that Hamlet consigns a 
part of himself to his companions. Time and again, he stretches the distance between his 
socially moulded identity and his inwardly experienced subjectivity in order to open up 
the nothingness that exists at the heart of his being. It is as if, paradoxically, Hamlet 
must become distanced from himself in order to fully realise how fragile and vulnerable 
‘selfhood’ really is. He reveals the irreducible duality of human consciousness: 
consciousness can only grasp itself by becoming distinct from itself. Perhaps Ophelia’s 
reply to Hamlet after he makes a series of lewd jibes at her expense during the 
performance of The Mousetrap, ‘You are naught, you are naught’ (III.ii.140), not only 
means that Hamlet is being ‘improper’ or ‘offensive’, but also invites a more literal 
reading. Like so many lines in Hamlet, the remark transcends its immediate context and 
reverberates across the play. Hamlet is permanently divided from himself in a way that 
reveals that he is ‘naught’. And it is not just Hamlet who is self-divided. When Laertes 
sees Ophelia who, in a state of madness, has become ‘Divided from herself and her fair 
judgement’ (IV.v.85), he remarks: ‘Nature is fine in love, and where ’tis fine / It sends 
some precious instance of itself / After the thing it loves’ (IV.v).427 Davis finds these 
lines particularly interesting and claims that the ‘it’ Laertes refers to is ‘an earlier almost 
pre-human force within the human set-up: an “it” in us that sends “some instance of 
itself” after the thing it loves.’428 This ‘pre-human force’ is not a self but an impulse of 
consciousness that comes into the world. 
 In Shakespeare and the Reason, Terence Hawkes notes that ideas about intellect, 
reason and the mental faculties of the human mind underwent considerable revision 
during the Renaissance. He writes: ‘The old view, well expressed by Aquinas, had 
conceived of the mind as a unity whose faculties were interdependent and moved in 
complementary directions to perform the single function which was ratio. The 
Renaissance view, however, was of a divided mind whose faculties were opposed to 
each other because they moved in directions which were mutually contradictory. . . . 
Division had replaced unity.’429 In existentialist thought, because nothingness exists at 
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the heart of being, consciousness is engaged in a never-ending process of self-creation. 
Human beings, the existentialists argue, thus find themselves in a perpetual state of 
existential restlessness. ‘Sir, in my heart there was a kind of fighting / That would not 
let me sleep’ (V.ii.4-5), Hamlet says to Horatio at the end of the play. It seems fitting 
that this crucial line should be uttered at the denouement of the play. For the first four 
acts of the play, Hamlet agonises over the nature of selfhood before he finally comes to 
the realisation that his ‘self’ is not really a self but ‘a kind of fighting’ within 
consciousness. It is the uneasy, agitated and ultimately futile attempt of consciousness 
to stabilise itself. 
 By exploring existentialist ideas about nothingness and consciousness, we can 
begin to see why Hamlet’s subjectivity is so frustratingly inaccessible for both himself 
and an audience. We can also begin to appreciate that Hamlet’s endless, unremitting 
pursuit of self, his existential quest for his own unique subjectivity is the life-force of 
the play. Grady writes:  
 
In short, what makes Hamlet suitable for our own decentred age is its insight 
into the constituting fissures and fictions of the tossing life raft of subjectivity 
to which Hamlet clings, for Hamlet is a humanist of the Montaignean sort - one 
who sees into the shifting, uncertain, contradictory, and unstable qualities of 
the self, not a humanist of the Rousseauistic school which makes of the self a 
fixed, essential source of unproblematic values and perceptions.430 
 
Hamlet’s humanism - like Montaigne’s - resonates strongly with existentialist 
humanism, because it presents man not as a source of ultimate value, but as a being 
constantly involved in the process of self-becoming. Charles Taylor adopts an 
existentialist perspective when he writes: ‘We seek self-knowledge, but this can no 
longer mean just impersonal lore about human nature, as it could for Plato. Each of us 
has to discover his or her own form. We are not looking for the universal nature; we 
each look for our own being.’431 In a famous passage in Existentialism and Humanism, 
Sartre asserts that 
 
the word humanism has two very different meanings. One may understand by 
humanism a theory that upholds man as the end in-itself and as the supreme 
value. . . . That kind of humanism is absurd. . . . But there is another sense of 
the word, of which the fundamental meaning is this: Man is all the time outside 
of himself: it is in projecting and losing himself beyond himself that he makes 
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man exist. . . . Since man is thus self-surpassing, and can grasp objects only in 
relation to his self-surpassing, he is the heart and centre of his transcendence. 
There is no universe other than a human universe, the universe of human 
subjectivity. . . . [T]his is what we call existential humanism. This is 
humanism, because we remind man that there is no legislator but himself; that 
he himself, thus abandoned, must decide for himself; also because we show 
that it is not by turning back upon himself, but always by seeking, beyond 
himself, an aim which is one of liberation or of some particular realisation, that 
man can realise himself as truly human.432  
 
As Sartre claims and Hamlet demonstrates, human beings are always to some degree 
outside of themselves, always capable of consciously reflecting and reconfiguring 
themselves and their world.  This is what Nuttall hints at when he refers to Shakespeare 
as ‘a philosopher of human possibility.’433  
 In Hamlet, Shakespeare shows a deep interest in the structures and workings of 
human consciousness. We have also seen how the idea of nothingness has a 
philosophical specificity that is akin to later existentialist theories of subjectivity. But 
once Shakespeare has established Hamlet’s self-relation, his exploration of human 
selfhood naturally opens up questions of authenticity, integrity and truthfulness to 
oneself. Hamlet is constantly negotiating his sense of self and this inevitably involves 
investigating modes of authenticity and inauthenticity. Through Hamlet, Shakespeare 
asks: what exactly does it mean to be ‘authentic’, and what are the ethical implications 
of personal authenticity? How can we determine firstly, which impulses are authentic, 
and secondly, whether or not we are being authentic if we act upon them?  
 
 
Being Authentic  
 
In Ivan Turgenev’s short story, ‘Hamlet of the Shchigrovsky District’ (1849), the 
narrator tells of when he once attended a dinner party at the home of a wealthy 
landowner. He recalls how during the occasion he came into contact with a series of 
would-be Hamlet figures. After his arrival, the narrator immediately notices amongst 
the company ‘a young man of about twenty, blond and myopic, dressed from head to 
foot in black’ and, although he appears shy and withdrawn, he continues to ‘smile 
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venomously’.434 The anonymous narrator is then introduced to Lupikhin, an embittered 
man who hides a greater personal pain under his stinging witticisms. Retiring to his 
shared accommodation, the narrator finally meets another clone of Hamlet with whom 
he happens to fall into conversation during a sleepless night. Recognising himself as a 
metafictional cliché, the character complains bitterly about being ‘born an imitation of 
someone else’.435 This eccentric caricature of Shakespeare’s Danish prince boasts of his 
own worthlessness, exaggerates his personal humiliations and repeatedly grumbles 
about being ‘unoriginal’. He eventually says to the narrator: ‘call me Hamlet of the 
Shchigrovsky District. There are many such Hamlets in every district, but perhaps you 
haven’t come across any others.’436 Turgenev’s sketch, in its creative, satirical take on 
Russian ‘Hamletism’, taps into and plays on Shakespeare’s Hamlet’s obsession with the 
notions of imitation, originality and authenticity. So, why is being original so 
existentially significant for the Danish Prince?  
 Hamlet knows that he is surrounded by ‘inauthentic’ people. He takes an 
immediate dislike to Claudius’ messenger Osric, referring to him as a ‘water-fly’ 
(V.ii.69) and a ‘lapwing’ (V.ii165). The imagery of creatures that hover just above the 
water’s surface aptly describes his superficial character. Osric is a man whom ‘the 
drossy age dotes on’ (V.ii.169), says Hamlet, because he plays ‘the tune of the time’ 
(V.ii.169-70). Two hundred years later, another melancholy Dane made a similar 
diagnosis of his society. ‘The present age’, writes Kierkegaard, ‘is essentially a sensible, 
reflecting age, devoid of passion, flaring up in superficial, short-lived enthusiasm and 
prudentially relaxing in indolence.’437 Both Hamlet and Kierkegaard see their worlds as 
existentially bankrupt. Hamlet is infuriated by the inauthentic ways of others: Laertes’ 
crocodile tears, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern’s surveillance work, and Polonius’ 
obsequiousness are all recognised and rebuffed by him. To put it in existentialist terms, 
human beings conform to the inauthentic ways of the ‘They-Self’ (also referred to by 
existentialists as the crowd, the public or the herd) when they unreflectively follow the 
norms, practices and conventions of society. When they act in this way, individuals 
appropriate the values of the They-self and flee from their existential responsibilities. 
They become absorbed in the world, convinced that their social role or identity is what 
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makes them who they are. Hamlet is extremely cautious of this kind of existence, aware 
of the ease with which people - himself included - can become caught up in their 
everyday goals and ambitions. He is also weary of the power of what he calls ‘general 
censure’ (I.iv.35). It worries him to think that a man’s character may be corrupted and 
compromised by common opinion. He reflects: 
 
So oft it chances in particular men 
That, for some vicious mole of nature in them,  
As in their birth wherein they are not guilty,  
(Since nature cannot choose his origin), 
By their o’ergrowth of some complexion 
Oft breaking down the pales and forts of reason, 
Or by some habit that too much o’erleavens 
The form of plausive manners – that these men, 
Carrying, I say, the stamp of one defect 
(Being Nature’s livery or Fortune’s star), 
His virtues else, be they as pure as grace, 
As infinite as man may undergo, 
Shall in the general censure take corruption 
From that particular fault:    (I.iv.23-36) 
 
This speech is rarely looked at in great detail, and is often regarded as one which 
Shakespeare eventually lost patience with. But there are some interesting details in this 
passage. Hamlet uses the image of over-risen bread – as he does when he criticises 
Osric for having ‘a kind of yeasty collection’ (V.ii.170-1) of habits and manners – to 
suggest that socially acceptable behaviour is often frothy and artificial. He condemns 
the customary wedding revelries that result in Denmark being ‘traduced and taxed’ 
(I.iv.18) by other nations. Hamlet’s mind then begins to contemplate the wider issue at 
stake: the way a man’s character can be reduced to a single, ‘particular fault’. Implicitly, 
he recognises that human beings are complicated things made up of both faults and 
virtues. The thought that public opinion can rob an individual of his existential 
complexity troubles Hamlet a great deal. Of course, there is an element of self-
conscious theatricality in the speech that foreshadows his concern for his posthumous 
reputation at the end of the play. Hamlet knows that the audience may judge him for his 
‘particular fault’ - his reluctance to act. He is also aware that his sense of self is, in part, 
derived from the opinions of others. If we recall from Chapter Three Sartre’s idea about 
the way human beings view their selves obliquely through the gaze of others, we can 
see here how Shakespeare gives the notion a metatheatrical dimension in Hamlet. 
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Hamlet hints in this speech at an awareness of the way his subjectivity is partially 
constituted by the audience. Ralph Berry offers a similar reading of these lines and 
argues that when Hamlet later tells the players that ‘censure . . . must in your allowance 
o’erweigh a whole theatre of others’ (III.ii.26-8), he is also demonstrating his awareness 
of the judgemental powers of an audience.438 Hamlet urges the players to judge what is 
fit and appropriate for their performance, and not to bend to the whims and desires of 
other people watching the play. If this advice is viewed in its metatheatrical context, we 
can see that Hamlet asserts his authenticity not only against other characters (as he does 
when he tells Rozencrantz and Guildernstern that he is not an instrument to be played 
upon (III.ii.355-63)), but also against his own audience. As existentialists would say, he 
struggles with the element of his existence that is ‘being-for-others’. 
 Hamlet is largely sceptical about what he sees as the existentially degrading 
customs and general opinions of society. He finds it difficult to avenge his father’s 
murder, because this action has been prescribed for him rather than authentically 
chosen. Yet he still feels an obligation to fulfil these expectations. Something of this 
idea emerges when Hamlet gives advice to his mother in the closet scene. He tells her: 
 
Assume a virtue if you have it not. 
That monster Custom, who all sense doth eat 
Of habits devil, is angel yet in this, 
That to the use of actions fair and good 
He likewise gives a frock or livery 
That aptly is put on.   (III.iv.158-63) 
 
The argument here is a complex one. Hamlet appears to be suggesting that custom is a 
devilish monster who ruins human sensitivity; but it can also engender more virtuous 
human actions, if individuals choose to conform to it on their own terms. An individual 
can authentically commit to an act and take responsibility for it, even if that act has been 
ordered or directed by someone or something else. For Hamlet, personal authenticity is 
paramount. He privileges and protects his unique sense of self and regards this feeling 
as a source of value. ‘The time is out of joint; O cursed spite / That ever I was born to 
set it right!’ (I.v.186-7), he says as he shoulders the burden of his responsibilities. By 
adhering to his father’s dictum and ‘setting things right’ in the latter’s sense, Hamlet 
would not be acting on his own terms in his own way, and therefore would be as 
inauthentic and hypocritical as those around him. Instead, Hamlet has to find his own 
authentic way to act and exist. 
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 It is perhaps useful at this stage to examine the idea of existential authenticity 
more closely. For thinkers such as Sartre and Heidegger, authenticity is the extent to 
which individuals engage with and take responsibility for their life as their own. 
Authenticity consequently requires truthfulness and transparency, the capacity to be 
honest with oneself. But one of the major problems with the notion of authenticity is the 
way it has become mixed up with essentialist politics. As Jonathan Dollimore notes, for 
a long time the idea of being authentic ‘has operated as a subcategory of the real, the 
natural, and the true.’439 Marshall Berman’s conclusions in 1970 are a good example of 
this, claims Dollimore. Berman writes:  
 
Our society is filled with people who are ardently yearning and consciously 
striving for authenticity: moral philosophers who are exploring the idea of 
‘self-realization’; psychiatrists and their patients who are working to 
develop and strengthen ‘ego-identity’; artists and writers who gave the word 
‘authenticity’ the cultural force it has today – some consciously influenced 
by existentialism, others ignorant of it, but all bent on creating works and 
living lives in which their deepest, truest selves will somehow be expressed  
. . . fighting, desperately and against all odds, simply to preserve, to feel, to 
be themselves.440  
 
Dollimore perhaps unfairly sees Berman’s view of authenticity as tantamount to an 
uncomplicated and achievable ideal, a direct and uncomplicated command to ‘be true to 
oneself’. Existentialists would forcefully reject this notion that that human beings have 
fixed, stable selves to be true to. Indeed, they would argue that such ideas of 
authenticity constitute a deeper and more dangerous form of bad faith. However, it must 
be acknowledged that some of these problems relating to the issue of authenticity 
originate from existentialism itself, most notably from Heidegger’s Being and Time.  
 Heidegger’s philosophical project attempts to lay bare the fundamental structures 
of human existence. To do this, he uses the term ‘Dasein’ (meaning ‘being-there’) to 
show how every human being has a particular understanding of their own existence. He 
explains: ‘Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence - in terms of a 
possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself. . . . Dasein decides its existence, whether it 
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does so by taking hold or by neglecting.’441 Adorno’s criticisms of Heidegger’s 
‘fundamental ontology’ in The Jargon of Authenticity and Negative Dialectics help to 
explain how Heidegger’s problematic use of language has undermined some of his 
philosophical arguments. Heidegger sought to use idiosyncratic language that would 
transcend the presuppositions of Western metaphysics and enable him to return to ‘the 
question of the meaning of Being.’442 But Adorno points out that the terms Heidegger 
uses to explain his philosophical insights cannot be severed from sociohistorically 
engendered meanings: ‘When [Heidegger’s jargon of authenticity] dresses empirical 
words with aura, it exaggerates general concepts and ideas of philosophy - for instance 
the concept of being - so grossly that their conceptual essence, the mediation through 
the thinking subject, disappears completely under the varnish.’443 According to Adorno, 
Heidegger’s ‘bad form of language’ is best demonstrated by his misuse of the concepts 
‘Being’, ‘death’ and ‘authenticity’.444 More specifically, Heidegger misemploys the 
word “is”. Adorno argues that the meaning of this verb is ‘fulfilled only in the relation 
between subject and predicate. It is not independent.’445 So when Heidegger refuses to 
use the word in its general, everyday sense and adopts it in a more idiosyncratic sense, 
he ends up objectifying Being; that is, he transforms Being, against his best intentions, 
into a fixed, definite state that can be analysed and explained, rather than regarding it as 
a fluid, open process that resists reduction and simplification. These problems continue 
in Heidegger’s writings on authenticity and death. In Heidegger’s mind, death is 
absolutely alien to human beings and it therefore individualises them. An apprehension 
of death, he claims, produces a realisation of ‘one’s ownmost possibility’, in the sense 
that it forces an individual to come to terms with their own finitude.446 But Adorno 
argues that by making the apprehension of death the ground of authentic transcendence, 
Heidegger hypostatises being. His view of death thus 
 
robs the subject of its moment of freedom and spontaneity: it completely freezes, 
like the Heideggerian states of mind, into something like an attribute of the 
substance ‘existence’. Hatred toward reifying psychology removes from the living 
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that which would make them other than reified. Authenticity . . . is made into an 
object.447 
 
Authenticity thus becomes a model of reification. In other words, it becomes an 
essentialised state of existence, a form of being that relates to a fixed or presupposed 
self. Sherman notes that Heidegger’s philosophy ultimately produces ‘a more invidious 
identity theory than those against which it rebels.’448 The idea of authenticity in Being 
and Time is difficult, because it takes away from the individual the opportunity to 
engage with the process of becoming authentic. In Heidegger’s mind, authenticity is 
something thrust upon one at the moment when one realises the inevitability of one’s 
own death, whereas for other existentialist thinkers, the troublesome path towards 
authenticity is something an individual has to carve out for himself. As critics such as 
Adorno and Sherman contend, Heidegger inadvertently undermines his own 
philosophical agenda. Of course, others disagree with this view of Heideggerian 
authenticity. Taylor Carmen argues that Heidegger’s idea of authentic existence ‘is 
above all a conception of the first-person perspective I have on myself and its 
irreducibility to any third-person point of view, no matter how descriptively thorough or 
accurate it may be’.449 He suggests that it is wrong to view Heidegger’s notion of 
authenticity as a normative ideal of integrated selfhood, because Dasein can never 
apprehend itself as a complete and unified entity. It perpetually falls short of total self-
understanding, because it cannot view being from an objective third-person perspective.  
 Although it is necessary to understand and appreciate the criticism of authenticity 
as a philosophical notion, it is also important to stress that the idea - with and without its 
limitations - was as important in Renaissance England, mutatis mutandis, as it continues 
to be in our contemporary world. For existentialists, the idea that individuals can have 
an intimate and authentic relationship with themselves is a vital one. In order for human 
beings to engage actively with the process of self-becoming, it is crucial that there is no 
fixed, predetermined, a priori self. Eric Langley underlines the importance of this 
notion in Renaissance literature. He writes: ‘Authenticity (being autocratic self-
authorization, etymologically speaking) should not be mistaken for subject-seeking 
essentialism, and thereby should not be displayed like a trophy or a quantity, but as a 
process should be heard in the echo between words or in the vacancies that impel these 
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narratives of self.’450 For existentialists and for Hamlet, an essentialised model of 
authenticity is not possible. However, this renders the notion of authenticity vulnerable 
and unstable, for if the self is always in a state of flux, how can an individual be true to 
it? As we shall see, this is the heart of Hamlet’s existential dilemma.  
 In Hamlet, Shakespeare is acutely aware of the complexity of the issue of 
individual authenticity, and, as I suggested in Chapter Two, he is particularly conscious 
of the interplay between authenticity and inauthenticity. Polonius’ advice to Laertes as 
he leaves for France epitomises the way a subtle and more self-deceiving form of 
inauthenticity can work under the veneer of idiosyncrasy and personal self-assertion: 
 
 Be thou familiar but by no means vulgar; 
 Those friends thou hast, and their adoption tried, 
 Grapple them unto thy soul with hoops of steel, 
 But do not dull thy palm with entertainment 
 Of each new-hatched, unfledged courage. . . .  
 This above all, to thine own self be true. (I.iii.60-4, 77) 
 
Polonius’ recommendation of fidelity to one’s best interests and advantage is a good 
example of a devious, inauthentic claim to authenticity. Kierkegaard explains that this 
type of human agency and action is ‘only the movement of abstraction within the 
concretions of individuality.’451 Paradoxically, human beings do not act in their own 
authentic, individual way when they assert the kind of individuality Polonius advocates, 
because they are simply conforming to the practices of society; they think they are 
acting for themselves, when they are in fact only replicating the desires and normative 
ideals prescribed by others. In short, they are not conscious of their own inauthenticity. 
So how do human beings, who (according to the existentialists) have an immediate and 
particular understanding of their own being, so thoroughly misunderstand the nature of 
their own existence? As Stephen Mulhall explains, ‘if Dasein typically loses itself in the 
“they”, it will understand both its world and itself in the terms that “they” make 
available to it, and so will interpret its own nature in terms of the categories that lie 
closest to hand in popular culture; and they will be as inauthentic as their creators.’452  
 Against the insincerity and inauthenticity of others, Hamlet asserts what 
existentialists would call an individualising sense of ‘mineness’. Lee notes how 
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important the phrase ‘to me’ is for the Danish Prince: ‘“To me” is the Prince’s own tag; 
it reflects his awareness that he is construing and his concern with the activity and the 
transformative nature of his understanding.’453 Hamlet is profoundly interested in the 
way the world discloses itself to his consciousness. ‘How weary, stale, flat and 
unprofitable / Seem to me all the uses of this world!’ (I.ii.133-4), he says as he agonises 
over his mother’s hasty marriage. McGinn observes that Hamlet’s ‘despair seems 
existential, not occasional, a matter of how he looks at the world rather than what the 
world throws specifically at him.’454 The fact that Hamlet apprehends the world around 
him in a distinctive way gives the impression that he is more authentically self-aware 
than other characters in the play. Holbrook writes: 
 
We don’t think Hamlet is inferior to Fortinbras, the energetic future leader 
of Denmark. We know there are types of worldly success that constitute 
existential failure. Hamlet refuses to become like Kierkegaard’s ‘the others’ 
or Heidegger’s ‘the they’. He holds himself back from the world, or ‘fails’ 
in it, if you like - but from a certain perspective this failure looks like high 
success, like freedom.455  
 
To a certain extent, Holbrook is correct. Hamlet does distance himself from those who 
have ‘got the tune of the time’ (V.ii.169-70). On hearing the distant wedding revelries, 
Horatio asks: ‘Is it a custom?’ (I.iv.12), to which Hamlet replies: ‘Ay, marry is’t, / But 
to my mind, though I am native here / And to the manner born, it is a custom / More 
honoured in the breach than the observance’ (I.iv.13-6). Hamlet suggests that it would 
be more honourable to break with tradition than to observe it; more authentic not to 
engage with inauthentic habits and conventions. But Hamlet also recognises that the 
distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity is not easy to determine, even 
inwardly. Hamlet challenges certain notions of authenticity while simultaneously 
affirming others. Mousley suggests: ‘A role for Hamlet is a possible self, or possibly 
even an anti-self masquerading as a self, but it is never merely a role.’456 Roles always 
have existential significance for Hamlet, and this introduces the problem of what it 
means to be an authentic self. Acting and theatricality make Hamlet ponder the question 
‘what is authenticity?’. He is outraged that the player’s speech can so convincingly 
simulate genuine emotion:   
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Is it not monstrous that this player here, 
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion, 
Could force his soul so to his own conceit 
That from her working all his visage wanned 
– Tears in his eyes, distraction in his aspect, 
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting 
With forms to his conceit – and all for nothing – 
For Hecuba? 
What’s Hecuba to him, or he to her, 
That he should weep for her? What would he do 
Had he the motive and that for passion 
That I have?      (II.ii.486-97) 
 
Mousley notes that, for Hamlet, ‘theatrical language is a signifier of both authenticity 
and inauthenticity: the player’s imitation of heroic passion is an inauthentic simulation 
of authentic passion.’457 The blurring of these states in the theatre makes it harder for 
Hamlet to determine what constitutes an authentic course of action. 
 We can also trace the dialectic of authenticity at work when Hamlet confronts 
Laertes in the graveyard. René Girard argues that Laertes provides a mimetic model for 
Hamlet: ‘He is trying to be a normal man himself; he is aping the well-adjusted 
personality of Laertes, a man who can draw his sword when he should and who can 
jump into his sister’s grave when he should without looking like an idiot.’458 For Girard, 
Hamlet’s language during the scene reveals the importance of mimetic rivalry: 
 
   ’Swounds, show me what thou’lt do. 
Woul’t weep, woul’t fight, woul’t fast, woul’t tear thyself, 
Woul’t drink up eisel, eat a crocodile? 
I’ll do’t. Dost thou come here to whine, 
To outface me with leaping in her grave? 
Be buried quick with her, and so will I. . . . 
I’ll rant as well as thou.   (V.i.263-8, 273)  
 
When Hamlet later admits that ‘the bravery of [Laertes’] grief did put me / Into a 
towering passion’ (V.ii),459 the interdependence of self and other becomes even more 
apparent. As sons of murdered fathers seeking revenge, Laertes and Hamlet should be 
identical doubles. But the closer Hamlet gets to Laertes, the more different and distinct 
he seems. In the graveyard, it is as if Hamlet is trying out another role, mimicking the 
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inauthenticity of Laertes in order to discard it for a more authentic way of being. His 
hyperbolic outburst, like his self-remonstrations and feigned madness, lingers in the 
existential no-man’s-land between authenticity and inauthenticity. 
 ‘I do not know / Why yet I live to say this thing’s to do, / Sith I have cause and 
will and strength and means / To do’t’ (IV.iv.42-5): Hamlet is thoroughly perplexed by 
his inability to act in accordance with the orders of his father’s ghost. His dilemma over 
action is a specifically existential problem. When Sartre discusses the problem of ‘bad 
faith’, he gives the example of a man who is a waiter in a café. He ‘can not be 
immediately a café waiter’ because role and self cannot perfectly coincide.460 In this 
situation, Sartre suggests, 
 
it is precisely this person who I have to be (if I am the waiter in question) and 
who I am not. It is not that I do not wish to be this person or that I want this 
person to be different. But rather there is no common measure between his 
being and mine. . . . I can not be he, I can only play at being him; that is, 
imagine myself that I am he. . . . In vain do I fulfill the functions of a café 
waiter. I can only be in a neutralized mode, as the actor is Hamlet, by 
mechanically making the typical gestures of my state and by aiming at myself 
as an imaginary café waiter.461 
 
The passing reference to Hamlet in this passage is not coincidental. Like Sartre’s waiter, 
Hamlet knows he cannot ‘find himself’ in the role he has been assigned. Sartre 
continues: ‘We are dealing with more than mere social positions; I am never any one of 
my attitudes, any one of my actions. . . . I can not say either that I am here or I am not 
here, in the sense that we can say “that box of matches is on the table;” . . . On all sides 
I escape being and yet - I am.’462 Here, Sartre begins to consider the difficulty of 
thinking of authenticity as a state of being, as something that can be affirmed and 
sustained.  
 There has been much debate about the room Sartre leaves for the possibility of 
‘good faith’. Sherman rejects the suggestion outright: ‘on Sartre’s account the 
phenomenon of bad faith is unavoidable for ontological reasons: human beings can 
never entirely overcome it.’463 Because human consciousness is divided and non-
identical, ‘it is what it is not’, it cannot ever repair the rupture in being that allows it to 
come into existence in the first place, Sherman explains. But Sartre does gesture 
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towards the possibility of good faith and authenticity. In Notebooks for an Ethics, he 
suggests that authenticity is the degree to which an individual reflectively participates in 
their life as their own. He writes: ‘Authenticity has to do with what I will. Sincerity 
presents itself as contemplation and an announcement of what I am.’464 This argument 
prompts Ronald E. Santoni to assert that  
 
it is a misreading of Sartre to conclude, as too many interpreters do, that 
Sartre’s philosophy condemns us irreversibly to bad faith and Sartrean hell. 
Notebooks for an Ethics makes this unequivocal. Although, for Sartre, 
authenticity may not give us the security and foundation for which we may be 
looking, it gives us an exit from the torment that comes from the futile attempt 
to secure ourselves in being, things, objects, and the world. We may not be 
able to suppress our tendency to want this grounding, but we can free ourselves 
from the hell of pursuing it.465 
 
Most existentialists concur that a large portion of human existence is lived 
inauthentically or in bad faith. Perhaps Shakespeare would agree with the suggestion 
that human beings find self-truth difficult, perhaps even impossible. In Much Ado About 
Nothing, Balthasar sings: ‘Men were deceivers ever, / One foot in sea, and one on shore, 
/ To one thing constant never’ (II.iii.57-9). Authenticity, for existentialists, involves a 
recognition of the unavoidably inauthentic quality of life, an awareness that we are all 
drawn into the world and cannot disassociate ourselves from it. This point becomes 
increasingly important for existentialists as they broaden their enquiry by examining the 
ethical and political dimensions of human existence.  
 So what does it mean to say that Hamlet is more ‘authentic’ than the other 
characters in the play? When Hamlet declares, ‘This is I, / Hamlet the Dane’ (V.i.245-
6), there is the sense that he is asserting his own kind of authenticity. He is moving 
when he says this line: the stage direction ‘[Advancing]’ makes this clear. Hamlet 
becomes the person he is by defining himself in the heat of action; he engages in the 
process of self-becoming. Fernie suggests that ‘Shakespeare’s play improvises a new 
ontology of being-in-action’,466 and that this gives the play its distinct existential 
intensity. The nothingness within consciousness allows Hamlet to transcend the givens 
of his situation and accept responsibility for his own life. 
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Hamlet’s Freedom 
 
We have seen that Hamlet is deeply concerned with two broadly existential issues: 
consciousness and authenticity. Shakespeare’s explorations of these philosophically rich 
ideas play a vital part in generating the energy and intensity of the play. Hamlet’s 
anxiety about consciousness and authenticity is created by his contemplation of another 
fundamentally existential dilemma: how to act. In fact, the problem of action engenders 
a series of inextricably connected existential dilemmas. Hamlet asks himself: should I 
act at all? If I act, when and how should I do so? Is this particular act of revenge an 
authentic act? Is it morally justifiable to act? Will I be plagued by my conscience once I 
have acted? Will this course of action confirm or call into question my sense of who I 
am? The ontological and ethical implications of action leave Hamlet utterly angst-
ridden. He realises that he is compelled to choose; that he cannot not choose. There is 
no escaping freedom - even the decision not to act is a self-defining choice. By 
acknowledging the importance of action, he ups the existential stakes and shows the 
audience that the freedom to act or not act is an inescapable part of being human. 
 In Hamlet, Shakespeare suggests that in order to understand freedom, we must 
confront the realities of death and human finitude. From the outset of the play, Hamlet 
contemplates the meaning of suicide. His father’s unexpected death and his mother’s 
swift marriage have led him to think about ‘self-slaughter’ (I.ii.132). Death - his own 
and that of others - is never far from his mind. It infiltrates his language and imagery. 
He teasingly speaks of walking out of the air and ‘into [his] grave’ (II.ii.204) with 
Polonius. He is astonished by the men in Fortinbras’ army, who can ‘Go to their graves 
like beds’ (IV.iv.61) for a plot of land that would not be big enough to bury them all in. 
In his soliloquy beginning ‘To be or not to be’, in which he meditates on the desirability 
and the fear of death, Hamlet suggests that reflection is the adversary of suicide: 
 
To be, or not to be – that is the question;  
Whether ’tis nobler in the mind to suffer 
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune 
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles 
And by opposing end them; to die: to sleep – 
No more, and by a sleep to say we end 
The heartache and the thousand natural shocks 
That flesh is heir to: ’tis a consummation 
Devoutly to be wished – to die: to sleep – 
To sleep, perchance to dream – ay, there’s the rub, 
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For in that sleep of death what dreams may come 
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil 
Must give us pause: there’s the respect 
That makes calamity of so long life. 
For who would bear the whips and scorns of time, 
Th’ oppressor’s wrong, the proud man’s contumely, 
The pangs of despised love, the law’s delay, 
The insolence of office and the spurns 
That patient merit of th’unworthy takes, 
When he himself might his quietus make 
With a bare bodkin. Who would fardels bear 
To grunt and sweat under a weary life 
But that the dread of something after death 
(The undiscovered country from whose bourn 
No traveller returns) puzzles the will 
And makes us rather bear those ills we have 
Than fly to others that we know not of. 
Thus conscience does make cowards of us all – 
And thus the native hue of resolution 
Is sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought, 
And enterprises of great pitch and moment 
With this regard their currents turn awry 
And lose the name of action.    (III.i.55-87) 
 
Hamlet no longer wants to endure the traumatic ‘whips and scorns of time’, no longer 
wishes ‘To grunt and sweat under a weary life’. The world he sees is painfully pointless, 
and this is what entices him to contemplate suicide. Bruster, however, calls this 
interpretation into question, arguing that ‘Hamlet’s regret over the role thinking takes in 
our life offers a more painful insight into the human condition. Hamlet’s inward guest 
works as a kind of grinning skull that mocks human achievement and ability. Far from 
being a hymn to self-consciousness, Hamlet’s soliloquy expresses profound misgivings 
about the process of thinking “too much.”’467 While it is certainly true that the speech 
branches out beyond the issue of suicide and feeds into other concerns such as the 
afterlife, conscience and action, it is important not to overlook the philosophical 
seriousness of Hamlet’s suicidal deliberations. The question ‘Why should I continue to 
live?’ is what Camus calls the ‘one truly serious philosophical problem.’468 He rejects 
the suggestion that the corrosive anguish produced by an apprehension of the absurdity 
of the world leaves no other choice but an act of suicide. Instead, the thought of killing 
oneself gives rise to a lucid awareness of one’s existence. Consciousness, being irritated 
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in the extreme by the thought of non-existence, is thus passionately intensified by the 
prospect of death. The logic of suicide, claims Camus, is not that it devalues life, but 
that paradoxically it makes life all the more worth living: ‘The return to consciousness, 
the escape from everyday sleep represents the first steps of absurd freedom.’469 The 
more Hamlet thinks about ending his life and freeing himself from being mentally 
tortured by the meaninglessness and irrationality of the world, the more alive and 
individualised he feels, which instantly disarms his suicidal impulse.  
 In the graveyard scene, Hamlet literally comes face to face with death. The 
anxiety produced by such a vivid apprehension of death manifests itself physically. 
When he realises that after death the well-bred bones of the skeletal remains before him 
are now good for nothing but playing at ‘loggets’, he confesses: ‘Mine ache to think 
on’t’ (V.i.87-8). When he takes Yorick’s skull in his hands, he says: ‘Alas, poor Yorick. 
I knew him, Horatio. A fellow of infinite jest, of most excellent fancy. He hath bore me 
on his back a thousand times, and now how abhorred in my imagination it is. My gorge 
rises at it’ (V.i.174-7). In the next scene, he tells Horatio: ‘Thou wouldst not think how 
ill all’s here about my heart’ (V.ii.190-1). The swell of existential nausea Hamlet feels 
is an immediate, physiological reaction to the finitude of human existence. Roquentin 
calls the sensation ‘a sort of sweet disgust’, ‘a host of little metamorphoses’, ‘an 
abstract change which settles on nothing.’470 In a similar way, Hamlet’s physical nausea 
is the symptom of a consciousness that is ill at ease with itself. Hamlet comes to realise 
that he exists in a crudely basic sense of the word: as a material being, he has a 
fundamental and irreducible corporeality. But he also understands that he exists in 
another way: his consciousness allows him to go beyond the givens of his existence. 
This space between what existentialists call facticity and transcendence or between 
essence and existence is where the possibility of freedom resides. Ophelia, in a state of 
pitiful madness, hints at the same idea when she says: ‘Lord, we know what we are but 
know not what we may be’ (IV.v.43-4).  
 In the graveyard scene, Hamlet’s confrontation with death - his ‘existential 
tremble’471 as Mousley calls it - allows him to understand human freedom in a radically 
different way. This is most powerfully dramatised in the final act of the play, when 
Hamlet becomes imbued with a curious spirituality. He tells Horatio that ‘There’s a 
divinity that shapes our ends, / Rough-hew them how we will’ (V.ii.10-1), and that ‘We 
defy augury. There is special providence in the fall of a sparrow’ (V.ii.197-8). As Fernie 
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reminds us, Hamlet is overcome by ‘a strange spirit of passive readiness.’472 As Hamlet 
comes to terms with the practical constraints of his situation, he finds that he is released 
to act. This freedom in his situation can be seen in the circumlocutory way Hamlet 
agrees to Claudius’ rigged sword fight. Answering Osric, he says: ‘Sir, I will walk here 
in the hall. If it please his majesty, it is the breathing time of day with me. Let the foils 
be brought, the gentleman willing and the King hold his purpose – I will win for him an 
I can; if not, I will gain nothing but my shame and the odd hits’ (V.ii.154-8). Hamlet’s 
use of the conditional mood jars with the firmness and repetition of the future indicative 
phrase ‘I will’. The same tension can be discerned when Hamlet adds: ‘I am constant to 
my purposes. They follow the King’s pleasure. If his fitness speaks, mine is ready. Now 
or whensoever, provided I be so able as now’ (V.ii.179-81). By choosing to agree to the 
challenge, Hamlet consciously decides to throw himself back into the fray: he chooses 
to act on his terms. If Hamlet is an existential ‘hero’ like Meursault or Roquentin, it is 
because he finds a paradoxical and unconventional way to assert his freedom.  
 ‘Man is free because he is not himself but presence to himself. The being which is 
what it is can not be free. Freedom is precisely the nothingness which is made-to-be at 
the heart of man and which forces human-reality to make itself instead of to be.’473 By 
this, Sartre means that because human beings can question themselves (as a result of the 
divided nature of consciousness), they are always actively engaged in the process of 
making themselves into the people they are. Human freedom is thus a frightening thing. 
Roquentin observes: ‘I am free: I haven’t a single reason for living left, all the ones I 
have tried have given way and I can’t imagine any more. . . . Alone and free. But this 
freedom is rather like death.’474 Hamlet recognises and asserts this ontological freedom 
in the last act. An existentially resonant passage in one of Mikhail Bakhtin’s neglected 
texts, Towards a Philosophy of the Act, further illuminates this idea. Bakhtin claims that 
there is ‘no alibi in existence’, because every human individual is responsible for 
making a contribution to ‘the ongoing event of being.’475 An act, he explains, 
 
in a non-fused yet undivided form is both the moment of my passivity and the 
moment of my self-activity: I find myself in Being (passivity) and I actively 
participate in it; both that which is given to me and that which is yet to be 
achieved by me: my own uniqueness is given, yet at the same time it exists only 
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to the extent to which it is really actualised by me as uniqueness - it is always in 
the act, in the performed deed.476 
  
Bakhtin draws attention to the two senses of the verb ‘to be’. Human beings can exist 
passively (existentialists choose to capitalise this form of ‘Being’), but they can also ‘be 
something’ by actively engaging in the process of existing (what existentialists call 
‘being’). Hamlet expresses a similar understanding of the convergence of action and 
passivity in being: ‘If it be, ’tis not to come. If it be not to come, it will be now. If it be 
not now, yet it will come. The readiness is all, since no man of aught he leaves knows 
what is’t to leave betimes. Let be’ (V.ii.198-202). Hamlet here is talking 
euphemistically about death, which shows that he is still afraid to confront it directly. In 
the New Cambridge edition, Philip Edwards understands the sentence ‘Since no man of 
aught he leaves knows, what is’t to leave betimes?’ (V.ii.195-6), to mean, ‘Since no 
man has any knowledge of the life he leaves behind him, what does it matter if one dies 
early?’477 But the folio reads: ‘The readiness is all. Since no man has ought of what he 
leaves, what is’t to leave betimes?’478 In this version, Hamlet seems to be saying: 
‘Being ready for death is all that matters. Since no one possesses anything, including 
their own life, no one loses anything by dying, either sooner or later. So death is nothing 
to be afraid of because there’s nothing to lose by it.’ Hamlet cannot own his life or 
possess it in a way he feels he should be able to. But this frees him to act by liberating 
him from the illusion that life is something he can lose. He comes to realise that he must 
reconcile himself to his fluctuating, unstable existence by focusing on the present 
moment, the here and now of the time he finds himself in. Hamlet tells us that ‘we defy 
augury’ (V.ii.197). We cannot look for signs of the future and act accordingly: we must 
take responsibility for the here and now of our existence, accept what the world throws 
at us and try to respond in the most authentic way we can. As Hamlet puts it, ‘the 
readiness is all’ (V.ii.200). The ‘all’ here has a touch of ambiguity as well. Being 
‘ready’ for the world is the most important thing to do and the only thing he can do. 
Hamlet’s eventual killing of Claudius is a rash, spontaneous act, but it is committed in a 
mood of energising acceptance. Freedom and necessity intensify each other in the 
denouement of the play. Under the mounting pressure of his situation, Hamlet 
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understands the existential immensity of his freedom to commit himself authentically to 
his situation.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have explored at length the existential nature of Hamlet’s subjectivity. 
As an agent of self-differentiation, Hamlet is constantly aware of his capacity to 
reconfigure his sense of self. The existential intensity of Hamlet’s character, his 
confrontation with powerful questions about what it means to exist as a human being, 
elicits pity and empathy from an audience. In this respect, the play functions as a 
terrifying reminder of our own existential fragility and vulnerability. This is what 
Hazlitt means when he remarks that the speeches and sayings of Hamlet are ‘as real as 
our own thoughts. Their reality is in the reader’s mind. It is we who are Hamlet.’479 
Harold Bloom makes a similar point when he insists that ‘We need to assert ourselves 
and read Shakespeare as strenuously as we can, while knowing that his plays will read 
us more energetically still. They read us definitively.’480 Shakespeare’s interest in 
existential concerns is a fundamental aspect of his continuing appeal. His plays have 
something to say about the experience of being human, and we have something to learn 
from such existential explorations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘NOT / OF STRONGER EARTH THAN OTHERS’ (V.III.28-9):  
ETHICAL LIFE IN CORIOLANUS 
 
 
 
Early on in The Ethics of Ambiguity, Simone de Beauvoir discusses the main charge 
levelled at existentialism - that it is a philosophy that repudiates all ethics and 
commends amorality. Critics of the philosophy, explains Beauvoir, reason that ‘if man 
is free to define for himself the conditions of a life which is valid in his own eyes, can 
he not choose whatever he likes and act however he likes?’481 Beauvoir’s resounding 
answer to this question is no. Human existence is always ethically charged because it is 
situated and embodied, and the suggestion that human beings must take responsibility 
for the formation and development of their own subjectivity functions as an ethical 
imperative in existentialist thought. But the texture of this argument becomes more 
intricate and complex as existentialists begin to examine the deep ambiguity that arises 
when an individual realises that they are not only a perceiving subject, but also an 
object perceived by other people. ‘I concern others and they concern me’, writes 
Beauvoir, and that is ‘an irreducible truth.’482 For human beings, the simultaneity of 
their subject and object status continually threatens their sense of autonomy, freedom 
and individuality. As a result, Sartre sees the relationship between one person and 
another as a site of conflict, because an individual’s sense of their intuitive, existential 
selfhood is always liable to feel threatened and alienated by the visual power of other 
people. In Being and Nothingness, he writes: ‘While I attempt to free myself from the 
hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave 
the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me.’483 As we saw in Chapter Three, Shakespeare 
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similarly presents the objectifying and alienating gaze of others as subjectively 
disorientating in his plays and poetry. But in Coriolanus, Shakespeare explores the 
ethical impact the relationship between self and other484 has on human subjectivity in a 
way that resonates powerfully with the work of existential ethicists such as Beauvoir 
and Martin Buber. Although Beauvoir concurs with Sartre’s view that the consciousness 
of others is an ontological problem and recognises that individuals ‘are separate, even 
opposed’,485 she insists that beneath the opposition between self and other there is a 
connection that constitutes the basis of relational life. Others are part of my existence 
and I am part of their existence, and this means that there is a basic bond between us, 
even if that bond is fraught with tension, conflict and friction. Beauvoir suggests that 
the fundamental linkage between self and other, the necessary reciprocity of that 
relationship, opens up the possibility of an ethics based on mutuality, solidarity and 
cooperation.  
 I want to argue in this chapter that Shakespeare is an existential ethicist avant la 
lettre, a writer whose drama envisages a relative ethics grounded in human 
understanding, love, sympathy, compassion and consideration. But it must be added that 
it is an existential ethics that refuses to be distilled into fixed moral precepts. 
Throughout this chapter, ‘morality’ and ‘moral’ are terms used to denote prescriptive 
codes of conduct, conventions and rules that dictate how human beings should behave 
within society. The terms ‘ethics’ and ‘ethical’, in contrast, are used to refer to 
situations in which human beings are aware of how their actions affect not only their 
own subjectivity, but also the lives of other people, in ways that conventional codes of 
conduct cannot accommodate. Ethical moments in Shakespeare’s plays are so vivid and 
intense that they resist being shaped into, or judged according to, established, moral 
principles. Rather than staging didactic moral lessons, Shakespeare’s plays invite us to 
appreciate the importance of ethical life and the existential necessity of respect for and 
openness towards others. Coriolanus reveals the momentous impact of this ethical 
approach on human subjectivity. Like Hamlet, Coriolanus is fixated on the idea of 
living authentically. In a perfect instance of a conflict between an individual ethical 
code of authenticity and a collective social morality, he describes himself as a man who 
would ‘rather be their servant in [his] way / Than sway with them in theirs’ (II.i.199-
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200). The idea of individual authenticity is developed and ramified in this play, 
submerged by Shakespeare in an intensely socialised setting in order to show the 
tension between general morals and personal ethics. Slowly and painfully, Coriolanus 
comes to see that detachment from the world and others brings terrible existential 
consequences. However, when he realises that he is a being that exists for others as well 
as for himself, his subjectivity is not damaged but paradoxically enhanced by his 
experience of self-loss. The new, unstable, vulnerable authenticity that suddenly 
becomes apparent as Shakespeare stages the transformation of Coriolanus’s perspective 
at the end of the play underscores the ethical power of subjectively identifying with 
other beings. By giving the idea of authenticity an ethical edge, Shakespeare intensifies 
its existential complexity and profundity. 
 
 
Existential Singularity Versus Being-For-Others 
 
Coriolanus, we are told, is a man like no other. Cominius says that he is ‘like a thing / 
Made by some other deity than nature’ (IV.vi.94-5), an individual who ‘cannot in the 
world / Be singly counterpoised’ (II.ii.84-5). After witnessing his ‘strange alteration’ 
(IV.v.149) at Aufidius’ house, the first servingman remarks, ‘would I were hanged but I 
thought there was more in him then I could think’ (IV.v.160-1), to which the second 
servingman adds: ‘He is simply the rarest man i’th’ world’ (IV.v.162-3). Almost every 
character in the play has something to say about Coriolanus’ exceptional, super-human 
character. Even the citizens single him out, bluntly stating that ‘Caius Martius is chief 
enemy to the people’ (I.i.7-8). When one member of the congregation asks the others to 
consider the ‘services he has done for his country’ (I.i.27-8), the first citizen suggests 
that his pride reaches ‘the altitude of his virtue’ (I.i.37), which suggests that his merits 
and flaws keep him aloof from society and ‘the commonalty’ (I.i.26). Critics too have 
been fascinated by the way Shakespeare underscores Coriolanus’ distinctiveness. In his 
classic reading of the play, A. C. Bradley thinks of Coriolanus as ‘an impossible 
person’, who suffers from an all-too-human quality that renders him doubly tragic, 
‘because it is not only his faults that make him impossible. There is bound up with them 
a nobleness of nature in which he surpasses everyone around him.’486 Bradley, up to a 
point, is right. There is something admirable about the way he refuses to play political 
games and ‘stoop to th’ herd’ (III.ii.32). In existentialist terms, Coriolanus lives by his 
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own ethic of authenticity; he makes his sense of integrity his personal ethical code. But 
Shakespeare manipulates the action of the play in such a way that the audience feels 
increasingly uncertain about Coriolanus’ belief in his own existential singularity. 
Coriolanus is tied to the world through familial, social and political relations: he has a 
mother, a wife, a son, an arch-nemesis, military colleagues, close friends, and real 
enemies, all of whom threaten his sense of his existential uniqueness. His singularity is 
constantly undermined and he is painfully aware that other people have the ability to 
objectify him. 
 The impenetrability of other people’s minds, the serious epistemological problem 
of knowing how others feel and what they think, is clearly a philosophical idea that 
Shakespeare was drawn to throughout his writing. He realised that the minds of other 
people are unfathomable and opaque, and that this has considerable consequences for a 
human subject’s sense of self. As Duncan puts it in Macbeth, ‘There’s no art / To find 
the mind’s construction in the face’ (I.iv.12-13). Sir Walter Raleigh’s Sceptick, or 
Speculations, a text that examines the deceptive nature of sensory impressions and 
proposes that human consciousness has no direct access to things in themselves, is an 
early modern investigation into the problematic nature of the minds of other people. He 
writes: ‘I may tell what the outward object seemeth to me; but what it seemeth to other 
creatures, or whether it be indeed that which it seemeth to me, or any other of them, I 
know not.’487 Drawing on Raleigh’s example, Katharine Maus notes that ‘in the English 
Renaissance . . . the “problem of other minds” presents itself to thinkers and writers not 
so much as a question of whether those minds exist as a question of how to know what 
they are thinking.’488 What Raleigh is articulating in this short treatise are his concerns 
about the untranslatability of the phenomenal experience. Though we may try, we 
simply cannot see things as others do. As James A. Knapp notes, ‘To see as another, to 
see the other, and to see oneself as another sees you are all at the heart of the ethical 
aporia haunting the history of metaphysics.’489 Unlike other characters such as Leontes 
or Othello, who strive to see as others do to such an extent that it brings them to the 
point of mental and emotional breakdown, Coriolanus refuses outright to acknowledge 
the sentiments, thoughts, and opinions of others. In his first vicious verbal attack on the 
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plebeians, he says, ‘What’s the matter, you dissentious rogues, / That, rubbing the poor 
itch of your opinion, / Make yourselves scabs?’ (I.i.161-3). In order to denigrate the 
plebeians’ power to form opinions of him, Coriolanus uses a gross, degrading image, 
which associates the formation of judgements with bodily sores. But the assault reveals 
more about him then it does about the plebeians. Coriolanus would prefer think of them 
as wounding themselves rather than wounding him, because he is sub-consciously 
concerned with their ability to make opinions that could potentially challenge or 
threaten his subjectivity. But, as we shall see, Coriolanus’s singular identity cannot 
sustain itself. He needs other people to reflect back a dimension of his existence that he 
has no immediate access to. As Sartre puts it: ‘I need the Other in order to realize fully 
all the structures of my being.’490 His view of himself is not enough; it must be 
validated through the eyes of others.  
 Andy Mousley argues that there is an important levelling impulse in Coriolanus. 
Coriolanus, the man praised for his supreme independence, ‘is brought down to earth 
and obliged to recognise his “only human” humanity.’491 ‘The play’, Mousley 
continues, ‘seems to go out of its way to make vulnerable someone who seems 
impervious to vulnerability. This has a universalising effect: if the “more than human” 
Coriolanus turns out to be “only human” after all, then this shows that the “truism” that 
we are all only human might have some “truth” in it.’492 This is a crucial aspect of the 
play. Coriolanus is forced to accept his existential frailty and dependence on others. 
Moreover, he is obliged to confront the fact that he plays a role within a wider society. 
The thought of this appals Coriolanus. As Cavell points out: ‘it is irrelevant to 
Coriolanus whether the parable of the belly is interpreted with the patricians or with the 
plebeians as the belly, or as the tongue, or as any other part. What alarms him is simply 
being part, one member among others of the same organism.’493 Throughout the play, 
Shakespeare not only humanises Coriolanus: at the level of language, Shakespeare also 
underscores the inescapable bonds that connect him to other beings in the world.  
 The relationship between Coriolanus and Aufidius is a foil for the authentic 
human connection between two individuals that they adumbrate. In the first act, both 
characters express a wish to be each other. ‘I sin in envying his nobility, / And were I 
anything but what I am, / I would wish me only he’ (I.i.228-30), says Coriolanus in the 
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opening scene of the play, admitting a few lines later that Aufidius ‘is a lion / That [he 
is] proud to hunt’ (I.i.233-4). Aufidius remarks: ‘I would I were a Roman, for I cannot, / 
Being a Volsce, be that I am’ (I.xi.4-5). These are strange utterances, which articulate 
not only a desire for self-transformation, but also, more pointedly, a desire to become 
one’s most despised enemy. Maurice Hunt calls this ‘a symbolic fusion of selves’,494 
albeit a perverse and inauthentic one: each soldier makes himself the other’s servant in 
order to venerate narcissistically a glorified version of himself. Thus what should be a 
relationship between self and other is reduced to a relationship between self and self. 
Adelman suggests that ‘the noble Aufidius is Coriolanus’s own invention, a reflection 
of his own doubts about what he is, an expression of what he would wish himself to 
be.’495 But even though the bond is fraught with tension, it remains intact. When 
Coriolanus meets Aufidius in battle, he says, ‘I’ll fight with none but thee, for I do hate 
thee / Worse than a promise breaker’ (I.ix.1-2), to which Aufidius replies, ‘We hate 
alike’ (I.ix.3). Coriolanus and Aufidius respect each other’s hatred of the other. The 
intensity of their mutual loathing paradoxically creates a form of emotional 
identification, a kind of existential magnetism between the two enemies.  
 ‘If e’er again I meet him beard to beard, / He’s mine, or I am his!’ (I.xi.11-12), 
says Aufidius, exemplifying the play’s obsession with the rhetorical technique of 
antithesis. Closely related to oxymoron, contradiction and paradox, antithesis is a 
literary device that positions structurally symmetrical yet opposing propositions next to 
one another. In the context of the play’s fascination with relationships between 
individuals, the pervasiveness of antithetical linguistic formulations is highly 
suggestive. Antithesis sets up opposites in a way that underscores a degree of 
parallelism between two ideas.496 It is a rhetorical convention that alternates tension and 
balance, manipulates contrariety and complementarity in a way that hints at some form 
of dialectical connection. The plebeians use the device repeatedly in their opening 
speeches: 
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Second Citizen.  One word, good citizens. 
First Citizen.   We are accounted poor citizens, the patricians 
good. What authority surfeits on would relieve us. . 
. . Let us revenge this with our pikes ere we 
become rakes; for the gods know, I speak this in 
hunger for bread, not in thirst for revenge. 
     (I.i.13-23) 
 
The underlying principle of antithesis, strengthened by the use of wordplay in this 
passage, is the positioning of difference within similarity and similarity within 
difference. John Roe, in his essay ‘Rhetoric, Style and Poetic Form’, draws attention to 
the importance of antithesis in Shakespeare’s sonnets and narrative poems, and argues 
that ‘antithesis is central to human experience, which finds itself readily reflected, with 
varying degrees of subtlety.’497 Furthermore, claims Roe, poetry’s rhetorical design 
brings to the fore ethical considerations, because techniques such as antithesis juxtapose 
and connect ethical positions in a way that makes their effect more powerful. 
Shakespeare uses antithesis to draw out the ethical dimension of human existence in 
Coriolanus’s speech before he enters Antium: 
 
 
O world, thy slippery turns! Friends now fast sworn, 
Whose double bosoms seem to wear one heart, 
Whose hours, whose bed, whose meal and exercise 
Are still together, who twin as ’twere in love 
Unseparable, shall within this hour, 
On a dissension of a doit, break out 
To bitterest enmity. So fellest foes, 
Whose passions and whose plots have broke their sleep 
To take the one the other, by some chance, 
Some trick not worth an egg, shall grow dear friends 
And interjoin their issues. So with me. 
My birthplace hate I, and my love’s upon 
This enemy town. I’ll enter. If he slay me, 
He does fair justice; if he give me way, 
I’ll do his country service.   (IV.iv.12-26) 
 
The antithesis here, the contrast between friends and foes, is intensified by the use of 
fricative alliteration. Coriolanus is thoroughly mystified by the frailty of human 
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relationships. Allegiances can be transformed within the space of an hour. But the larger 
idea in this speech is the suggestion that individuals are inevitably tied to others, 
whether in friendship or in enmity. Through Coriolanus’s perplexity, Shakespeare asks: 
how do human beings ‘interjoin’ and what is ethically at stake when these relationships 
break down? 
 As I have begun to demonstrate, Coriolanus’s attempt to demarcate the boundary 
between his self and the selves of others is constantly undermined in the play. When 
Coriolanus is fighting alone in Corioles, Larius says of his military leader: ‘A carbuncle 
entire, as big as thou art, / Were not so rich a jewel’ (I.v.28-9). The image functions on 
two levels. A carbuncle is a fiery red precious stone, which conveys the energy and 
intensity of Coriolanus’s temperament and fighting style. But a carbuncle is also a 
growth or a cancerous lump,498 which instantly calls to mind Coriolanus’s particular 
preference for imagery of infection and disease. Only a few lines earlier, Coriolanus 
screams abuse at his Roman deserters, calling them a ‘herd of—Boils and plagues’ 
(I.v.2). But his own imagery turns against him when Sicinius later claims that 
Coriolanus ‘is a disease that must be cut away’ (III.i.297) and that ‘The service of the 
foot, / Being once gangrened, is not then respected / For what before it was’ (III.i.308-
10). The way the imagery in the play cuts both ways, subtly calling attention to 
Coriolanus’s ties to other individuals and society in general, is significant. Mousley 
observes that ‘the play keeps reminding us of Coriolanus’s ordinary humanity even as 
he repudiates it. The hero is, after all, of this world.’499 Of course, as Cavell observes, 
Coriolanus is disgusted by the way he must use the same words as others, ‘he has a 
horror of putting in his mouth what . . . comes out of the mouths of others.’500  He spits 
out his words as if they are bits of food he cannot bear to swallow. The contagious 
echoing of language is nowhere better demonstrated than in Coriolanus’s petulant reply 
to his sentencing of banishment: ‘I banish you!’ (III.iii.124).  
 The tension between Coriolanus’ sense of his own individuality and his 
unavoidable relations with others can also be discerned in the war scenes in Act I. 
Coriolanus likes to think of himself as a one-man army, a ferocious lone soldier ‘Who 
sensibly outdares his senseless sword’ (I.v.26). For the first part of the action, he fights 
for himself, by himself. The inhabitants of Corioles shut the gate and leave him ‘alone 
to answer all the city’ (I.v.24-5), and it is in this state that he feels most self-assured. 
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Coriolanus is Hamlet’s polar opposite. Hamlet is all thought and reflection; Coriolanus 
all action and activity. Philip Davis argues that Coriolanus ‘does not believe that 
character primarily exists before the moment of acting, any more than on the other hand 
he believes that character is created by the moment of acting. But, in between the two, 
character for him is forged in the very heat of action.’501 Shakespeare makes it clear, 
however, that Coriolanus’s singularity is unsustainable. When he retreats to the Roman 
camp, he says to Cominius: 
 
   O, let me clip ye 
In arms as sound as when I wooed, in heart 
As merry as when our nuptial day was done, 
And tapers burnt to bedward! 
[They embrace]   (I.xii.29-32) 
 
These lines, which invoke imagery of marriage and are sealed with a physical embrace, 
seem contradictory and uncharacteristic. In this momentary lapse, Coriolanus, the man 
who has single-handedly fought off the enemy forces, reveals his capacity to identify 
with another being. Shakespeare uses comparisons between the martial and the marital 
realms throughout the play. When Aufidius welcomes Coriolanus into his house, he 
says: ‘Let me twine / Mine arms about that body where-against / My grainèd ash an 
hundred times hath broke, / And scarred the moon with splinters’ (IV.v.107-10), and a 
few lines later: ‘that I see thee here, / Thou noble thing, more dances my rapt heart / 
Than when I first my wedded mistress saw / Bestride my threshold’ (IV.v.116-9). 
Ironically, when his wife kisses him at the end of the play, he can think only of war and 
revenge. Shakespeare fuses the imagery of marriage and war in the play to strengthen 
the suggestion that the same bonds between human beings have the potential to be both 
conflictual and harmonious. 
 Until Coriolanus realises his ethical obligations to others in the final act, he 
continually mingles claims of reciprocity and mutuality with assertions of his singular 
existence. As he rallies his soldiers before they charge into battle, he says:  
 
   I do beseech you 
By all the battles wherein we have fought, 
By th’ blood we have shed together, 
By th’ vows we have made 
To endure friends, that you directly set me 
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Against Aufidius and his Antiates, 
And that you not delay the present, but, 
Filling the air with swords advanced and darts, 
We prove this very hour. . . . 
. . .if any fear 
Lesser his person than an ill report; 
If any think brave death outweighs bad life, 
And that his country’s dearer than himself, 
Let him alone, or so many so minded,  
Wave thus to express his disposition, 
And follow Martius. 
[He waves his sword.] They all shout and wave their swords, take him up in 
their arms and cast up their caps. 
O, me alone! Make you a sword of me?    (I.xii.55-77) 
 
This speech is not beautiful or poetic; it is not filled with evocative imagery. Indeed, it 
may be a passage that is easily skimmed over. But here Shakespeare offers a 
philosophically sophisticated understanding of human existence by juxtaposing what 
existentialists would call Coriolanus’s existential singularity with his being-for-others. 
Coriolanus underscores the mutual nature of their relationship by reminding his soldiers 
of their battles together, their blood shed in war, their vows (perhaps also another subtle 
hint at the affinity between marital and military relations) and their friendships. 
Ironically, he uses these ideas as the basis of his argument for why he should be allowed 
to face Aufidius alone. It is clear that being and acting alone are crucial for Coriolanus. 
He goes on to suggest that those who are brave enough can either follow him ‘alone’ or 
with others that are of a similar mind-set. The speech climaxes with his exultant line: 
‘O, me alone!’ Even though Coriolanus is clearly aware of the value of human 
solidarity, he resists embracing that aspect of his existence and is wary of losing his 
individuality in the crowd. 
 When the fighting is over, Coriolanus returns to the camp a hero. He is honoured 
with a new title and warmly welcomed by the other soldiers. But while others praise his 
heroic feats, Coriolanus offers a modest and understated view of his achievements, 
declaring: ‘I have done as you have done, that’s what I can; / . . . He that has but 
effected his good will / Hath overta’en mine act’ (I.x.16-9). Coriolanus is effectively 
suggesting that an individual who lives up to his own good intentions achieves a greater 
form of success than himself. So why does Coriolanus so adamantly oppose the 
discussion or celebration of his successes? We are repeatedly told that Coriolanus is a 
proud man, ‘topping all others in boasting’ (II.i.19), but this is clearly untrue. In fact, in 
terms of the existential significance of the play, Coriolanus’s reluctance to be showered 
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‘In acclamations hyperbolical’ or ‘praises sauced with lies’ (I.x.51, 53) is far more 
telling. Coriolanus does not want his deeds acknowledged because, as Hans-Jürgen 
Weckermann notes, this ‘would render them no longer his own exclusive property but 
the common possession of all the people of Rome by integrating his actions into a 
common cause.’502 To put it another way, praise would also entail recognising his need 
of others.  
 At the end of Act I, Coriolanus makes a strange request of Cominius: 
 
Coriolanus.  I sometime lay here in Corioles, 
   At a poor man’s house. He used me kindly. 
   He cried to me; I saw him prisoner; 
   But then Aufidius was within my view, 
   And wrath o’erwhelmed my pity. I request you 
   To give my poor host freedom. 
Cominius.   O, well begged! 
   Were he the butcher of my son, he should 
   Be free as is the wind. Deliver him, Titus. 
Lartius.   Martius, his name? 
Coriolanus. By Jupiter, forgot! 
   I am weary, yea, my memory is tired. (I.x.82-91) 
 
This is an attempt by Coriolanus at genuine fellow feeling and human empathy. He 
remembers the suffering of another and tries to have the prisoner released. But the 
moment of kindness is instantly punctured by Coriolanus’s forgetfulness. His memory 
fails because of fatigue, another ordinary symptom of being human. By making the man 
Coriolanus forget a prisoner of war, Shakespeare links the notion of otherness with the 
notion of freedom. In Pyrrhus and Cinéas Beauvoir writes: 
 
All men are free, and as soon as we have anything to do with other people, 
we experience their freedom. If we want to disregard these dangerous free 
beings, we have to turn away from mankind, but at that moment our being 
contracts and dwindles away. Our being can only be realised by choosing to 
risk itself in the world, by placing itself in danger of being grasped by other 
alien and divided free beings.503 
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When Beauvoir claims that ‘all men are free’, she means that human consciousness is 
freely engaged in the perpetual task of self-construction. But when we acknowledge 
another being, we also acknowledge that they too have a consciousness that is free to 
form itself, and this freedom of others threatens our own sense of self, because we 
realise that others can freely make judgements and have opinions about us. To reject 
other people’s freedom, claims Beauvoir, is to cause oneself to become existentially 
diminished. Something of this idea comes through in Coriolanus’s failure to recall the 
name of the man who once showed him pity and compassion. The exchange crystallises 
the issue at stake: the necessary consideration of others and the appeal to common 
human feelings. It foreshadows Coriolanus’ ethical identification with his own family at 
the end of the play.  
 Like their early modern precursor, Shakespeare, existentialists are interested in 
what Sartre calls the ethics of ‘a human reality in situation.’504 As Christine Daigle 
explains, ethics for existentialists are always ‘radically immanent’, grounded in 
individual, embodied existence.505 There are no transcendental absolutes, no definitive 
morality dictated by God. All exponents of existentialism agree that human beings must 
decide for themselves how to live, how to actualise their existence through ‘definitive, 
absolute engagements.’506 Beauvoir writes: ‘for existentialism, it is not impersonal 
universal man who is the source of values, but the plurality of concrete particular men 
projecting themselves toward their ends on the basis of situations whose particularity is 
as radical and irreducible as subjectivity itself.’507 Of course, as Beauvoir 
acknowledges, this argument naturally leads to the following question: if ethics are 
based on relativism and not universalism, how can human beings establish ethical codes 
and practices that bind society together? She contends that, although human beings are 
individuals and must assert their existence on the basis of their own sense of 
authenticity and individuality, they are also inevitably part of a network of human 
relations. This is what Beauvoir calls the ambiguity of existence: it is always open to, 
but also potentially threatened by, the existence of others. She writes: ‘An ethics of 
ambiguity will be one which will refuse to deny a priori that separate existants [sic] 
can, at the same time, be bound to each other, that their individual freedoms can forge 
                                                            
504 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 645. 
505 Christine Daigle, ‘The Problem of Ethics for Existentialism’, in Existentialist Thinkers and Ethics, ed. 
Christine Daigle (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), p. 14. 
506 Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, p. 16. 
507 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
  152 
laws valid for all.’508 Beauvoir thus thinks of the radical individuality of the subject as 
existing within a collective whole. Later in The Ethics of Ambiguity Beauvoir 
summarises her main argument: ‘Thus, we see that no existence can be validly fulfilled 
if it is limited to itself. It appeals to the existence of others.’509 She accepts that ‘The 
idea of such a dependence is frightening, and the separation and multiplicity of existants 
[sic] raises highly disturbing problems’, but ultimately concludes that there is a ‘bond of 
each man with all others.’510 As we can see, existentialist ethics are precariously rooted 
in the ambiguity of human existence. 
 It may not be a coincidence that Coriolanus resonates strongly with existentialist 
ethics. Before the Second World War broke out, a friend lent Beauvoir the Pléiade 
edition of Shakespeare’s collected works translated by Victor Hugo, and in a letter 
dated 20 October 1939 she explains to Sartre how she was determined ‘to reread the 
lot’.511 After she had finished, she sent the Shakespeare collection to Sartre (without her 
friend’s approval), and he too began carefully rereading the plays. In a letter to 
Beauvoir dated 22 November 1939, Sartre wrote: ‘I got back to reading the first act of 
Coriolanus, which is very enjoyable. . . . I didn’t know Shakespeare at all. This is a sort 
of discovery and it’s made a strong impression.’512 Beauvoir would later refer to this 
period of her life (roughly 1939-49) as her ‘moral period’.513 During this time, she 
produced a body of material, including both literary and philosophical texts, that tackled 
directly the question of existentialist ethics. The war had brought issues of human 
solidarity and personal responsibility more sharply into focus, and existentialism, which 
had previously concentrated almost entirely on the ontological condition of man, began 
to investigate the ethical and political dimensions of human existence. One of the most 
significant works from this period was Beauvoir’s novel, The Blood of Others.514 In The 
Prime of Life, Beauvoir describes how, whilst writing the book, she came to the 
understanding that ‘An individual . . . only receives a human dimension by recognizing 
the existence of others.’515 The book dwells on issues of human freedom and action, but 
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suggests that these concepts can be fully understood only within the context of society 
and human relationships. The epigraph of the book is a quote from Dostoevsky’s The 
Brothers Karamazov: ‘Each of us is responsible for everything to every human being.’ 
Jean Blomart and Hélène Bertrand, the central figures in the novel, both come to the 
realisation that individual freedom must be premised on an authentic acknowledgement 
of other people’s freedom; they understand that they exist alongside each other and 
therefore have a responsibility for each other. There is a good chance that Coriolanus 
was an important source of inspiration for Beauvoir’s novel, as the title, The Blood of 
Others, is a phrase from the play. When Coriolanus returns from fighting in Corioles, he 
asks: ‘Come I too late?’, to which Cominius replies, ‘Ay, if you come not in the blood 
of others, / But mantled in your own’ (I.vii.27-9).516 The lines suggest that it is 
impossible to distinguished between one’s own blood and the blood of another human 
being; they are identical to the human eye. The fact that Coriolanus’s blood is literally 
intermingled with the blood of others suggests that Shakespeare is making an important 
point about the ethical nature of human life. Perhaps Coriolanus was not far from 
Beauvoir’s mind when she wrote, ‘to suppress one’s awareness of the Other’s existence 
is mere childishness.’517 The ethics in Beauvoir’s novel may provide a key to unlock the 
existential concerns of Shakespeare’s play.  
 
 
Bleeding and Blushing 
 
Coriolanus is ashamed of his body and fears bodily exposure. This is clearly apparent 
when he refuses to reveal his wounds to the citizens. He tells the senators: ‘I cannot / 
Put on the gown, stand naked, and entreat them / For my wounds’ sake to give their 
suffrage’ (II.ii.135-7). The way Coriolanus confuses being clothed and being undressed 
in these lines shows his deep unease about revealing his body to the public. It is not 
false modesty. Ewan Fernie argues that ‘there is something symptomatic in the 
protagonist’s antipathy to nakedness and excessive sensitivity to the gaze of others.’518 
Coriolanus cannot stand the thought of other people looking at him; he is horrified to 
realise that his body exists as an object for other people. This aspect of the play, its 
obvious fascination with bodies and embodiment, is existentially significant, because it 
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suggests that human beings have a troubled relationship with this element of their 
existence. Two particular physical experiences, bleeding and blushing, cause a sense of 
alienation within an individual. Such experiences, claim existentialists, reveal that the 
body is divorced from consciousness. Individuals can have a relationship with their 
body; they can think of it as an object or a thing; they can see how it can be defined 
externally by others. As Sartre puts it, ‘the discovery of my body as an object is indeed 
a revelation of its being. But the being which is thus revealed to me is its being-for-
others.’519 This existentialist idea of ‘the body-for-others’ resonates strongly with 
Coriolanus.  
 Coriolanus would rather have his wounds ‘heal again / Than hear say how [he] 
got them’ II.ii.67-8). He tells Cominius that ‘they smart / To hear themselves 
remembered’ (I.x.28-9). Clearly, it is an image that Shakespeare was drawn to. In 
Richard III, Lady Anne says to Richard: 
 
   Dead Henry’s wounds 
Ope their congealèd mouths and bleed afresh. 
Blush, blush, thou lump of foul deformity, 
For ’tis thy presence that ex-hales this blood 
From cold and empty veins where no blood dwells.   
        (Richard III, I.ii.55-9)  
 
The passage parallels another particularly grotesque image in Coriolanus. The citizens 
discuss how they must make Coriolanus’s injuries meaningful because he is reluctant to 
do so himself: ‘If he show us his wounds and tell us his deeds, we are to put our tongues 
into those wounds and speak for them’ (II.iii.5-7). In both these examples, Shakespeare 
suggests that bleeding wounds can declare the truth. In Henry’s case, his wounds weep 
with blood because his murderer stands beside his body. For Coriolanus, his lacerations 
and injuries bleed again because they are being talked about. As R. B. Parker notes, 
‘Mutilation has been converted from its painful subjective reality to a form of currency 
in Rome’, and this is precisely why Coriolanus refuses to use them for political gain.520 
Coriolanus is disgusted by the thought that he got his wounds only to please the 
citizens: ‘Show them th’unaching scars, which I should hide, / As if I had received them 
for the hire / Of their breathe only!’ (II.ii.147-9). It is interesting that Coriolanus should 
think of his fresh wounds as ‘unaching scars’. He wants his injuries to heal swiftly and 
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be forgotten. Bleeding is shameful, because it is one of the most basic signs of physical 
vulnerability and being human. He bleeds in the same way that other people bleed. 
When Menenius urges the senators to ‘Think / Upon the wounds his body bears, which 
show / Like graves i’th’ holy churchyard’, Coriolanus quickly tells them that they are 
‘Scratches with briers, / Scars to move laughter only’ (III.iii.47-50). If his wounds were 
symbolic representations of other people’s graves, as Menenius suggests, they would be 
for the benefit of other people. 
 The terrible experience of watching your body bleed, Shakespeare suggests in this 
play, has an alienating effect on human consciousness. Coriolanus resists thinking about 
his own blood. He says to Aufidius, ‘’Tis not my blood / Wherein thou seest me 
masked’ (I.ix.9-10), and tells Lartius, ‘The blood I drop is rather physical / Than 
dangerous to me’ (I.vi.18-9). In order to over-compensate for his anxiety about the loss 
of blood, Coriolanus regards bleeding as a physically restorative process, a means to 
enhance his strength rather than reveal his human fragility. It is important not to 
overlook the fact that Coriolanus is appallingly blood-soaked in this play, a fact that is 
made clear in a number of stage directions: ‘Enter Martius, [bleeding]’ (I.vi) and ‘Enter 
Martius, bloody’ (I.vii). Like a newly skinned carcass, he is literally covered from head 
to toe in a mixture of his own blood and ‘the blood of others’ (I.vii.28). He is 
unrecognisable. Lartius asks: ‘Who’s yonder, / That does appear as he were flayed?’ 
(I.vii.21-2). The unidentifiable being ‘has the stamp of Martius’ (I.vii.23), but the 
onlookers cannot distinguish his face. In the following act, Menenius tells the senators 
that ‘From face to foot / He was a thing of blood’ (II.ii.106-7). The image perhaps also 
carries with it the suggestion that Coriolanus is similar to a new-born baby smeared 
with blood. The link between blood and childhood hovers over the play. Valeria wants 
Virgilia and Volumnia to accompany her on her visit to a lady who is expecting to give 
birth imminently. In another memorable example, Volumnia suggests that ‘The breasts 
of Hecuba / When she did suckle Hector looked not lovelier / Than Hector’s forehead 
when it spit forth blood / At Grecian sword, contemning’ (I.iii.41-3). In a well-known 
passage, Adelman remarks: ‘Blood is more beautiful than milk, the wound than the 
breast, warfare than peaceful feeding. . . . [Hector] is transformed immediately from 
infantile feeding mouth to bleeding wound.’521 But another metaphoric process is also at 
work in these lines. As Cavell notes, ‘the lines set up an equation between a mother’s 
milk and man’s blood’,522 which implies that man suckles blood from his mother. 
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Cavell explains: ‘when Hector contemns Grecian swords, he is also thought of as 
fighting, as wielding a sword, so the mouth is transformed into, or seen as, a cutting 
weapon: The suckling mother is presented as being slashed by the son-hero.’523 The 
image is expressed more fully later in the play when Coriolanus says to Aufidius: ‘I 
have . . . / Drawn tuns of blood out of thy country’s breast’ (IV.v.99-100). This 
rereading of Volumnia’s disturbing image still supports Adelman’s overarching 
argument that Coriolanus, although horrified by the idea of maternal dependency, is 
nevertheless bound to the woman who gave him life. But a fresh view of these lines 
allows for a greater understanding of the existential significance of Coriolanus’s anxiety 
about blood and bleeding.  
 As human beings, we are closest of all to people we share blood with. Coriolanus 
knows that he literally shares the same flesh and blood as his mother. When he returns 
from battle he confesses that ‘My mother, / Who has a charter to extol her blood, / 
When she does praise me, grieves me’ (I.x.13-5). He sees himself here, not as an 
individual in his own right, but as an extension of Volumnia’s blood. At the end of the 
play, he refers to her as ‘the honoured mould / Wherein this trunk was framed’ 
(V.iii.23). This is a powerful realisation that his own body has in fact been produced 
from the body of someone else. The existential intensity of this statement cannot be 
overstated. To acknowledge that his entire existence owes itself to someone else is an 
astonishing climax to a play that gravitates around a man who has so passionately 
believed that he is sui generis, a singular, unique entity, incomparable to all others. The 
play continually hints at the idea that we all share the same blood and thus intimates the 
notion of a ‘democratic concept of human nature’,524 to borrow Mousley’s phrase. The 
stomach in Menenius’s fable reminds the other limbs that he supplies sustenance 
through the rivers of blood within the body (I.i.132). Although Coriolanus would have 
us believe that he ‘rewards / His deeds with doing them’ (II.ii.125-6) and acts only for 
himself, the truth of the matter is that his feats have been ‘Induced . . . for [his] country’ 
(I.x.17). Before he returns to the senate, Volumnia urges her son ‘to take in a town with 
gentle words, / Which else would put you to your fortune and / The hazard of much 
blood’ (III.ii.61-3). Coriolanus has risked his blood for the freedom of Rome and will 
risk it again to betray his country.  
 In The Blood of Others, Beauvoir uses the imagery of blood to make a similar 
point about the ethical relationships between human beings. After having been rejected 
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by Jean, Hélène falls pregnant with another man’s child and is consequently forced to 
seek an illegal abortion. The procedure is conducted at Jean’s apartment, but in the 
following hours Hélène suffers some complications. Accepting his responsibility for the 
turn of events, Jean remarks: ‘She moaned no longer. It was as though not a drop of 
blood were left in her veins . . . this fight had united us more strongly than an act of 
love; she was my flesh and blood. I would have given my life to save her.’525 Jean 
realises that he has a responsibility to take care of Hélène, because his freedom has had 
an unintended impact on her life. Later on in the novel, when Hélène is dying after 
having been shot during a resistance mission, Jean thinks back to his childhood and 
remembers going to visit Louise, a family friend whose baby had died. Afterwards, he 
is distraught and cannot eat, but his father presses him to finish his soup. He recalls: ‘I 
cried myself to sleep because of that thing which had poured into my throat with the 
tepid soup - more bitter than the sense of guilt - my sin. The sin of smiling whilst 
Louise was weeping, the sin of shedding my own tears and not hers. The sin of being 
another being.’526 This is what existentialists refer to as a feeling of existential guilt: a 
realisation that you exist in the world of other people, and an acknowledgement that you 
cannot cross the frontiers of other people’s consciousnesses. Jean cannot experience 
Louise’s suffering as she does. This existential guilt, claims Beauvoir, is a fundamental 
aspect of our social and ethical lives, an ontological problem that must be respected, if 
an individual is to enter into a fully open relationship with another. 
 After his return from the battlefields, a new honorific title is bestowed on 
Coriolanus. He is embarrassed by the ‘good addition’ (I.x.72) to his formal identity and 
says to the crowd: ‘I will go wash, / And when my face is fair you shall perceive / 
Whether I blush or no’ (I.x.68-70). His face is still covered in blood from the battle, 
giving the impression that he is blushing at the accolades. Cominius also draws 
attention to Coriolanus’s blood-stained face at the end of the scene when he remarks: 
‘The blood upon your visage dries; ’tis time / It should be looked to’ (I.x.93-4). 
Blushing is a type of internal bleeding, an involuntary rush of blood to the face. As 
Sartre points out, it is bodily experience you cannot prevent from happening, an 
‘internal hemorrhage’ of being.527 Coriolanus is deeply fearful of blushing. When I 
realise that I am being looked at, says Sartre, my world ‘bleeds’ towards the Other.528 
Later, when it becomes incumbent upon Coriolanus to beg the voices of the citizens, he 
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says: ‘It is a part / That I shall blush in acting’ (II.ii.143-4). Aufidius manipulates his 
fear of blushing at the end of the play: 
 
   But at his nurse’s tears 
He whined and roared away your victory, 
That pages blushed at him, and men of heart 
Looked wond’ring each at others.   (V.vi.99-102) 
 
In this passage, Aufidius suggests that Coriolanus’s childish emotions and dependence 
on his mother are so hideously embarrassing that they make others blush. Here 
Shakespeare implies that human beings blush not only at the realisation of their own 
existence, but also at the witnessing of another’s humiliation and disgrace. They can 
internalise other people’s shame. In this respect, Shakespeare advances the idea of 
individual existential shame by suggesting that we are ashamed not only of ourselves, 
but also of the fact that we exist for others and others exist for us. By doing this, he 
depicts the experiences of blushing and feeling ashamed from both an ontological and 
an ethical perspective.  
 William W. E. Slights notes that ‘The rules governing concealment and revelation 
of inner truths were changing rapidly in the period and with them the approved but often 
transgressed boundaries between inner and outer, the private self and the society of 
others, invisibility and transparency.’529 Coriolanus’ existential panic at the idea of 
blushing before others is symptomatic of his wider problem with the existence of others. 
Sartre suggests that when an individual blushes, he ‘is vividly and constantly conscious 
of his body not as it is for him but as it is for the Other.’530 In other words, I become 
aware that I am an instrumental object in other people’s world. He continues: ‘This 
constant uneasiness, which is the apprehension of my body’s alienation as irredeemable, 
can determine psychoses such as ereutophobia (a pathological fear of blushing); these 
are nothing but the horrified metaphysical apprehension of the existence of my body for 
Others.’531 As a viscerally intense experience, blushing is simultaneously physical and 
psychological. It reveals that my body is ‘a thing outside my subjectivity, in the midst of 
the world that is not mine.’532 This is truly terrifying for Coriolanus, an individual who 
wishes to assert his self-sufficiency and independence at every opportunity. He does not 
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want to accept that his body, wounds and blood do not only exist for him, but can also 
be utilised and known by others. Another of Sartre’s observations rings true with 
Coriolanus. He writes: ‘We often say that the shy man is “embarrassed by his own 
body.” Actually this expression is incorrect; I can not be embarrassed by my own body 
as I exist it [sic]. It is my body as it is for the Other which may embarrass me.’533 As we 
saw earlier, Coriolanus would rather show healed scars than bleeding flesh, because 
blood signifies that one’s body is not united with one’s consciousness. His anxiety 
about the relationship between mind and body is further evidenced when he realises that 
he must go and speak to the people of Rome. He declares angrily, ‘I will not do’t, / Lest 
surcease to honour mine own truth, / And by my body’s action teach my mind / A most 
inherent baseness’ (III.ii.122-5). By showing his wounds to others, Coriolanus thinks 
that the actions of his body will embarrass his mind. His tortured modesty is 
existentially revealing: his mind is alienated from his body and his body is alienated 
from his mind by virtue of the fact that it exists not for himself, but as an object for 
others. 
 Blushing is the manifestation of existential shame, the shame of one’s own 
existence. ‘Shame’, Sartre suggests, ‘is intentional; it is a shameful apprehension of 
something and this something is me. I am ashamed of what I am. . . . Shame is by nature 
recognition. I recognize that I am as the Other sees me. . . . Shame is an immediate 
shudder which runs through me from head to foot without any discursive 
preparation.’534 Unsurprisingly, Coriolanus wishes to be ‘to shame unvulnerable’ 
(V.iii.73). To admit that he is vulnerable to shame would be to admit that he is ethically 
and existentially tied to other people. ‘I’ll never / Be such a gosling to obey instinct, but 
stand / As if a man were author of himself / And knew no other kin’ (V.iii.34-6): this is 
Coriolanus’s fantasy of self-reliance and absolute independence. But, as Fernie notes, 
‘Given the contradiction between his own self-reliant strictness and his susceptibility to 
his mother, it is only a matter of time before Coriolanus is forced to take shame, and it 
creates much of the dramatic tension in this play.’535 As he watches the retreating 
dissenters in the Roman army scurry back to their trenches, Coriolanus calls them 
‘shames of Rome!’ (I.v.2), foreshadowing his own shameful banishment from the city. 
At the end of the play, Coriolanus is shamed into acknowledging the existence of his 
family. ‘[L]et us shame him with our knees’ (V.iii.170), says Volumnia as she kneels 
before her son. Shame here is not the subjectively corrosive experience that Coriolanus 
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so fears. In this scene, it has the more existentially regenerative power to allow human 
beings to see that they exist in a world with other people. 
 In some respects, Shakespeare goes further than Sartre by suggesting that one can 
be not only ashamed of one’s individual existence, but also ashamed that other people 
exist. The play hints at the idea of a circle of shame: I am ashamed that I exist for others 
and ashamed that others exist for me. After Coriolanus’s banishment, Sicinius asks 
Volumnia, ‘Are you mankind?’ and Volumnia replies, ‘Ay, fool. Is that a shame?’ 
(IV.ii.18-9). Sicinius is playing on the sense of the word, implying that Volumnia has 
manly characteristics. But Volumnia chooses to interpret ‘mankind’ as meaning 
‘humanity’ or ‘belonging to the human race’. Her following question, ‘Is that a 
shame?’, gestures towards a notion of existential guilt.  
 
 
Coriolanus’s Freedom 
 
‘Hell is - other people!’: This is Garcin’s notorious utterance in Sartre’s play No Exit, 
which has often been used to sum up the existentialist’s conception of being-for-
others.536 As we have seen, for Sartre, the look of the other is a subjectively threatening 
and unsettling experience. It challenges an individual’s sense of his or her own freedom. 
Garcin cannot compel Estelle and Inez to see him in the distorted way he sees himself; 
likewise, Estelle cannot compel Garcin and Inez to love her in a way that will confirm 
her narcissistic impulses. The problem of the intractability of other people’s 
consciousness cannot be surmounted: it leaves the characters in Sartre’s play torturously 
fearful of the people who surround them. According to Sartre, the look of the other 
‘makes me be beyond my being in this world and puts me in the midst of the world 
which is at once this world and beyond this world.’537 The look is part of the world an 
individual shares with the other, but it also transports that individual beyond the 
ontological security of their own world and into a strange territory over which they have 
no control. It is a new world that is occupied and known only by another. In other 
words, when I see people looking at me, I recognise that other people are free to regard 
me as they wish; I cannot directly access their consciousness and control their 
perception of me. Sartre insists that the relationship between self and other is 
antagonistic, a power struggle which causes deep feelings of existential insecurity 
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within an individual.538 Clearly, this Sartrean idea resonates with Coriolanus. However, 
towards the end of the play, Shakespeare moves from an examination of Coriolanus’s 
hostile relationship with others towards a consideration of the mutually beneficial nature 
of an authentic encounter with others. In this play, Shakespeare suggests that individual 
freedom must acknowledge the freedom of others, if it is to form the basis of ethical 
life. 
  Beauvoir, unlike Sartre, emphasises the mutual ethical obligations that underpin 
the relationship between self and other. Rather than focusing solely on what other 
people takes away from an individual, she examines what an individual stands to gain 
from an encounter with other people. In fact, Beauvoir goes so far as to suggest that an 
individual can assert his or her own freedom only if they simultaneously realise the 
freedom of others. Whereas Sartre ultimately sees the other as having a restrictive 
influence on human freedom and producing a relationship based on subordination and 
conflict, Beauvoir insists that the other serves a validating function: he is a guarantor of 
individual freedom. In The Ethics of Ambiguity, she writes: ‘It is not true that the 
recognition of the freedom of others limits my own freedom: to be free is not to have 
the power to do anything you like; it is to be able to surpass the given towards an open 
future; the existence of others as a freedom defines my situation and is even the 
condition of my own freedom.’539 Like Beauvoir, Shakespeare allows us to glimpse the 
possibility of an existentialist ethics whereby authentic human existence is based on 
reciprocity and mutuality. 
 Beauvoir’s ideas about the relationship between self-consciousness and otherness 
owe a great deal to Hegel’s account of self-consciousness’s ambiguous journey away 
from itself when it is faced by the existence of another consciousness. He writes:  
 
First, [self-consciousness] must proceed to supersede the other independent 
being in order thereby to become certain of itself as the essential being; 
secondly, in so doing it proceeds to supersede its own self, for this other is 
itself. This ambiguous supersession of its ambiguous otherness is equally an 
ambiguous return into itself. For first, through the supersession, it receives 
back its own self, because, by superseding its otherness, it again becomes 
equal to itself; but secondly, the other self-consciousness equally gives it 
back again to itself, for it saw itself in the other, but supersedes this being of 
                                                            
538 T. Storm Heter argues that in his later works ‘Sartre develops the idea that ethical relations must be 
based on intersubjective recognition’ (‘Authenticity and Others: Sartre’s Ethics of Recognition’, Sartre 
Studies International, 12:2 (2006), p. 17). There are good grounds for this argument. However, Heter 
does not adequately credit Beauvoir and the influence of her much earlier work on Sartre’s ethical 
thinking.  
539 Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, p. 91. 
  162 
itself in the other and thus lets the other again go free.540 
 
Like Sartre, Hegel does insist on an epic and enduring struggle between self and other. 
But in accordance with his dialectical logic, self-consciousness is transformed by an 
encounter with another being. This ambiguous confrontation is, in fact, a positive and 
necessary part of authenticity, a way for self-consciousness to become more familiar 
with itself by venturing outside itself. It is a movement of self-discovery that involves 
self-loss; self-alienation paves the way for authentic self-knowledge. This crucially 
important understanding of the ontological necessity of a journey away from oneself in 
order to return to oneself resonates deeply with Coriolanus. As Nancy Selleck observes 
in The Interpersonal Idiom in Shakespeare, Donne, and Early Modern Culture, ‘The 
selves coined by Renaissance speakers and writers are various, but they share a 
tendency to locate selfhood beyond subjective experience, in the experience of an 
other.’541 
 As he acknowledges that his betrayal of Rome will inevitably have life-
threatening consequences for his family, Coriolanus says: ‘it is no little thing to make / 
Mine eyes to sweat compassion’ (V.iii.196-7). Interestingly, Volumnia invokes an 
image of imprisonment to persuade her son to recognise her existence. She says: 
‘There’s no man in the world / More bound to’s mother, yet here he lets me prate / Like 
one i’th’ stocks’ (V.iii.159-61). In an attempt to use reverse psychology, Volumnia 
envisages herself as a vagabond who is confined to the stocks and ignored by passers-
by. The technique works to great effect: Coriolanus is forced to acknowledge his 
mother, as indicated by the stage direction: ‘He holds her by the hand, silent’ (V.iii). 
Holding hands is a powerful symbol of unity and mutual respect in Shakespearean 
drama. In the final lines of The Comedy of Errors, Dromio of Ephesus says: ‘We came 
into the world like brother and brother, / And now let’s go hand in hand, not one before 
another’ (V.i.426-7). Kiernan Ryan suggests that this egalitarian sentiment, voiced by a 
character who has been subjected to repeated beatings in the play, epitomises 
Shakespearean comedy’s levelling and liberating spirit.542 Coriolanus’s touching of 
others is significant. In II.i, he leaves the scene in a childlike position, holding hands 
with his mother and his wife. The physical linking of hands symbolises human 
solidarity. Like the physical embraces noted earlier, hand clasps carry the simple, yet 
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ethically important suggestion that human beings are connected to one another. In this 
respect, Shakespeare differs from Sartre, who focuses on the radically distinct 
experiences of touching and being touched, and writes: ‘I see my hand touching objects, 
but do not know it in the act of touching them. . . . For my hand reveals to me the 
resistance of objects, their hardness or softness, but not itself.’543 The experience of 
touching another person, Shakespeare’s play implies, draws an individual into the realm 
of a common, shared humanity. Human beings need comfort, recognition and affection. 
When Coriolanus holds Volumnia’s hand, he is not sealing a pact, as he does when he 
shakes hands with Aufidius in IV.v. Instead, he silently affirms the existence of his 
family. 
 Earlier in the play, Brutus informs the audience of Coriolanus’s deep disrespect 
for the freedom of the citizens. He remarks:  
 
    [Coriolanus] would 
Have made them mules, silenced their pleaders, 
And dispropertied their freedoms, holding them 
In human action and capacity 
Of no more soul nor fitness for the world 
Than camels in the war, who have their provand 
Only for bearing burdens, and sore blows 
For sinking under them.   (II.i.242-9)  
 
This assessment of Coriolanus’s treatment of others in the past perhaps does not come 
as a surprise. The citizens are angry because they have not been treated ‘humanely’ 
(I.i.17). They laugh at the suggestion that the patricians have cared for them ‘like 
fathers’ (I.i.74). Coriolanus shows his forgetfulness of others when he fails to remember 
the name of the prisoner who helped him in Corioles. He shies away from revealing his 
wounds to others, because he does not want to accept that he is an object for others in 
the same way that they are objects for him. Coriolanus’s astonishing change in attitude 
towards his family in the identification scene is a remarkable affirmation of his basic 
link with others. The transformation is considerable. ‘These eyes are not the same I 
wore in Rome’ (V.iii.38), he tells his family, signalling a change in his fundamental 
understanding of his relationship with the people closest to him. We know that 
Coriolanus has previously sought ‘Not to be other than one thing’ (IV.vii.42). When he 
confesses, ‘I melt, and am not / Of stronger earth than others’ (V.iii.28-9), we sense the 
beginning of an ethical conversion in Coriolanus. It is a tremendously unsettling 
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experience. Once again, Shakespeare employs deliquescent imagery as a metaphor for 
subjective dissolution. Coriolanus acknowledges the unavoidably social nature of 
human existence and realises that his freedom can only be meaningful, if it is asserted 
on behalf of another.  
 Charles Taylor’s argument in The Ethics of Authenticity resonates with the 
existentialist ethics in Coriolanus. Taylor writes: ‘If authenticity is being true to 
ourselves, is recovering our own “sentiment de l’existence,” then perhaps we can only 
achieve it integrally if we recognize that this sentiment connects us to a wider whole. . . 
. Perhaps the loss of a sense of belonging through a publicly defined order needs to be 
compensated by a stronger, more inner sense of linkage.’544 Taylor directly confronts 
the problem of the notion of authenticity: if we consider authenticity to be our highest 
existential value, and thus follow our desires and impulses at all costs, we risk losing 
sight of our responsibilities and moral obligations to the communities in which we live. 
In Coriolanus, we can see Shakespeare anticipating this concern by dramatising the 
dangers of believing too firmly in one’s existential singularity. Volumnia stresses her 
belief that the fates of human beings are bound together. She says to Coriolanus: 
 
   Thou barr’st us 
Our prayers to the gods, which is a comfort 
That all but we enjoy. For how can we, 
Alas, how can we for our country pray, 
Whereto we are bound, together with thy victory, 
Whereto we are bound? Alack, or we must lose 
The country, our dear nurse, or else thy person, 
Our comfort in the country. We must find 
An evident calamity, though we had 
Our wish which side should win. For either thou 
Must as a foreign recreant be led 
With manacles thorough our streets, or else 
Triumphantly tread on thy country’s ruin, 
And bear the palm for having bravely shed 
Thy wife and children’s blood.   (V.iii.105-19) 
 
 
The epizeuxis in this speech, Volumnia’s emotional repetition of the phrase ‘Whereto 
we are bound’, is existentially revealing. Coriolanus’s treachery, she suggests, will 
result either in his being dragged through the streets of Rome in chains, or in Rome’s 
                                                            
544 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge Massachusetts and London: Harvard University 
Press, 1991), p. 91. 
  165 
ruin and his family’s death. Volumnia’s speech invokes the imagery of the blood of 
others, specifically that of Coriolanus’s wife and son, and then threatens her son with 
the prospect of her own suicide. Coriolanus is dumbfounded by the emotional entreaties 
of his family, forced to confront the reality that his actions will have devastating 
consequences for them. The same idea comes through in Beauvoir’s existentialist novel.  
As he is drawn further into the activities of the resistance, Jean acknowledges that he 
has an ethical responsibility to act. His lover asks him, ‘why should other people have 
rights over us?’, and Jean replies: ‘It’s not a question of rights . . . they are there.’545 As 
he waits for Hélène to die, he reflects on how he came to understand the significance of 
this idea: ‘I was anchored to the world by tenacious roots which fed my own sap with a 
thousand borrowed juices; I was incapable of freeing myself so that I could soar above 
it, and destroy it, remake it; and I was only separated from it by a lonely anguish which 
bore witness to my own presence.’546 Something of this resonates with the identification 
scene in Coriolanus. Coriolanus begins to see others not as subjectively threatening, but 
as individuals to whom he must choose to respond. This is Coriolanus’s freedom: the 
freedom to choose how to reciprocate with others. By deciding to reconcile himself with 
Rome, he knows that he is putting the lives of his mother, wife and son before his own. 
Emotionally stricken, he says: 
 
    O mother, mother! 
What have you done? Behold, the heavens do ope, 
The gods look down, and this unnatural scene 
They laugh at. O my mother, mother, O! 
You have won a happy victory to Rome; 
But for your son, believe it, O believe it, 
Most dangerously you have with him prevailed, 
If not most mortal to him. But let it come.—  (V.iii.183-90) 
 
Coriolanus is clearly not a man frightened by the prospect of death, so his claim that his 
mother’s actions are ‘most mortal to him’ contains a deeper meaning. Coriolanus knows 
that his death will not be that of the glorious, heroic warrior, fighting alone against the 
world: he will sacrifice himself so that others can live. The tragic resignation here that 
parallels Hamlet’s ‘Let be’ (V.ii.201-2) suggests that Coriolanus recognises the ethical 
and existential significance of his actions. 
 I have examined this crucial scene at some length, arguing that Shakespeare 
allows us to witness the emergence of a new ethical mode of being. This view of the 
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ethics of human life, the implication that true relationships between human beings are 
possible, chimes with Martin Buber’s ‘I-It’ and ‘I-Thou’ formulations. In an ‘I-It’ 
position, claims Buber, an individual  
 
perceives what exists round about him - simply things, and beings as things; 
and what happens round about him - simply events, and actions as events; 
things consisting of qualities, events of moments; . . . he perceives an ordered 
and detached world. . . . Its organisation can be surveyed and brought out again 
and again; gone over with closed eyes, and verified with open eyes. . . . You 
perceive it, take it to yourself as the ‘truth’, and it lets itself be taken; but it 
does not give itself to you. Only concerning it may you make yourself 
‘understood’ with others; it is ready, though attached to everyone in a different 
way, to be an object common to you all. But you cannot meet others in it.547   
 
This is the way Coriolanus previously viewed human existence: others were objects in 
his world and he was an object for others. This paradigm engendered conflict and 
distrust between individuals. Buber suggests that alternatively, in an ‘I-Thou’ position, 
an individual encounters 
 
each thing simply as being. . . . Nothing is present for him except this one 
being, but it implicates the whole world. . . . Between you and it there is 
mutual giving: you say Thou to it and give yourself to it, it says Thou to you 
and gives itself to you. You cannot make yourself understood with others 
concerning it, you are alone with it. But it teaches you to meet others, and to 
hold your ground when you meet them, Through the graciousness of its 
comings and the solemn sadness of its goings it leads you away to the Thou 
in which the parallel lines of relations meet.548 
 
As he comes to realise the relational nature of his existence, Coriolanus moves forward 
in the direction of an ‘I-Thou’ relationship. But a caveat must be added to this 
argument: he remains on the brink of this new ethical existence rather than experiencing 
a full ethical conversion. When he faces Aufidius and the conspirators, he once again 
asserts his singularity: ‘I / Fluttered your Volscians in Corioles. / Alone I did it, boy!’ 
(V.vi.115-17). But perhaps Coriolanus’s shortcomings make the final scenes of the play 
all the more ethically compelling. It is easier to believe in oneself, Shakespeare implies, 
than to believe that one exists for others; easier to assert individual authenticity than to 
accept that that sense of authenticity owes itself to the world it exists in.  
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 David Ruiter has recently suggested that Buber’s understanding of the duality of 
relational human experience can be used to illuminate the Henry IV plays. Focusing on 
the tavern scenes and particularly on Hal’s treatment of the tapster Francis, Ruiter 
observes that the lines ‘repeatedly evoke the difference between treating others as 
subjective individuals or as objects to be used for one’s own advantage.’549 Ruiter 
celebrates Shakespeare’s ability to dramatise ‘the ethics of casualness, of relaxation, of 
contingent rather than ultimate situations that define our lives.’550 Examining Hal’s 
failure to recognise the ethics that underpin his relations with others, he writes: ‘The 
pathos of this is not blunted but sharpened by the humdrum quality of a barroom 
encounter, which suggests that the most important issues of human ethics and ontology 
are dramatized and decided in the infinite series of forgettable moments that comprise 
the everyday.’551 Although Shakespeare is clearly interested in situations that have an 
ethical ultimacy, the ethics in his plays are subtly dramatised. In Coriolanus, he focuses 
on the ethical value of a simple shift in his protagonist’s attitude towards others. In 
doing so, he points towards a new way of existing - a more existentially fulfilling life. 
Openness towards others allows oneself to know oneself better.552 
 In other plays, Shakespeare also allows us to glimpse the idea of an ethics based 
on relational life. In Romeo and Juliet, when the lovers exchange vows of love and 
solidarity, Juliet remarks: 
 
Juliet. I gave thee mine before thou didst request it, 
 And yet I would it were to give again. 
Romeo. Wouldst thou withdraw it? For what purpose, love? 
Juliet.  But to be frank and give it thee again. 
 And yet I wish but for the thing I have. 
 My bounty is as boundless as the sea, 
 My love as deep. The more I give to thee 
 The more I have, for both are infinite.  
         (II.i.170-7)	  
 
As Ryan notes, this is a description of ‘a mutually enhancing, limitless love, whose 
value defies selfish quantification.’553 Juliet’s belief in the reciprocity of passion 
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highlights the ethics that underpin sexual relationships. A similar idea is hinted at in 
Much Ado About Nothing when Claudio says: ‘Lady, as you are mine, I am yours. I give 
away myself for you, and dote upon the exchange’ (II.i.268-70). In the twentieth 
century, Beauvoir theorised the existential significance of erotic love, arguing in The 
Second Sex that in the mutual generosity of an erotic experience, the ambiguity of the 
human condition is revealed: ‘lovers can enjoy a common pleasure . . . the partners each 
feeling the pleasure as being his or her own but as having its source in the other.’554 In 
many ways, Shakespeare’s play prefigures this argument and much of the existential 
intensity of the tragedy is generated through this ethically rich vision of human 
relationships.  
 In Titus Andronicus, Shakespeare presents an ethics grounded in empathy and 
identification. As Titus confronts his savagely mutilated daughter, Lavinia, he asks:  
 
Shall thy good uncle, and thy brother Lucius, 
And thou, and I, sit round about some fountain, 
Looking all downwards to behold our cheeks 
How they are stained, like meadows yet not dry 
With miry slime left on them by a flood? 
And in the fountain shall we gaze so long 
Till the fresh taste be taken from that clearness, 
And made a brine pit with our bitter tears? 
Or shall we cut away our hands like thine? 
Or shall we bite our tongues, and in dumb shows 
Pass the remainder of our hateful days?  (III.i.122-32) 
 
‘O, what a sympathy of woe is this—’ (III.i.148), cries Titus a few lines later. His desire 
to cut off his limbs so that he too might experience her pain is at once pitiful and 
horrifying. Titus is a prototype of Lear, a man who finds that his sense of individual 
authenticity is intimately tied to his ability to understand and empathise with others. 
Offering a similar reading of Shakespearean ethics, Knapp writes: ‘Ethics is invariably 
tied to choice, to the decision, and the concept of the ethical decision is one that 
necessarily involves the “sympathy” of others. Locating the meeting point at which such 
sympathy might be found can be understood as the challenge facing any attempt to 
articulate an ethics that adequately accounts for the alterity of the other person.’555 He 
picks out Lysander’s fleeting utopian vision in A Midsummer Night’s Dream as 
evidence of Shakespeare’s deep interest in the ethically and politically transformative 
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power of empathetic insight. Hermia is distraught at the prospect of having ‘to choose 
love by another’s eyes’ (I.i.140), and her lover responds: 
 
Or if there were a sympathy of choice, 
War, death, or sickness did lay siege to it, 
Making it momentany as a sound, 
Swift as a shadow, short as any dream, 
Brief as the lightening in the collied night, 
That, in a spleen, unfolds both heaven and earth, 
And, ere a man hath power to say ‘Behold!’, 
The jaws of darkness do devour it up. 
So quick bright things come to confusion.  (I.i.141-9) 
 
In this remarkable speech, Shakespeare suggests that human beings have the ability to 
transcend the inaccessibility of other people’s minds and experience what it is to be 
another human being by engaging in a process of affective reciprocity. ‘The ethical 
valence of the visual’, writes Knapp, ‘is a matter of how one sees rather than what one 
sees.’556 William M. Hawley is also attracted to the idea of mutually enhancing ethical 
relationships in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, and argues that by ‘treating ontology and 
ethics as facets of the same movement,’ Shakespeare ‘shows ethical conflicts to be 
resolved relationally’.557 
 Following Knapp and Hawley, I want to stress the significance of the ethics of 
empathy in Shakespeare’s drama. This argument takes issue with Richard Strier’s 
suggestion that, as Shakespeare’s career progressed, he ‘developed more and more fully 
and explicitly his sense of the limitation of the moral perspective.’558 Although there 
may be some truth in the suggestion that Shakespeare’s plays reveal the inadequacy of 
moralising condemnation and insinuate that ‘moral judgment, however precise, is not 
the way to approach even some situations to which, it seems, such judgment should 
apply’,559 such conclusions do not offer a comprehensive assessment of Shakespeare’s 
interest in the ethics of human life. Shakespeare’s plays are not only critiques of 
moralism: they also show how significant ethical decisions are felt in their fullest sense 
when they are regarded as internal mandates with the power to shape an individual’s 
sense of self. My existential reading of Shakespearean ethics, which also links self-
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becoming with a firmer sense of collective identity, also contrasts sharply with Peter 
Holbrook’s view of the conflict between ethics and individualism. He writes:  
 
The injunction of ‘ethics’ is that one listen to the ‘Other’ (defined in group 
terms) rather than oneself. . . . This ethical, Other-regarding turn in 
contemporary Western mores takes a dim view of self-expression, which 
comes increasingly to appear as something we need protection against: ‘if a 
man will make curtsy and say nothing, he is virtuous’ (2 Henry IV, II.i.124-
5). To the extent Left intellectuals have taken this conformist path they 
have, it seems to me, badly compromised those once prominent 
Enlightenment and Romantic commitments that made the Left the natural 
defender of individual freedom. ‘Ethics’, as currently imagined, is the 
perfect ideology for a corporatized, networked, fundamentally illiberal 
social order.560  
 
Holbrook does not put his best argument forward here, as he creates a false opposition 
between individual freedom and ethics and equates ethics with moral prescription. 
Ethics, if understood in a deeper, existential sense, link up to inward feelings and are 
therefore always incorporated into our sense of individual freedom. Contrary to 
Holbrook’s view, existentialists claim - in a way that Taylor would later echo - that self-
development, authenticity and a sense of individualism depend upon a deep, ethical 
respect for other people. This is the crux of Beauvoir’s argument. She acknowledges 
that assertions of freedom inevitably come into conflict with the freedom of others; but 
she also suggests that these moments of conflict can in fact produce a better 
understanding of the way an individual’s freedom is dependent on a recognition of the 
freedom of others. In other words, by witnessing the freedom of others, I more fully 
understand the importance of my own freedom. At the end of The Ethics of Ambiguity, 
Beauvoir asks: ‘Is this kind of ethics individualistic or not?’ Her answer is:  
 
Yes, if one means by that that it accords to the individual an absolute value 
and that it recognizes in him alone the power of laying the foundations of 
his own existence. . . . But it is not solipsistic, since the individual is defined 
only by his relationship to the world and to other individuals; he exists only 
by transcending himself, and his freedom can be achieved only through the 
freedom of others. He justifies his existence by a movement which, like 
freedom, springs from his heart but which leads outside of him.561 
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We can see Beauvoir here using ethics as a way to broach the issue of the relationship 
between individual self-becoming and the politics of collective existence. In many 
ways, Beauvoir responds to Sartre’s suggestion at the very end of Being and 
Nothingness that there are many questions about the nature of human existence that ‘can 
find their reply only on the ethical plane.’562  
 Many critics have noted the anti-climactic quality of the final scene of 
Coriolanus. Coriolanus’s murder seems to lack the existential intensity and tragic 
significance often found in other Shakespearean tragedies. But in the context of the 
play’s fascination with the idea of existential otherness, the scene functions as a 
powerful reminder of the difficulties of living in a world full of other people. After 
making a pact with his life-long enemy, Aufidius is appalled to find that he has been 
eclipsed by Coriolanus. He tells his conspirators:  
 
    I took him, 
Made him joint-servant with me, gave him way 
In all his own desires; nay, let him choose 
Out of my files, his projects to accomplish, 
My best and freshest men; served his designments 
In mine own person, holp to reap the fame 
Which he did end all his, and took some pride 
To do myself this wrong, till at the last 
I seemed his follower, not partner, and 
He waged me with his countenance as if  
I had been mercenary.    (V.vi.30-9) 
 
Aufidius sees his relationship with Coriolanus as adopting the structure of a master-
slave dialectic. He explains that Coriolanus has undermined his sense of authority and 
power to such an extent that he now feels like ‘his follower’. Fear and anxiety about the 
effect this has on Aufidius’s sense of self lead him to plot Coriolanus’s immediate 
death. At the end of the play, Shakespeare reminds us of the friction and conflict that 
exist in the relationship between self and other, and thus underlines the need for a 
stronger sense of connection between human beings. The ethical headway made by 
Coriolanus when he recognised the needs of his family in V.iii is tragically undone at 
the end of the play. Coriolanus dies reminding his attackers that he ‘Fluttered [their] 
Volscians in Corioles’ (V.vi.117) and aggressively demanding that they ‘Stain all [their] 
edges on [him]’ (V.xi.113). This play is an ethical tragedy, which, by showing us the 
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challenges inherent in our relationships with others, reminds us of the existential 
necessity of authentic human bonds.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have sought to demonstrate the existentially relevant ethics that emerge 
in Coriolanus. Clearly, the existentialist ethics that are apparent in Shakespeare’s drama 
are not stable or straightforward and cannot easily be formulated into moral codes 
which prescribe ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ action. Instead, Shakespeare offers a broader 
understanding of the ethical nature of human life. The play traces Coriolanus’s troubled 
relationship with others and focuses on his anxiety about bodily exposure that is 
manifested in his worries about bleeding and blushing before others. At the end of the 
play, Shakespeare shows how a sense of individual authenticity can, paradoxically, be 
strengthened by an openness and respect for other people. When Coriolanus admits that 
he is ‘not / of stronger earth than others’ (V.iii.28-9), we are struck by this moment of 
intense self-awareness, amazed that a man who has fervently insisted on his own 
existential singularity can find a stronger, richer sense of authenticity, not from within, 
but from his connection with other beings. This process is, of course, traumatic; 
Coriolanus risks self-loss and subjective dissolution. But Shakespeare’s play insists that 
this loss of self-control is a price worth paying. To think of oneself as the singular 
source of oneself is strangely stultifying. Instead, we have to reach out to others in order 
to locate a more liberating sense of our selves. This is the basis of an authentically 
ethical life. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘FREEDOM LIVES HENCE’ (I.I.180): POLITICAL LIFE IN KING LEAR 
 
 
 
 
 
In the previous two chapters, I have painted a picture of Shakespeare as a proto-
existentialist writer deeply concerned with the notion of human freedom and I have 
endeavoured to show how Shakespeare presents the idea of freedom as perpetually 
bound up with questions of ethics. His plays insist that human beings must not only 
commit themselves to the task of self-creation, they must also acknowledge their 
responsibility for the world they live in. This is no easy undertaking; it is a perilous and 
sometimes terrifying element of human life. In this chapter, I want to focus primarily on 
the idea of political freedom in King Lear and uncover the ways in which the play 
suggests that self-realisation is both an ethical and a political command. Shakespeare is 
fascinated by the inherently political nature of human existence. In her recent study, 
Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and Life, Julia Reinhard Lupton outlines 
the constitutive relationship between human life and human politics in Shakespeare’s 
work. She argues that when Shylock asks ‘If you prick us do we not bleed?’ (The 
Merchant of Venice, III.i.54), his ‘question is political, since it broaches the conditions 
of personhood, civic belonging, and human rights, but the question ‘also bears on life, 
flaring up here as the pierced casing of creaturely existence. And he staples politics and 
life together with a certain brute simplicity, the stream of monosyllables unmediated by 
juridical or philosophical terminology.’563 Political issues and questions in 
Shakespeare’s drama are always powerfully imbued with existential intensity, and in 
King Lear, a play in which a sovereign is forced to realise that his hand ‘smells of 
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mortality’ (xx.128), Shakespeare’s existential political thinking is most fully and lucidly 
revealed.   
 In modern existentialist philosophy, the issue of politics produced a diverse range 
of perspectives among writers and theorists. Broadly speaking, existentialists were 
intensely conscious of the fact that no individual exists in a historical, social or political 
vacuum. By insisting on the situated, concrete and engaged nature of human life, they 
became increasingly aware of the need to integrate their ontological account of 
existence with social theory and a socio-historical understanding of existence. The 
devastation of the Second World War stressed the thoroughly political nature of issues 
such as freedom, authenticity and self-realisation. Existentialists saw the necessity of 
promoting not isolated individualism, but an authentic life grounded in an acceptance 
and recognition of others. Human beings must ‘make themselves’ in and through 
collective social action, they tell us. Progressing towards a Marxist version of 
existentialism and exploring the material aspect of human existence, writers such as 
Sartre, Beauvoir and Camus sought to understand more accurately the relationship 
between freedom and determinism. In The Ethics of Ambiguity, countering the argument 
that Marxism posits a subject completely determined by history, Beauvoir claims that 
‘Marxism does not always deny freedom. The very notion of action would lose all 
meaning if history were a mechanical unrolling in which man appears only as a passive 
conductor of outside forces. By acting, as by preaching action, the Marxist 
revolutionary asserts himself as a veritable agent; he assumes himself to be free.’564 
Beauvoir is not alone in her insistence on a re-humanised form of Marxist thought. 
Erich Fromm refers to Marxist philosophy as ‘a spiritual existentialism in secular 
language’, and points out that ‘Marx is primarily concerned with the emancipation of 
man as an individual, the overcoming of alienation, the restoration of his capacity to 
relate himself fully to man and to nature.’565 In stressing the humanistic impulse that 
lies beneath Marx’s thought, existentialists show that a rapprochement of the two 
philosophies provides a better understanding of the dynamic interaction between the 
freedom of consciousness and the limits of history. With this in mind, I shall now look 
at the strengths and limitations of previous political readings of King Lear, and proceed 
to offer an existentialist interpretation of the play’s politics. 
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Previous Political Readings of King Lear 
 
The history of Lear’s critical reception is extensive and diverse. Over the last thirty 
years, various schools of thought (new-historicism, cultural-materialism, feminism and 
psychoanalytic criticism, to name but a few) have offered their own distinctive 
interpretations of the play’s political concerns. The increasing number of political 
readings of Lear marked an important paradigm shift in Shakespearean criticism, which 
moved away from humanist views of the tragedy and began to put questions about 
social and ideological structures at the top of its agenda. Kiernan Ryan notes that with 
the rise of theory, the 1980s saw the emergence of ‘a fresh generation of critics, for 
whom the meaning of Lear was inseparable from questions of language, gender, power 
and the unconscious.’566 During this period, new-historicist scholars, whose views 
proved especially influential, argued that Shakespeare’s mightiest tragedy endorsed the 
dominant ideology of its time and thus encouraged its spectators to become unwitting 
accomplices in their own subjection.567  
 Stephen Greenblatt’s two essays on the play, ‘Shakespeare and the Exorcists’ and 
‘The Cultivation of Anxiety: King Lear and his Heirs’, are impressive examples of this 
line of argument. In the latter essay, Greenblatt argues that ‘The very practice of tragedy 
depends upon a communal conviction that anxiety may be profitably and even 
pleasurably cultivated. That is, tragedy goes beyond the usual philosophical and 
religious consolations for affliction, and both exemplifies and perfects techniques for 
the creation or intensification of affliction.’568 By enjoying the anxiety-producing 
experience of watching theatre, spectators become complicit in a process that aims to 
keep them in their place. As an audience, ‘we enjoy being brazenly lied to, we welcome 
for the sake of pleasure what we know to be untrue, but we withhold from the theater 
the simple assent that we grant to everyday reality’, Greenblatt explains in ‘Shakespeare 
and the Exorcists’.569 He acknowledges that Shakespeare seems to be deeply conscious 
of this inherent quality of his drama, and suggests that in Measure for Measure and The 
Tempest Shakespeare deliberately weaves his anxiety about his authorial omnipotence 
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into the fabric of the plays. The contention that Lear reveals ‘the practice of salutary 
anxiety at the symbolic centre of society’, the systematic displacement of fear by royal 
sovereigns onto their subjects in order to maintain subservience and quash political 
discontent, is compellingly explored by Greenblatt.570 However, we need not come to 
such a bleak conclusion. The arousing of anxiety in others initiated by the demands of 
Lear’s love test has many different effects on the play’s characters and its audience. The 
play engenders a sense of existential trepidation and uncertainty, which is more radical 
than Greenblatt is willing to admit to. Anxiety is an ambiguous experience. When I 
stand at the edge of a cliff, ‘I am afraid not of falling over the precipice, but of throwing 
myself over’, remarks Sartre.571 Fear is brought about by the recognition that human life 
can be influenced and altered by external factors; but anxiety is created when an 
individual realises that he is an active agent in the world, a participant in existence. 
Anguish is produced when ‘I distrust myself and my own reactions’ in a particular 
situation.572 Gloucester believes he has been brought to ‘a cliff whose high and bending 
head / Looks saucily in the confinèd deep’ (xv.71-2), that he stands ‘within a foot / Of 
th’extreme verge’ (xx.25-6). His final thoughts are for the son he has mistreated: ‘If 
Edgar live, O bless him!-’ (xx.40). For the audience, his suicide attempt is pitiful, 
ridiculous, even grotesque. But in many ways, this increases the existential significance 
of the theatrical moment. Shakespeare stages a scene in which a blind man, afflicted by 
a deep sense of angst, stands not before the vertiginous heights of Dover Cliff, but 
standing on smooth, even ground. The effect of this is to mobilise our own sense of 
freedom, for we are encouraged to recall ‘How fearful / And dizzy ’tis to cast one’s eyes 
so low!’ (xx.11-12), how frightening and yet invigorating it is to look over a precipice. 
As a result, the awakening of anxiety is existentially beneficial. In Sartre’s words, it 
allows me to see ‘a self that I am not yet’: ‘I approach the precipice, and my scrutiny is 
searching for my self in my very depths. In terms of this moment, I play with my 
possibilities.’573 Gloucester allows his imagination (against the better judgement of his 
senses) to envisage himself standing one step away from a leap to his death, because the 
experience of anxiety is valuable and to some extent existentially regenerative. Edgar 
knows this and believes that allowing his father to experience the full force of his 
anxiety and despair ‘Is done to cure it’ (xx.34). Of course, Gloucester is not knowingly 
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on a journey of self-discovery. But there are indications that his sufferings have enabled 
him, like Lear, to become more intuitively self-aware. He says: 
 
  How stiff is my vile sense, 
That I stand up and have ingenious feeling 
Of my huge sorrows! Better I were distraught;  
So should my thoughts be fencèd from my griefs, 
And woes by wrong imaginations lose 
The knowledge of themselves.   (xx.271-6) 
 
Gloucester is spared the relief of madness; his grief is intensified by knowledge. His 
growth of understanding, albeit grasped only intermittently and fleetingly, is an 
important aspect of the play’s insistence on the value of existential unease. This 
reassessment of the role of anxiety in Lear helps shed light on some criticisms levelled 
at readings such as Greenblatt’s. Hugh Grady observes that such views ‘seem to present 
an inevitable process of the triumph of power and ideology . . . with no or very little 
space left from which it is possible to understand how a resistance to power and 
received identities could be mounted.’574 But if Lear implies that anxiety stimulates 
rather than sedates the human impulse to be free, then the play becomes more 
recognisably concerned with the possibility of political resistance or change. King Lear, 
as Ryan argues, is a tragedy that ‘confounds conventional expectations by obliging us to 
reach beyond the facts of Lear’s personal fate to examine the codes that determine the 
shape his fate takes.’575 
 Another seminal reading of the politics of King Lear is Jonathan Dollimore’s 
‘King Lear and Essentialist Humanism’, which distances itself from Christian, 
existentialist and humanistic readings by insisting that the play is not about passive 
endurance, tragic inevitability, redemptive suffering or divine justice, but ‘about power, 
property and inheritance.’576 One of the key strengths of Dollimore’s influential reading 
is his suggestion that there is a subversive political impulse at the heart of the play. By 
revealing that human nature is not given or innate but largely shaped and influenced by 
material conditions, and by insisting that individuals often internalise society’s 
dominant ideology, Lear allows us to envisage the possibility of political 
transformation, claims Dollimore. Exposing the way political mechanisms function in 
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society enables individuals to see how those mechanisms can be changed, modified, 
even completely overhauled. This insightful and progressive ‘exploration of human 
consciousness in relation to social being’577 has brought to light the way an essentialist 
belief in human nature can often be employed as an ideological tactic to ensure the 
preservation of the political status quo.  
 But there are limitations to Dollimore’s assessment, the most significant being his 
rejection of existential humanism, which he sees as a tradition that emphasises ‘essential 
heroism and existential integrity’ and is thus ‘merely a mutation of Christianity’.578 He 
correctly notes, however, that ‘In literary criticism the social implications of 
existentialism, such as they were, were easily ignored, the emphasis being instead on a 
modernist angst and man’s thwarted spiritual potential.’579 But Dollimore does not seek 
to rejuvenate the social or political ideas of existentialism to counter this neglect of 
those ideas in literary criticism. Instead, he endeavours to prove that in King Lear pity, 
compassion and human kindness are ineffectual means of bringing about social change. 
Dollimore suggest that ‘Far from endorsing the idea that man can redeem himself in and 
through an access to pity,’ the play insists that the king exists in a world where ‘the 
majority will remain poor, naked wretches’, adding that ‘in fiction the wheel of fortune 
rarely brings them that low.’580 ‘As a basis for human kind’s self-redemption’, kindness 
‘is a nonstarter.’581 Some critics have pointed out the shortcomings of Dollimore’s 
perspective on the role of pity in the play. Tom McAlindon claims that Shakespeare 
places real emphasis on the necessity of compassion, ‘the art of known and feeling 
sorrows’ (xx.214) as Edgar puts it, and ‘thus shaped plot and character so as to provide 
for a reconstitution of the existing social order on a wise, strong and humane basis.’582 
Many existentialists would agree, arguing that an openness towards other people 
engendered by compassion and pity is in fact the foundation on which a better society 
can be built. This radical and integral sentiment lies at the heart of Lear, a play that is 
continually reminding us of the value of ‘feeling’ for and alongside others.583   
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 The purpose of this chapter is not to contest the suggestion of new historicists and 
cultural materialists that the work of Renaissance writers and dramatists reveals a deep 
interest in the mechanisms of power and ideology. King Lear clearly interrogates the 
dangerous individualistic ethos of utility and instrumentality. But the play also 
repeatedly flags up the existential inadequacies and shortcomings of such ways of 
thinking. John D. Cox concurs with this view, and his explanation of the way 
Shakespearean drama examines the existential cost of rational political thinking is worth 
quoting at length: 
 
Shakespeare was no less insightful than Machiavelli about the infinite 
resourcefulness of instrumental thinking, and he embodied that resourcefulness 
in plays about historical process, which for him, as for Machiavelli, meant 
political process. Where Shakespeare departs most profoundly from Machiavelli 
is in his affirmation of moral limitation— not in the political process itself, 
whose exclusive end is the acquiring and maintaining of political power, but in 
the human situation that encompasses kings and commoners alike, whether the 
first are willing to admit it or not. Shakespeare’s most powerful politicians are 
the most self-deceived, because self-knowledge comes only with the 
acknowledgement of human limitations, and politicians, as Machiavelli well 
knew, need to act as if nothing limits them, least of all moral scruples. 
Shakespeare knew this too, but his politicians suffer, in ways that Machiavelli’s 
prince never does, because they attempt to deny limitations that their world 
nonetheless imposes on them.584  
 
Donald R. Wehrs argues in a similar vein when he observes that Shakespeare was well 
aware ‘of how his theatre was particularly well-suited to expose the folly and moral cost 
of separating self-fashioning reason from a corporeal subjectivity binding the self to 
ethics and sociability.’585 ‘I cannot be / Mine own, nor anything to any, if / I be not 
thine’ (IV.iv.43-5), says Florizel to Perdita in The Winter’s Tale. Individual identity in 
Shakespearean drama, as we have seen in the previous two chapters, is often conceived 
as relational. Shakespeare’s characters never interpret their identity in isolation; they 
negotiate their sense of self through a dialogue with others. 
 Before we turn to examine in more detail the way Shakespeare links the idea of 
relational, ethical subjectivity to human politics, it is worth pausing over Sartre’s 
                                                                                                                                                                              
with another, participation in suffering; fellow-feeling, sympathy’ (OED) and thus conveyed the idea that 
compassion is a collaborative and potentially regenerative process.    
584 John D. Cox, Seeming Knowledge: Shakespeare and Skeptical Faith (Waco: Baylor University Press, 
2007), p. 160. 
585 Donald R. Wehrs, ‘Moral Physiology, Ethical Prototypes, and the Denaturing of Sense in 
Shakespearean Tragedy’, College Literature, 33:1 (2006), p. 75. 
  180 
elaboration of his concept of freedom in Being and Nothingness. In a chapter entitled 
‘Freedom and Facticity: The Situation’, Sartre addresses the main charge levelled at 
proponents of freedom by materialists and determinists:                                                                 
 
The decisive argument which is employed by common sense against freedom 
consists in reminding us of our powerlessness. Far from being able to modify 
our situation at our whim, we seem to be unable to change ourselves. . . . Much 
more than he appears ‘to make himself,’ man seems ‘to be made’ by climate and 
the earth, race and class, language, the history of the collectivity of which he is 
part, heredity, the individual circumstances of his childhood, acquired habits, the 
great and small events of our life.586  
 
In response to this argument (an argument that clearly resonates with some readings of 
the politics in Lear), Sartre suggests that ‘the coefficient of adversity in things can not 
be an argument against our freedom for it is by us—i.e., by the preliminary positing of 
an end—that this coefficient of adversity arises.’587 ‘The coefficient of adversity’ is the 
term Sartre uses to describe the worldly resistance we encounter when we pursue our 
projects, the historical, political and moral circumstances that limit our freedom. Sartre 
continues: ‘Thus although brute things . . . can from the start limit our freedom of 
action, it is our freedom itself which must first constitute the framework, the technique, 
and the ends in relation to which they will manifest themselves as limits.’588 In other 
words, as we pursue our projects in the world, we confront objects, people and 
environments that curtail the range of our actions. But because we are pursuing a project 
in the first place, because we are freely following the goals, ambitions and objectives 
that we have set ourselves, we ascribe meaning to these elements of the world. Sartre 
explains: ‘A particular crag, which manifests a profound resistance if I wish to displace 
it, will on the contrary be a valuable aid if I want to climb upon it in order to look over 
the countryside. In itself . . . [the crag] is neutral; that is, it awaits to be illuminated by 
an end in order to manifest itself as adverse or helpful.’589 
 It is clear that Sartre is not suggesting that human beings are absolutely free. He 
rejects this claim outright, and clarifies his understanding of freedom by stating that ‘the 
formula “to be free” does not mean “to obtain what one has wished” but rather “by 
oneself to determine oneself to wish” (in the broad sense of choosing).’590 He argues 
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that human beings only come to understand the nature of their freedom when that 
freedom collides with the limits and givens of their situation. Practical limits, says 
Sartre, are ‘indispensable to the existence of a freedom,’591 because they give freedom 
meaning. This understanding allows him to explain what he calls ‘the paradox of 
freedom’: ‘there is freedom only in a situation, and there is a situation only through 
freedom. Human-reality everywhere encounters resistance and obstacles which it has 
not created, but these resistances and obstacles have meaning only in and through the 
free choice which human-reality is.’592 In an essay that clarifies the idea of existential 
freedom, Sonia Kruks writes: ‘Since we are each a situated freedom, we will each 
discover how the social milieu in which we live, with its normative and cultural 
practices, informs (even though it does not determine) our judgements. . . . We will 
learn, in short, that we do not only decide “in” situation, but we decide as selves that are 
already strongly suffused by their situation.’593  
I have dwelt on Sartre’s explanation of his concept of freedom because I believe 
it is especially pertinent to Shakespearean drama. Departing from his previous negative 
view of the possibility of freedom and independence, Greenblatt has recently offered a 
more dialectical understanding of the relationship between freedom and limitation in 
Shakespeare’s plays. In Shakespeare’s Freedom, he writes: 
 
[Shakespeare’s] kings repeatedly discover the constraints within which they 
must function if they hope to survive. His generals draw lines on maps and 
issue peremptory commands, only to find that the reality on the ground defies 
their designs. So too his proud churchmen are mocked for their pretensions, 
while religious visionaries are exposed as frauds. 
 Above all, perhaps, it is Shakespeare’s lovers who encounter again and 
again the boundaries that society or nature sets to the most exulted and 
seemingly unconfined passions. . . . The particular magic of Shakespeare’s 
comedies is that love’s preciousness and intensity are not diminished by such 
exposure to limits but rather enhanced. And when lovers in the tragedies – 
Romeo and Juliet, Othello, Antony – refuse to acknowledge any limits, their 
refusal inevitably leads to death and destruction.594 
 
When their freedom collides with the full force of history, Greenblatt argues, 
Shakespeare’s characters understand more clearly the nature and existential importance 
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of that freedom. This argument provides some insight into the dramatic and 
philosophical intensity of the opening scene of King Lear. 
 The ethical and political chaos of the abdication scene is perhaps one of the most 
important dramatic depictions of human freedom conflicting not only with the deeply 
ingrained political ideologies of society, but also with the freedom of other people, in 
the whole of Shakespeare’s canon. Cordelia’s failure to conform to her father’s wishes 
is the critical moment that sets the play’s devastating consequences in motion. She says 
to Lear: ‘I love your majesty / According to my bond, nor more nor less’ (i.83-4), and 
then adds: 
 
   Good my lord, 
You have begot me, bred me, loved me.  
I return those duties back as are right fit— 
Obey you, love you, and most honour you. 
Why have my sisters husbands if they say 
They love you all? Haply when I shall wed 
That lord whose hand must take my plight shall carry 
Half my love with him, half my care and duty. 
Sure, I shall never marry like my sisters, 
To love my father all.    (i.86-95) 
 
For the most part, critics have viewed Cordelia’s verbal rebellion from two different 
perspectives, neither of which adequately conveys the full political intensity of her 
response to her father’s demand for love. Dollimore claims that ‘[Lear’s] relationship to 
[Cordelia] is saturated with the ideological imperatives of power’, and therefore 
Cordelia is incapable of expressing her love in any terms other than those of power and 
contractual relations.595 On the other hand, Peter Holbrook sees this moment as a prime 
example of Shakespeare’s interest in individual, unfettered freedom. He claims that 
‘Cordelia insists upon speaking in her own voice rather than another’s.’596 Both these 
interpretations fail to show how Cordelia’s refusal to participate in the love test or, more 
specifically, the way she shapes her response in the dehumanised, insensitive discourse 
that is endemic in Lear’s court, is a radical political act. Rather than speaking in her 
‘own voice’, Cordelia consciously mirrors back the violently degraded nature of human 
relationships that have become part of the fabric of Lear’s world. Through her flagrantly 
disobedient act, she forces her father to confront the fact that devotion and affection 
cannot be commanded from on high, that he simply cannot compel another human 
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being to love him, and in doing so, she attacks the system that corrupts and destroys 
authentic human affection. Beauvoir, in The Ethics of Ambiguity, reflects: ‘In order for 
the universe of revolutionary values to arise, a subjective movement must create them in 
revolt and hope.’597 Cordelia is, in short, an existential rebel. When a rebel says ‘no’, 
writes Camus, he says ‘yes’ to life, because he ‘affirms that there are limits and also that 
he suspects – and wishes to preserve – the existence of certain things beyond those 
limits . . . In every act of rebellion, the man concerned experiences not only a feeling of 
revulsion at the infringement of his rights but also a complete and spontaneous loyalty 
to certain aspects of himself.’598 
 When Cordelia says, ‘I am sure my love’s / More richer than my tongue’ (i.71-2), 
we realise that her love for her father goes beyond the limits of verbal communication. 
So when she speaks of her ‘bond’ and her ‘duties’, we are urged to recognise the 
political intensity of Cordelia’s stubbornness. The simple act of not saying what she is 
supposed to say has catastrophic repercussions: it shakes the foundations on which 
Lear’s society is built. Paul Cefalu suggests that ‘she seems to be unwittingly mocking 
the entire system of command morality that overreaches the conduct of all the 
characters.’599 In the process, Cordelia gains dignity and a sense of self-worth. Lear tells 
his daughters’ suitors that ‘her price is fallen’ and that she is an individual of ‘little 
seeming substance’ (i.186-7), but Cordelia knows that she is ‘richer’ for not having ‘A 
still-soliciting eye’ (i.222). When France says, ‘Fairest Cordelia, that art most rich, 
being poor’ (i.240), he indicates that he sees Cordelia as being existentially rich for 
resolutely adhering to her own ethic of authenticity. France also hints that Cordelia’s 
strength, though it may have brought ruin on herself, has laid bare the existential 
shortcomings of others. She is ‘queen of us’ (i.247), says France, and unlike the 
‘wat’rish Burgundy’ (i.248), he chooses to love her for her existential ‘virtues’ (i.242). 
 Shakespeare explores the troubled relationship between human freedom and 
political action in King Lear. As we have seen, some previous readings of the politics of 
the play have failed to account fully for Shakespeare’s interest in the power human 
beings have to resist the dominant ideological influences of their time. McAlindon also 
draws attention to this point, arguing that ‘The King of France and the Duke of 
Burgundy are presumably products of the same ideology, as Cordelia and her sisters are 
the children of the same parents. Clearly, this text forces upon our attention from the 
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outset the often startling autonomy of the self; its baffling individuality; its resistance to 
environmental “subjection” and formulaic explanation.’600 Stanley Cavell suggests that 
there is no inevitability about this tragedy. To suggest that there is, he argues, runs 
contrary to our experience of ‘these characters as radically and continuously free, 
operating under their own power, at every moment choosing their destruction.’601 But 
Cordelia’s mobilisation of freedom in the abdication scene reveals Shakespeare’s 
complex vision of individual freedom. To borrow a line from The Ethics of Ambiguity, 
Shakespeare thinks like an existentialist, because he ‘sees in political operation a total 
manifestation of man as having-to-be at the same time as being.’602 In other words, 
Shakespeare presents Cordelia as an individual who exists within a certain set of 
historical circumstances, but also as an individual who must actively participate in the 
process of her own existence.  
 
 
Linking Ethics and Politics 
 
Throughout his plays, and particularly in King Lear, Shakespeare invites consideration 
of the ethical nature of human politics. Cox explains how inseparable these two issues 
were in early modern thought: 
 
Where ethics and politics are concerned, Shakespeare inherited a teleological 
conception from Aristotle, who argued that the purpose of ethical life is 
happiness, and that happiness can best be achieved in the kind of polity 
Aristotle knew in the Greek poleis. Ethics, or the study of how human beings 
achieve their proper end by becoming virtuous, thus serves the purpose of 
politics. . . . In late Tudor England, ethics had thus become political in a 
manner Aristotle never imagined. For Shakespeare, the relationship between 
ethics and politics is implicit in his way of imagining history as the aspirations 
and actions of powerful elites, because their aspiration is defined both by 
power and by moral expectation, and the difference between moral expectation 
and political action is so wide.603  
 
Ethics and politics are linked, Shakespeare’s plays imply, because they both relate back 
to the broader issue at stake: human existence, or, to put it more accurately, the way our 
experience of ourselves and our experience of others are deeply connected. As Sartre 
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aphoristically puts it: ‘History = ethics. History implies ethics (without universal 
conversion, no meaning to evolution or to revolutions). Ethics implies History (no 
morality possible without systematic action on the situation).’604  
 In the previous chapter, we saw how Shakespeare’s plays imaginatively 
reconstruct human ethics, not only by offering a meta-ethical enquiry into the 
foundations of ethical systems, but also by implying that self-realisation and 
authenticity are ethical commands. In King Lear, Shakespeare also scrutinises ethical 
directives. Shakespeare is as sceptical of passive goodness as he is of calculating 
rationalism. Albany’s ‘milky gentleness’ (iv.322) is an ineffectual counterforce against 
endemic terror and oppression. When Gonoril berates her husband for his lack of 
wisdom and political cunning rather than his leniency and mildness of character, 
Shakespeare underscores the ethical inadequacies of both political approaches to the 
world. Characters such as Gonoril, Regan, Cornwall and Edmund are ‘smiling rogues’ 
who ‘like rats, oft bite those cords in twain / Which are too entrenched to unloose’ 
(vii.70-2). Equally, conventional Christian pity elevated to a moral principle is hollow 
and ethically worthless, indicative of a relationship based on power and self-interest 
rather than compassion and kindness. But in Lear real, authentic pity is always coupled 
with an emotional openness towards others. In this respect, the play cultivates an 
alternative affective ethic of empathy, which suggests that the suffering of others can be 
internalised and lived. By taking an imaginative leap and placing themselves in the 
position of others, the characters in the play becomes more ethically aware and thus 
more capable of seeing the political inadequacies of the world in which they exist. In 
other words, they open themselves up to a world of horrors to allow themselves to feel 
‘how this world goes’ (xx.142-3).  
 James A. Knapp convincingly argues that Shakespeare ‘represents[s] the process 
by which moral conviction is produced phenomenologically, welling up in their 
characters despite their awareness of established moral principles and in tension with 
the calm domain of moral reasoning.’605 Arguing in a similar vein, Cefalu suggests that 
‘The abdication scene allegorizes the limitations of any ethical system which holds that 
actions stemming purely from duty, in the absence of affective considerations, can 
effectively motivate conduct.’606 When Cordelia refuses to shower her father with 
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eloquent declarations of love, Lear is devastated that his daughter could be ‘so 
untender’ (i.98), and their exchange immediately foregrounds the importance of 
emotional reciprocity in the play. But this ethic of empathy entails more than a simple 
process of identification or sympathy, more than simply feeling sorry for someone else. 
Lear suggests that one can understand the existential significance of one’s own 
suffering only by becoming directly engaged with the suffering of others. A short 
passage from Being and Nothingness will help to illuminate this complex idea. Sartre 
claims that 
 
the affective self is directly present as a lack suffered in the very heart of 
suffering. . . .  The suffering of which we speak is never exactly that which we 
feel. What we call ‘noble’ or ‘good’ or ‘true’ suffering and what moves us is 
the suffering which we read on the faces of others, better yet in portraits, in the 
face of a statue, in a tragic mask. It is suffering which has being.607 
 
Sartre is saying here that we experience our own suffering and the suffering of others in 
different ways. But whereas Sartre sees the suffering of others ‘as a degraded 
approximation of that suffering-in-itself which haunts our own suffering’,608 
Shakespeare values this empathetic union of sufferers and shows how the witnessing of 
another’s suffering brings one’s own suffering into perspective. The idea is reiterated at 
a number of points in the play. When Edgar comes into contact with Lear, he says: 
 
When we our betters see bearing our woes, 
We scarcely think our miseries our foes. 
Who alone suffers, suffers most i’the mind, 
Leaving free things and happy shows behind. 
But then the mind much sufferance doth o’erskip 
When grief hath mates, and bearing fellowship. 
How light and portable my pain seems now, 
When that which makes me bend, makes the King bow, 
He childed as I fathered.       (xiii.95-103) 
 
These lines are often read sceptically, seen as an attempt by Edgar to alleviate the 
burden of his pain. But what Shakespeare is articulating here is the ethical urgency and 
importance of bearing witness to the intolerable suffering of others. Edgar comes to 
realise that his own pain is only ever what Sartre would call ‘consciousness of 
suffering’. It is a ‘grief which is haunted by a perpetual absence – the absence of the 
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motionless, mute suffering which is the self.’609 For suffering to have form, it must be 
confronted as something which is embodied by others. As Sartre writes: ‘It is for my 
eyes that [the man of grief] is “crushed” by suffering.’610 When Edgar sees others 
violently degraded, their suffering gives shape to his inner anguish and he thus 
establishes an ethical connection first with Lear and then with his father. Edgar is the 
voice of empathy: ‘A most poor man, made lame by fortune’s blows, / Who by the art 
of known and feeling sorrows / Am pregnant to good pity’ (xx.213-5). When he sees a 
distraught Lear rage against the joint stools in the mock trial of his daughters, he says in 
an aside: ‘My tears begin to take his part so much / They’ll mar my counterfeiting’ 
(xiii.55-6). This is an extraordinary statement, evidence of just how invested 
Shakespeare is in the existential power of his plays. Edgar suggests that his own tears 
are so authentic that it is as if he is crying Lear’s tears for him. Moreover, it is an act of 
emotional identification that intensifies his own self-experience to the point where he 
fears it will damage his disguise and reveal his true identity. Clearly, Edgar has moved 
beyond the realm of pity into the realm of empathy. But his empathetic connection with 
Lear is doubly revealing, because not only does he expose himself to feel as others do 
and thus understand more fully the suffering of others, but such an act also strengthens 
and deepens his own sense of authenticity. 
 It is useful at this juncture to introduce some of Martha C. Nussbaum’s reflections 
on the nature of compassion in Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions 
(2001). Nussbaum distinguishes between empathy and compassion, arguing that the 
former involves ‘an imaginative reconstruction of another person’s experience, without 
any particular evaluation of that experience.’611 In some cases, empathy is an important 
step on the way to compassion, but on its own it is an insufficient emotional response to 
suffering, argues Nussbaum. Compassion, on the other hand, requires evaluative 
engagement with those who suffer: 
 
Equipped with her general conception of human flourishing, the spectator 
looks at the world in which people suffer hunger, disability, disease, 
slavery, through no fault of their own. She believes that goods such as food, 
health, citizenship, freedom, do matter. And yet she acknowledges, as well, 
that it is uncertain whether she herself will remain among the safe and 
privileged ones to whom such goods are stably guaranteed. She 
acknowledges that the lot of the beggar might be (or become) her own. This 
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leads her to turn her thoughts outward, asking about society’s general 
arrangement for the allocation of goods and resources. Given the 
uncertainty of life, she will be inclined, other things being equal, to want a 
society in which the lot of the worst off - of the poor, of people defeated in 
war, of women, of servants - is as good as it can be. Self-interest itself, via 
thought about shared vulnerabilities, promotes the selection of principles 
that raise society’s floor.612  
 
Before Edgar sees his ‘parti-eyed’ (xv.7) father, he reasons that ‘To be worst, / The 
low’st and most dejected thing of fortune, / Stands still in esperance, lives not in fear’ 
(xv.2-4). After his suffering and tormented father is led onto the stage by an old man, he 
says: ‘Who is’t can say “I am the worst”? / I am worse than e’er I was’ (xv.23-4), 
adding: ‘And worse I may be yet. The worse is not / As long as we can say “This is the 
worst”’ (xv.25-6). Through compassion, we register the injustice of another’s emotional 
distress and thus invest life with human worth. However, empathy and compassion as 
characterised by Nussbaum are not easily prised apart in Lear. In fact, Shakespeare 
fuses the experiences of feeling with others, feeling for others, and caring for the 
condition of one’s own self.   
 As King Lear makes clear, watching another person suffer is an existentially 
traumatic experience. There is a powerful emphasis on the value of emotional 
identification in the play, and this is epitomised by one of its most important passages. 
When Lear is urged by his companions to enter the hovel, he says: 
 
Prithee, go in thyself. Seek thy own ease. 
This tempest will not give me leave to ponder 
On things would hurt me more; but I’ll go in; [Exit Fool] 
Poor naked wretches, wheresoe’er you are, 
That bide the pelting of this pitiless night, 
How shall your houseless heads and unfed sides, 
Your looped and windowed raggedness, defend you 
From seasons such as these? O, I have ta’en 
Too little care of this. Take physic, pomp, 
Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel, 
That thou mayst shake the superflux to them 
And show the heavens more just.   (xi.22-33) 
 
In some ways, this reading of Shakespeare’s emphasis on empathy and affectivity 
contradicts Cavell’s influential essay, ‘The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King 
Lear’, where he argues that the play dramatises the ethical failure of the characters to 
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understand and acknowledge their need for love and recognition. Of course, Lear’s 
shameful rejection of others is the trigger that sets the play’s terrible events in motion, 
and Cavell rightly underscores the significance of this. Shakespeare insists that an 
individual’s freedom not only runs up against the socio-historical structures of the world 
it exists in, it is also challenged and confronted by the freedom of other people. Like 
Coriolanus, Lear is ashamed that his existence entails appealing to and engaging with 
others. Shakespeare traces the repercussions of Lear’s failure to acknowledge others, 
dramatising his rapid development from rejection to oppression to violence. The terrible 
shame of being looked at and the fact that such looks can engender cruelty and 
aggression is nowhere better illustrated than when Lear says to Oswald, ‘Do you bandy 
looks with me, you rascal?’ (iv.79), and then strikes him. But the play also dramatises 
the devastating political repercussions of the failure to connect with others. Moreover, it 
shows us the potentially radical and ethically charged politics that could develop out of 
moments of genuine identification and empathy. Rather than stressing the distance 
between kings and paupers, Shakespeare repeatedly suggests that, once all the symbols 
of status and wealth are stripped away, human beings are not all that different from each 
other. Lear says to Poor Tom: ‘thou art the thing itself. Unaccommodated man is no 
more but such a poor, bare, forked animal as thou art. Off, off, you lendings!’ (xi.96-8). 
By seeking to divest himself of his royal robes, Lear actively attempts to close the gap 
between them. It is an act of levelling that points towards Lear’s newfound appreciation 
of vulnerable, fragile common humanity. When Lear initially meets Poor Tom, he 
solipsistically projects his personal grievances onto him, repeatedly asking him if his 
daughters have brought him to such destitution. He tries to assimilate him to his 
suffering, because he is engrossed in his own pain and anguish. As he ‘Strives in his 
little world of man’ (viii.9), he cannot see beyond his immediate circumstances. But 
when he comes into contact with Poor Tom, he repeatedly refuses to take shelter and 
insists that he wants to stay in the company of his ‘Noble philosopher’ (xi.157). We 
begin to see this ethic of empathy emerge from the interactions of the characters on the 
heath. Ryan argues that Lear ‘learns to identify physically and emotionally with the 
“houseless poverty” of the dispossessed and discounted, embodied before him in the 
figure of Poor Tom. He stumbles . . . into a way of seeing which enables us to 
apprehend the need to rebuild our social life upon beliefs diametrically opposed to those 
responsible for this tragedy.’613 
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 Sartre is drawn to the existential profundity of Lear, and especially attracted to the 
political vision that emerges after Lear comes into contact with Poor Tom. In his 
biography of Flaubert, he writes: ‘The beauty of the scene comes from the fact that it 
brings a father, swindled by two of his daughters and having misunderstood the third, 
face to face with a son, misunderstood and hunted by his father at the instigation of his 
half-brother.’614 He goes on to note that it is as if Lear has ‘found himself in the 
presence of Cordelia who had become other, having changed sex, and instinctively 
attached himself to Edgar as a function of this resemblance.’615 This argument gives a 
new dimension to Lear’s and Poor Tom’s newly discovered friendship in suffering. If 
Poor Tom metaphorically represents Cordelia, then the inference is that Lear also comes 
face-to-face with the suffering of his cast-out daughter. Sartre claims that Flaubert was 
unable to grasp the ethical power of the scenes on the heath, underneath which lies a 
new understanding of human politics. In a passage that benefits from being quoted in 
full, Sartre explains how the play reveals to us the nature of our basic, physical 
existence: 
 
Overcome by misery, Lear intuits the human condition by discovering those 
more miserable than himself; the strangeness of his statements is not the 
product of a delirium but of a lucidity too new and too powerful to be easily 
expressed. Hence the ‘passage to the act,’ the attempt – immediately aborted 
by his companions – to tear off the ‘lendings,’ the rags that still cover him, to 
abolish the last vestiges of royalty and appear as the bare animal, the starting 
point from which a new order may be instituted that is proper to man. As if all 
the effort of centuries had been to hide our needs and veil our bodies, in short, 
to turn our backs on the truth of the human condition. Instead, true humanism, 
far from masking our animality, our needs exasperated by penury, should take 
these as its starting point and never deviate from them. Hope, glimpsed too 
late, vanishes: Lear’s authentic greatness will prevent neither his madness nor 
his death, nor that of Cordelia. Be that as it may, man is possible; curtain.616  
 
Flaubert could not come to terms with the pessimism of the play, writes Sartre. He 
failed to appreciate how the play affords the audience a glimpse of a better world, 
although he concedes that the utopian vision is unbearably cruel, because ‘it is revealed 
to the wretched at the moment that an ineluctable juggernaut is about to roll over them 
and crush them to death.’617 If we recall from Chapter Four Sartre’s reconceptualisation 
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of humanism as a theory that insists that ‘Man is all the time outside of himself’,618 then 
we can begin to see how Lear insists that human existence always retains the possibility 
of being otherwise. Contrary to Dollimore, who dismisses existential humanism in 
Radical Tragedy as ‘merely a mutation of Christianity’,619 I would like to suggest 
(following Sartre) that the existential humanism in Lear augments the political intensity 
of the play, because it implies that human beings have the capacity to change the world 
they live in.  
 An integral part of the existential humanism of Lear is the particular emphasis the 
play places on the human capacity to shed tears. Weeping is a deeply unsettling 
experience that links up an individual’s inward self-experience with their experience of 
other people in the surrounding world. Tears are associated with subjective 
disintegration. Early on in the play, when Lear’s sense of self is on the cusp of collapse, 
he says to Gonoril:  
 
 Life and death! I am ashamed 
That thou hast power to shake my manhood thus, 
That these hot tears, that break from me perforce 
And should make thee – worst blasts and fogs upon thee! 
Untented woundings of a father’s curse 
Pierce every sense about thee! Old fond eyes, 
Beweep this cause again I’ll pluck you out 
And cast you, with the waters that you make, 
To temper clay.     (iv.287-95) 
 
Lear struggles not to cry even as his ‘hot tears’ roll down his face, which indicates that 
he has very little control over his emotional response to the world. It is as if his tears 
somehow surprise his subjectivity and instantly jeopardise what he believes to be the 
very core of his existence: his sense of himself as an all-powerful monarch. His tears 
show him that, far from being an invulnerable, self-possessed individual, he is in fact 
wholly susceptible to the actions of others. Lear finds this basic truth shameful, and in a 
vivid prefiguration of the shocking attack on Gloucester, he claims that he would rather 
rip out his eyes than be seen to weep in front of others. This statement conflicts with his 
desire, expressed only a few lines earlier, to have someone identify with his pain. He 
wishes Gonoril could know what it feels like to have a child who makes ‘cadent tears 
fret channels in her cheeks’ (iv.275).  
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 Later, Lear implores the gods to ‘touch [him] with noble anger. / O, let not 
women’s weapons, water-drops, / Stain [his] man’s cheeks!’ (vii.434-6). As we saw in 
Coriolanus, anger can thwart emotional identification and dehumanise an individual. In 
Lear’s lines, Shakespeare shows us how anger establishes the boundaries of the self, 
whereas tears dissolve them. But anger can have a value as well. Lear continues his rant 
against his daughters, and says:  
 
  No, you unnatural hags, 
I will have such revenges on you both 
That all the world shall – I will do such things – 
What they are, yet I know not; but they shall be 
The terrors of the earth. You think I’ll weep. 
No, I’ll not weep.     [Storm within] 
I have full cause of weeping, but this heart 
Shall break into a hundred thousand flaws  
Or ere I’ll weep. – O fool, I shall go mad!   (vii.436-44). 
 
Although King Lear ‘is aware of the cost of irrational rage’, as Richard Strier argues in 
an essay that examines the complex interaction of stoicism and anti-stoicism in the early 
modern period, ‘the moral status of rage in the play undergoes a transformation.’620 
Strier convincingly suggests that Shakespeare was deeply interested in the power of 
extreme human emotions. He cites Adriana’s speech against the virtues of patience and 
stoic endurance in The Comedy of Errors as evidence of the centrality of passion in 
Shakespearean drama. She says: ‘A wretched soul, bruised with adversity, / We bid be 
quiet when we hear it cry. / But were we burdened with like weight of pain, / As much 
or more we should ourselves complain’ (II.i.34-7). In Lear, the dynamic interplay of 
anger and sorrow shows us the power these emotions have not only to provoke a 
transformation of the self, but also, consequently, to transform the ethical and political 
dimensions of human existence. Although Lear’s previous identity has crumbled, a 
sense of self remains. This vulnerable, intuitive selfhood has no fixed form, but is rather 
grasped from moment to moment. It is both an intensified self-consciousness and an 
intensified awareness of others: an experience of a self that is at once inwardly felt and 
outwardly perceived. By evoking imagery of crying and weeping, Shakespeare signifies 
a change in his conception of the self. Tears testify to the authenticity of grief and thus 
to the authenticity of the crying individual. In a way, even though Lear undergoes a 
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traumatic experience of subjective disintegration, his selfhood is enriched in the 
process, because it is exposed to the compassion of others.  
 As Leon Harold Craig notes, Shakespeare is keen to emphasise that ‘weeping has 
an effect on other people. Tears evoke pity, draw forth mercy, solicit assistance, and 
attest to the sincerity of the weeper’s misery. And sometimes mere expressions of 
sympathy from one’s fellows are enough to ease the burden of suffering.’621 This idea is 
most poignantly conveyed when the Gentleman informs Kent of Cordelia’s emotional 
response to his letter. He recalls how ‘an ample tear trilled down / Her delicate cheek. It 
seemed she was a queen / Over her passion who, most rebel-like, / Sought to be king 
o’er her’ (xvii.13-16). Though she strives to control them, Cordelia’s emotions get the 
better of her. When Kent enquires whether she was ‘moved’ by the correspondence, the 
Gentleman admits that although she did not fly into ‘a rage’ (xvii.17), her vehement 
indignation eventually overcame her. Like Edgar, Cordelia cries for Lear and opens 
herself up to his pain. It is perhaps, then, no surprise that tears flow freely from the eyes 
of both Cordelia and Lear when they are reunited. Lear asks simply, ‘Be your tears 
wet?’ (xxi.68), possibly indicating that he touches her face or even tastes her tears. The 
act of shedding tears draws them closer together, and the scene’s emphasis on their 
mutual affectivity invites us to see how ‘tears’ can point us towards ‘a better way’ 
(xvii.19-20). Maurice Hunt observes that ‘Shakespeare makes empathy personal . . . for 
playgoers and readers in his own and future ages. For he modestly sparks within us the 
insight that imaginative literature like his own can inspire us to feel a brotherhood of 
pain that, when recognized, can cause us to . . . feel empathy for others and forgive’.622 
But, in some ways, Shakespeare goes further than this by implying that emotional 
responsiveness modifies and enhances self-understanding and allows consciousness to 
understand itself differently. By putting ourselves in another’s position, we can come to 
know ourselves better.  
 Supporting contextual evidence for an early modern interest in the ethics of 
identification can be found in John Lesly’s 1631 text, An Epithrene: or Voice of 
Weeping, where he states: 
 
The sorrowfull are comforted, when friends condole their Sorrows, saith the 
Philosopher: Whereof hee yeeldeth two Reasons; One is, for that naturally 
they who groane vnder any burden feele his hand sweete, which laboureth 
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to discharge them, or which helpe to support them; But friends that 
endeauour by Weeping to ease them (as it were) of the burden, which 
presseth them downe, doe sweeten their paine, and make them endure their 
Affliction, with more Constancy and Resolution: Secondly, for that they 
seeing their friends participate with their Griefe, know thereby that their 
Affections are sound, and that they love them entirely, which is the sweetest 
thing that may happen in this life; For by Nature wee desire, if wee cannot 
bee relieved, yet to bee pitied, to see some who condole our Misery, who 
wish vs well, who want not Will, but power to relieve vs.623 
 
In a similar way to Lear, Lesly emphasises that human beings can become more fully 
self-aware through an act of crying. He insists on the regenerative capacity of empathy 
and the power human beings have to lessen the woes of others by internalising their 
pain. Interestingly, Lesly does not advocate orthodox Christian pity: weeping, in his 
mind, involves authentic human recognition. In the chapter entitled ‘Applying Some 
Vses of Weeping’ that follows the passage quoted above, he outlines the ways in which 
weeping enables individuals to recover themselves and locate a more accurate sense of 
their own authentic lives. An Epithrene illuminates the existential pathos that is clearly 
so fundamental to King Lear. By paying close attention to the importance of emotional 
reciprocity in Lear, we can also think afresh about the play’s most violent and savage 
moment: the gouging out of Gloucester’s eyes onstage before a theatre of onlookers. If, 
by virtue of their ability to shed tears, the eyes are representative of the human capacity 
to empathise and identify with others, then the attack on Gloucester is also an attempt to 
dehumanise him, to make him incapable of relating to others. In terms of the play’s 
political concerns, it is a brutal assault on a source of ethics that could potentially form 
the basis of a radical politics aimed at destroying voracious, ethically bankrupt 
individualism. To put it simply, the self-seeking characters in the play find the idea of 
emotional identification and authentic human connection threatening, because these 
existentially revealing experiences have the strength to overthrow a political system 
based on class, wealth, status and power. 
 The heart is the emotional core of human life. In his recent study, William W. E. 
Slights argues that the heart in early modern culture had ‘immense significance as a 
determining force in creating and storing all aspects of human understanding.’624 In 
Lear, the image of the heart is tied to the idea of emotional connectivity with others. 
                                                            
623 John Lesly, An Epithrene: or Voice of Weeping: Bewailing The want of Weeping. A Meditation 
(London: Printed by A. M. for Humphrey Robinson, 1631), pp. 97-8.  
624 William W. E. Slights, The Heart in the Age of Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), p. 26. 
  195 
Slights notes that not only does it contribute ‘to the structural orchestration of political 
narrative’, but it is also ‘crucial to the humanizing of [the] characters.’625 Throughout 
the play, the heart is described as swelling, splitting, bursting and cracking, as it is 
unable to bear the emotional strain of seemingly endless suffering. Like Coriolanus, 
who tells Aufidius, ‘thou hast made my heart / Too great for what contains it’ 
(V.vi.104-5), Edgar describes how his father’s ‘flawed heart- / . . . ’Twixt two extremes 
of passion, joy and grief, / Burst smilingly’ (xxiv.193-6). The actions of other people 
penetrate deep into the centre of an individual’s sense of self. Although this experience 
is painful, and sometimes self-destructive, Shakespeare insists that the emotions of the 
heart can journey outwards, even when it suffers greatly. Deeply troubled by his own 
sorrow and heartache, Lear can still care for another being: He tells his Fool: ‘I have 
one part of my heart / That sorrows yet for thee’ (ix.73-4). 
 In direct contrast to Cavell, I have attempted to show that this play is primarily 
concerned with the dynamics of existential identification and recognition. Moments 
when recognition is either deferred or withheld are designed by Shakespeare to increase 
the dramatic force of the scenes in which characters open up to each other and embrace 
a new form of authentic being. It is as if, paradoxically, the characters in King Lear are 
drawn away from themselves, forced to reach out to others in order to become more 
fully self-aware. The play stresses the absolute existential necessity of this human 
connection and shows us how the kind of vulnerable authenticity that is created through 
such contact can become the basis of our collective existence. Ewan Fernie concurs, 
arguing that ‘True perception of the other, as this tragedy reveals, is the revolutionary 
move, the foundation of all ethical and political projects. Only this could begin to make 
Lear’s egalitarian fantasies real. He has made the change, which we are in a position to 
carry beyond the page and theatre. His unique distinction among tragic heroes is that he 
dies pointing away from himself, at somebody else.’626 The existential politics of the 
play have a metatheatrical dimension: they urge us to see that we have the freedom to 
refashion the values and moral expectations of our world. 
 
 
Freedom in the World Beyond the Play 
 
We have seen how a moral and existential seriousness underpins Shakespeare’s political 
thinking. His approach to the politics of human existence, I would like to suggest, 
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chimes with Camus’s post-war political philosophy.627 In one of his less well-known 
texts, Neither Victims Nor Executioners (originally serialised in the French Resistance 
newspaper, Combat, in November 1946), Camus sets out his view of the political task 
facing human beings in the wake of the violence, terror and oppression of the Second 
World War. He writes: ‘Hope remains only in the most difficult task of all: to 
reconsider everything from the ground up, so as to shape a living society inside a dying 
society. Men must therefore, as individuals, draw up among themselves, within frontiers 
and across them, a new social contract which will unite them according to more 
reasonable principles.’628 This idea resonates strongly with Lear and Camus’s views on 
freedom freshly illuminate the play’s politics. ‘No Shakespeare play speaks more 
usefully and truly about how to think about defeat’, writes Holbrook.629 Shakespeare 
reveals to us a world on the brink of total destruction. ‘Is this the promised end?’ asks 
Kent, to which Edgar replies, ‘Or image of that horror?’ (xxiv.259-60), insinuating that 
history could bring about even crueller scenes of devastation in the future. The question 
is shocking in its simplicity, but it also invites us to consider the gap that exists between 
the condition of reality and the potential condition of a future world.  
 Camus contends: ‘It is true that we cannot “escape History,” since we are in it up 
to our necks. But one may propose to fight within History to preserve from History that 
part of man which is not its proper province.’630 Lear leaves us with the same existential 
sentiment. While the characters exist in a world where ‘All’s cheerless, dark, and 
deadly’ (xxiv.285), we are compelled to realise that it need not be that way. Attempts to 
attribute the catastrophic events to the gods or divine justice, Kent’s belief that ‘The 
stars above us govern our conditions’ (xvii.34) and Albany’s conviction that ‘All 
friends shall taste / The wages of their virtue, and all foes / The cup of their deservings’ 
(xxiv.297-9), are ludicrously inadequate. As we watch the drama unfold, we become 
less convinced that these individuals are merely products of a given set of historical 
circumstances, and more aware of the extent to which they choose to shape both 
themselves and their world. This play, Cavell suggests, 
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is a drama not about the given condition in which the soul finds itself (in 
relation to gods or to earth) but about the soul . . . as the provider of the 
given, of the conditions under which gods and earth can appear. It is an 
enactment not of fate but of responsibility, including the responsibility for 
fate. However this is finally to be put, its reception demands a particular 
kind of perception.631  
 
This play is fascinated by acts of human freedom. The remarkable moment when 
Cornwall’s brave servant says ‘Hold your hand, my lord. / . . . better service have I 
never done you / Than now to bid you hold’ (xiv.69-72) testifies to Shakespeare’s 
awareness of such acts as dramatically thrilling. The servant’s defence of human dignity 
and decency is not political in any explicit sense; but it has political implications, 
because it is a moment when ethics and politics become inseparable. Cornwall’s 
servant, like the other characters who dare to rebel, pays for his assertion of freedom 
with his life. As a result, we are struck by the sense that somehow, inexplicably, these 
characters are both agents and victims. The characters seem to find a self-shattering 
form of authenticity as they assert their freedom. In the end, they are all finally crushed 
by history. But Shakespeare insists that freedom is not about achievement. Sartre points 
out that freedom cannot be measured in terms of material success; it cannot be thought 
of as ‘the ability to obtain the ends chosen’.632 Shakespeare, like Sartre, commends the 
powerful existential ramifications of assertions of freedom. Acts of freedom are always 
simultaneously ethical choices. They are declarations about who we are, what we value, 
whom we love and what we are prepared to risk our lives for. The inherently ethical 
nature of human freedom makes existence a profoundly serious matter. Of course, our 
historical and social circumstances have an enormous impact on us as individuals. But 
this fact does not prevent us from protecting a small kernel of freedom at the heart of 
being. Camus writes: ‘Since these forces are working themselves out and since it is 
inevitable that they continue to do so, there is no reason why some of us should not take 
on the job of keeping alive, through the apocalyptic historical vista that stretches before 
us, a modest thoughtfulness which, without pretending to solve everything, will 
constantly be prepared to give some human meaning to everyday life.’633 In Camus’s 
mind, the condemned, the exiled and the injured ‘reinvest the world with trust.’634 For 
him, the integrity of the concrete individual is the starting point for an alternative mode 
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of existing alongside others. When Edgar suggests at the end of the play that ‘The 
weight of this sad time we must obey, / Speak what we feel, not what we ought to say’ 
(xxiv.319), there is a sense that he is reaching out to the audience, encouraging us to 
acquire a ‘modest thoughtfulness’, to borrow Camus’s phrase, about how we as 
individuals relate to the world we exist in.   
 ‘Freedom lives hence, and banishment is here’ (I.i.182),635 declares Kent as he is 
exiled from Lear’s court. Like Edgar’s final sentiments, this line is imbued with a 
metatheatrical resonance: the fate of the characters on stage is determined, but freedom 
exists in our world. Refining his point about Shakespeare’s treatment of freedom in the 
play, Cavell continues: 
 
It is as if in a theater these two worlds [of freedom and determination] are 
faced off against one another, in their intimacy and their mutual 
inaccessibility. The audience is free – of the circumstance and passion of the 
characters, but that freedom cannot reach the arena in which it could 
become effective. The actors are determined – not because their words and 
actions are dictated and their future sealed, but because, if the dramatist has 
really peopled a world, the characters are exercising all the freedom at their 
command, and specifically failing to. Specifically; not exercising or ceding 
it once for all. They are, in a word, men and women; and our liabilities in 
responding to them are nothing other than our liabilities in responding to 
any person – rejection, brutality, sentimentality, indifference, the relief and 
the terror in finding courage, the ironies of human wishes.636 
 
There is a strange dialectic between the freedom of the audience and the circumscription 
of the characters on stage. When the action of the play ceases, our freedom is mobilised, 
argues Cavell: ‘Because the actors have stopped, we are freed to act again; but also 
compelled to. Our hiddenness, our silence, and our placement are now our choices.’637 
Ryan suggests that, although the play interrogates two competing ideologies, ‘the old 
code based on service and the new self-serving realism’, it finally encourages us to 
adopt ‘an implicit perspective, whose purchase on our imagination and moral sense is 
far more powerful.’638 We can appreciate the full implications of this ‘implicit 
perspective’, because it is only we who are able to perceive the concrete synoptic vision 
of the play; it is an understanding that is denied to the characters. We are placed in a 
position that enables us to forge an existential politics that accommodates both the 
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claims of the personal and the claims of the social realm. The play, as Ryan contends, 
allows us to see ‘the option of being otherwise.’639 This is the essence of tragedy. 
Nussbaum notes that ‘albeit in a fictive way, tragedies promote concern for someone 
different from oneself, through the compelling resources of poetry and drama. . . . 
Tragic fictions promote extension of concern by linking the imagination powerfully to 
the adventures of the distant life in question.’640 We are empowered by tragedy, 
especially Shakespeare’s tragedies. As Karl Jaspers insists: ‘It is essential that I not only 
watch and derive “aesthetic” edification from the tragedy, but also participate in it with 
my innermost self and act out its insight because of its direct importance to me. The 
whole content is lost if I think myself safe, or if I look upon the tragic as something 
alien to myself.’641 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Building on the ideas in my readings of Hamlet and Coriolanus, this chapter has shown 
that the political concerns of King Lear have an existential intensity. Human politics, 
Shakespeare’s play suggests, are intimately related to the ontological and ethical 
dimensions of human existence. The self is a ‘little world of man’ (viii.9), a 
micropolitical realm not entirely divorced from the strategies and practices of ideology, 
but still able to find scope for self-modification. Because human beings must engage in 
ethical negotiations, their relations with others are inevitably vulnerable to tension and 
conflict. But if individuals can relate to one another in a more empathetic way, then 
emotional identification and authentic connection are possible: they possess the 
potential to radically transform oppressive political realities and systems.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis has revealed Shakespeare’s profound ability to perceive and conceptualise 
the world in existentialist terms. As explained in Chapter One, it has examined 
moments of subjective crisis and anguish in Shakespeare’s plays not only to reveal the 
intellectually illuminating reciprocity between Shakespeare’s drama and existentialism, 
but also to develop fresh readings of particular tragic texts. The second chapter of this 
study uncovered evolving existentialist concerns, ideas and issues in the early modern 
period. It drew upon a variety of examples from a range of sources to argue that 
Renaissance thinkers, dramatists, poets and philosophers played a crucial role in the 
inception of existentialist thought. It argued, moreover, not only that existentialist ideas 
were beginning to emerge during this time, but also that writers were beginning to 
formulate a new, distinctive existentialist vocabulary and discourse. Chapter Three 
explained the methodological approach adopted by this thesis, which entails the 
treatment of Shakespeare’s plays as philosophically responsive texts, rich in existential 
significance. Shakespeare puts life on stage. Human existence can be at times messy 
and anguished, at others gloriously full of potential, sometimes even strangely and 
inexplicably both. In the words of Karl Jaspers, in Shakespeare’s plays, ‘Human life 
understands itself in terms of its potentialities and perils, its greatness and nothingness, 
its human and diabolical strains, its nobleness and meanness, its sheer joy at being alive 
and its bewildered terror at failure and destruction, its love, dedication, and openness of 
heart, and then again its hatred, narrowness and blindness.’642 An existential vitality 
comes through in the darkest moments of Shakespeare’s plays. The special fusion of 
critical thought and literary form evident in both existentialist literature and 
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Shakespearean drama sharpens the existential immediacy and the philosophical 
intelligibility of the issues addressed in both kinds of writing. When Shakespeare’s 
characters pose serious and profound questions about being, death, justice, morality, and 
knowledge, they do so as situated and embodied beings – characters in the process of 
becoming. Chapters Four, Five and Six explored the special kinds of existential thinking 
in Hamlet, Coriolanus, and King Lear, three plays that are outstanding examples of the 
depth and breadth of Shakespeare’s existential interests. Although I have focused on 
these plays, I have also, where appropriate, drawn on passages from other plays to bring 
Shakespeare’s existentialism to light more fully. These readings are united by their 
focus on the theme of existential freedom, something Shakespeare sees as lived, 
embodied and expressed in human life.  
 In order to offer a detailed analysis of specific plays, I have obviously had to be 
selective in my choice of both Shakespeare’s texts and existentialist texts. However, my 
choices have not been arbitrary: rather than mapping existentialism onto the plays, I 
have been more interested in the germination of different kinds of existentialism within 
the plays themselves. Once the presence of existentialist thought in particular plays 
became apparent, I sought to draw on passages from existentialist works – both literary 
and philosophical texts – that resonate with those plays, so as to engage actively and 
critically with both bodies of writing. At various points in the study, I have invoked 
passages from existentialist literature to explain the ideas shared by both more fully, and 
to show the philosophical rapport that exists between existentialist thinkers and their 
Renaissance precursor. This dissertation thus endeavoured to examine Shakespearean 
drama and existentialist philosophy dialectically, revealing in the process points at 
which Shakespeare advances existentialist thought further than the existentialists 
themselves.  
 Of course, there are other works in Shakespeare’s canon upon which an 
existentialist interpretation could shed new light. One of the most important outcomes 
of this thesis has been an increased awareness of the pervasiveness and centrality of 
existentialism in Shakespeare’s plays and poetry. At every turn, his work seems full of 
questions about the way we exist as ourselves and as beings in a peopled world. Other 
tragedies, in particular, especially Macbeth, Othello, Antony and Cleopatra, Timon of 
Athens, Titus Andronicus and Julius Caesar, would all profit from an existentialist 
reading. Timon’s withdrawal from society and the suicidal intensity of his declaration 
that ‘nothing brings me all things’ (Timon of Athens, V.ii.73) has an extraordinary 
existential power. Tormented by his tortured consciousness, Macbeth is a man whose 
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mind is ‘brain-sickly of things’ (II.ii.44). His consciousness struggles to posit a fixed 
self, only to find that within moments that self has morphed into another. It is perhaps 
no coincidence that Sartre’s Roquentin is the sufferer of ‘lobster-like thoughts’643 and 
Macbeth’s mind is famously ‘full of scorpions’ (III.ii.37). At the nadir of existential 
despair, Titus laments: 
 
If there were reason for these miseries, 
Then into limits could I bind my woes. 
When heaven doth weep, doth not the earth o’erflow? 
If the winds rage, doth not the sea wax mad, 
Threat’ning the welkin with his big-swoll’n face? 
And wilt thou have a reason for this coil? 
I am the sea. Hark how her sighs doth blow. 
She is the weeping welkin, I the earth. 
Then must my sea be movèd with her sighs, 
Then must my earth with her continual tears 
Become a deluge overflowed and drowned, 
Forwhy my bowels cannot hide her woes, 
But like a drunkard must I vomit them.   
     (Titus Andronicus, III.i.218-30) 
 
In light of some of the ideas explored in this thesis, Titus’s outpouring of sorrow and 
anguish is extremely suggestive. The symbolism of Titus’s sea-like self is further 
evidence of the radical, complex and philosophically advanced nature of Shakespeare’s 
existential thinking. Titus describes the painful, inward experience of drowning in 
himself. Yet it is at this point, when his self is reduced to an abject state of dissolution, 
that he is able to feel how his raped and mutilated daughter’s ‘sighs doth blow’ 
(III.i.224). The passage ends with an image of existential nausea and anguished 
embodiment as Titus spews up the pain of Lavinia’s afflictions and his own. His son, 
Lucius, remarks: ‘Ah, that this sight should make so deep a wound / And yet detested 
life not shrink thereat− / That ever death should let life bear his name / Where life hath 
no more interest but to breathe!’ (III.i.245-8). Human life – struggling to breathe and 
stamped with the mark of death – is a painful test of endurance for Lucius. However, 
there is a persistent implication in the text that hard, worldly experience does not 
entirely destroy the self, but rather gives individuals reason to live.  
 These examples from Timon of Athens, Macbeth, and Titus Andronicus testify to 
the remarkable range of existential concerns that animate Shakespearean tragedy. But, 
as my quotations from diverse comedies, histories, problem plays and Romances 
                                                            
643 Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. Robert Baldick (London: Penguin, 2000), p. 20. 
  203 
throughout this thesis attest, the tragedies are by no means the only genre that provides 
further opportunities for bringing Shakespeare and existentialism into dialogue with one 
another. Throughout this thesis, I have cited the recent work of a number of existentially 
orientated critics in an attempt to demonstrate the merits of such readings of 
Shakespeare. Although few invoke existentialism explicitly, many critics, including 
Mousley, Fernie, Davis, Ryan, Holbrook and Cavell, have in their own ways begun to 
examine the existential depth and richness of Shakespearean drama. What is unique 
about this study is that it places Shakespeare and existentialism openly and directly 
side-by-side. Moreover, unlike studies that have brought existentialism to bear 
anachronistically on the plays,644 this thesis has read both bodies of work in conjunction 
with one another while maintaining an awareness of historical difference. The result of 
this approach has been a fresh appreciation of the way early modern thinkers and 
Shakespeare in particular contributed to the development of existentialist thought. It has 
been beyond the scope of this thesis to historicise existentialism fully,645 but I hope I 
have shown that the early modern period was an important part of existentialism’s 
philosophical heritage, and that early modern thinkers made substantial philosophical 
advances, which would provide the foundations for what would be recognised more 
formally as the existentialist movement in philosophy.  
 As well as paying due attention to the historical distance between Shakespeare 
and existentialism, this thesis has made a bolder implicit claim about the relationship 
between the existential concerns of Shakespeare’s plays and his enduring popularity as 
a dramatist. It has argued that Shakespeare’s enduring, universal appeal has a lot to do 
with his particular skill in dramatising existential crises. Julia Reinhard Lupton suggests 
that her study ‘attests to the universality of Shakespeare’s plays, not as a thesaurus of 
eternal messages but in their capacity to establish real connections with the successive 
worlds shared and sustained by actors and audiences over time.’646 In so much as I have 
                                                            
644 I refer here to some of the studies examined in the opening chapter, including Asloob Ahmad Ansari, 
The Existential Dramaturgy of William Shakespeare: Character Created Through Crisis (Lewiston, New 
York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2010); Jagannath Chakrevorty, King Lear: Shakespeare's Existentialist 
Hero (Calcutta: Avantgarde Press, 1990); and Michael G. Bielmeier, Shakespeare, Kierkegaard and 
Existential Tragedy (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000). All these studies pay little if any attention to 
the historical difference between early modern drama and twentieth century philosophy and often treat 
Shakespeare as though he were fully aware of existentialist theory.  
645 Contrary to those who argue that existentialism quickly arose in post-war France and then quickly 
diminished once other lines of philosophical enquiry had been established, I believe that the philosophy 
has a long and densely complicated history. It has been shaped by many different kinds of literary and 
philosophical thinkers. 
646 Julia Reinhard Lupton, Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and Life (Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2011), p. 18. 
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shown that there is a real philosophical reciprocity between Shakespeare and 
existentialism, with the former having a tremendous influence on the latter, this thesis 
corroborates the conclusion of Lupton’s study. The journals, diaries and letters of Sartre 
and Beauvoir show that they immersed themselves in Shakespeare’s work, often 
reading plays for several hours a day, while writing and formulating their own 
existentialist theories. It is therefore not altogether implausible to suggest that key ideas, 
incidents and passages from Shakespeare’s work informed – either consciously or 
unconsciously – their philosophies. This thesis has also highlighted the existentially 
engaged nature of these philosophers’ appropriation of Shakespeare. Existentialists 
from Kierkegaard to Camus have been drawn to the powerful, revelatory energy of 
Shakespeare’s drama; they have found that the affective impact of the plays reveals the 
subjective and personal nature of our aesthetic encounter with Shakespeare. The passion 
Shakespeare’s plays arouse in us as human beings, claim existentialists, is politically 
valuable. They make a strong case for making our existential engagement in literature 
central to the practice of criticism.  
 Part of the aim of this thesis has been to dispel the popular myth that 
existentialism espouses an absurdist and nihilistic view of the world and human 
existence. On the contrary, existentialists insist that individuals must not abandon 
themselves to despair because the world is inherently meaningless and futile, for that is 
what makes a meaningful human life possible. Instead, this fact makes human life 
possible. As Christopher C. Robinson succinctly puts it: ‘Absurdity is expressed as a 
starting point and not a terminus.’647 In The Ethics of Ambiguity, Simone de Beauvoir 
writes: ‘Men do not like to feel themselves in danger. Yet, it is because there are real 
dangers, real failures and real earthly damnation that words like victory, wisdom, or joy 
have meaning. Nothing is decided in advance, and it is because man has something to 
lose and because he can lose that he can also win.’648 A further aim of this thesis has 
been to offer a new view of existential subjectivity. It has revealed the existential self 
not as splendidly isolated and autonomous, but as fully immersed and implicated in 
history. Moreover, it has reappraised and underscored existentialism’s emphasis on the 
ethical relationship between self and other. Reviving these often overlooked aspects of 
existentialism has been an important objective of this study, because doing so has 
provided a stronger and fuller sense of existentialism’s view of the human subject. 
Despite Western philosophy’s widespread tendency over the last forty years to 
                                                            
647 Christopher C. Robinson, ‘Theorizing Politics After Camus’, Human Studies, 32:1 (2009), p. 8. 
648 Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Citadel Press, 
1976), p. 34. 
  205 
disparage any philosophical enquiry that centres on the idea of ‘the subject’, 
existentialism has had and continues to have an important part to play in the 
philosophical rehabilitation of the subject. Take, for instance, the existentialist assertion 
that it is impossible to tackle real politic problems without dealing first with the 
ontological and ethical issues that underpin those problems. This simple yet potent 
argument continues to exert force on current political philosophy.  In The Ticklish 
Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, Slavoj Žižek claims that ‘a spectre is 
haunting Western Academia . . . the spectre of the Cartesian subject.’649 He reasons that 
the idea of an authentic political project that aims to ameliorate existing political 
conditions demands a robust understanding of the human subject. Žižek tells us that his 
intention ‘is not to return to the cogito in the guise in which this notion has dominated 
thought (the self-transparent thinking subject), but to bring to light its forgotten obverse, 
the excessive unacknowledged kernel of the cogito, which is far from the pacifying 
image of the transparent self.’650 Žižek’s study has existentialist roots and shows some 
of the ways in which existentialism paved the way for other thinkers and philosophical 
projects. Existentialism is not a dead philosophy of the past; it continues to inform both 
literature and criticism as well as theory and political thought.  
 This thesis has investigated some of the ontological, ethical and political concerns 
in Shakespeare’s drama from an explicitly existentialist perspective. The primary 
purpose of this investigation has been to provide a fresh account of the process of 
subjectivity in Shakespearean tragedy. In Hamlet, we saw that Shakespeare is 
profoundly interested in fundamental questions about the nature of being. Through 
Hamlet’s probing reflections, Shakespeare interrogates the internal contradictions, 
ambiguities, and tensions of human consciousness. In Coriolanus, we saw the 
emergence of an existentialist ethics grounded in the value of mutual recognition and a 
deep understanding of the individual’s obligations to others. By showing his audience a 
form of authenticity linked not to individual self-assertion but to a respect for and 
recognition of others, Shakespeare builds on the notion of the self as a fluid, unfixed 
and vulnerable entity. Self-revelation and the revelation of others are the sides of the 
same coin in Shakespearean drama. This linking of ethics and subjectivity makes 
possible an existentially powerful understanding of human politics. The politics of 
Shakespeare’s plays demands much more from the audience than placing them in the 
context of early modern political theory. They allow us to see the possibility of 
                                                            
649 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999), p. 
1. 
650 Ibid., p. 2. 
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transfiguring our own political sphere. As David Ruiter suggests: ‘Individual identity is 
more complex than the “is” and “was” of existence. It entails the hope of what “could 
be” and even the wish to live up to what we “should be.”’651 This chimes with the way 
existentialism encourages a more considered and active engagement with the world. 
Nathan Oaklander writes: ‘What existentialists say about the structure of existence is 
existentially relevant only if we choose to see it in relation to our own life, incorporate it 
into our life, and become involved in an intensely personal act of self-transformation as 
a consequence of it.’652 In the spirit of existentialism, Shakespeare’s plays provide us 
with the hope of transforming our selves and our world for the better. 
 
 
 
Word Count: 845897 
 
                                                            
651 David Ruiter, ‘Harry’s (In)human Face’, in Spiritual Shakespeares, ed. Ewan Fernie (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 51. 
652 Nathan Oaklander, Existentialist Philosophy: An Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1992), p. 9. 
  207 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary Renaissance Sources 
 
Abbadie, Jacques, The Art of Knowing Oneself: or, An Enquiry into the Sources of 
Morality (Oxford: Leonard Lichfield, 1695). 
Abercromby, David, A Moral Discourse of the Power of Interest (London: Printed by 
Tho. Hodgkin, 1690). 
Bacon, Francis, The Essays, ed. John Pitcher (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985). 
Calamy, Edmund, The Monster of Sinful Self-Seeking; Anatomized., Together with A 
Description of the Heavenly and Blessed Selfe-Seeking (London: Printed by F.G, 
1654).  
Calvin, John, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, ed. John T. 
McNeill (London: S.C.M. Press 1960). 
Crowley, Robert, The Selected Works of Robert Crowley, ed. J. M. Cowper (London: 
1872). 
Dyke, Daniell, The Mystery Of Selfe-Deceiving. Or A Discovrse and Discouery of the 
Deceitfullnesse of Mans Heart (London: Printed by Edward Griffin, 1614). 
Donne, John, The Complete Poems of John Donne: Epigrams, Verse Letters to Friends, 
Love-Lyrics, Love-Elegies, Satire, Religion Poems, Wedding Celebrations, Verse 
Epistles to Patronesses, Commemorations and Anniversaries, ed. Robin Robbins 
(Harlow: Longman, 2010).  
-------------, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions, ed. Anthony Raspa (Montreal and 
London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1975). 
Erasmus, Desiderius, Praise of Folly, trans. Betty Radice (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1993). 
Goodwin, George, Automachia, or The Self-Conflict of a Christian, trans. Josuah 
Sylvester (London: Printed by Melch Bradwood for Edward Blovnt, 1607). 
Harrison, William, ‘A Historicall description of the Iland of Britaine, with a briefe 
rehersall of the nature and qualities of the people of England, and such 
commodities as are to be found in the same’, in The First and Second Volumes of 
Chronicles, ed. Raphael Holinshed and William Harrison (London: Printed by 
Henry Denham, 1587). 
Jedin, Hubert (ed.), Contarini und Camaldoli (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura 
1953). 
Jonson, Ben, Discoveries 1641; Conversations with William Drummond of 
Hawthornden 1619 (London: Barnes & Noble, 1966). 
Lesly, John, An Epithrene: or Voice of Weeping: Bewailing The want of Weeping. A 
Meditation (London: Printed by A. M. for Humphrey Robinson, 1631). 
Machiavelli, Niccolò, The Prince, trans. George Bull (London: Penguin, 1999). 
Montaigne, Michel de, The Complete Essays, trans. M. A. Screech (London: Penguin, 
2003). 
Mirandola, Giovanni Pico della, On the Dignity of Man, On Being and the One and 
Heptaplus, trans. Charles Glenn Wallis et al. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998). 
Raleigh, Walter, Sceptick, or Speculations. And Observations of the Magnificency and 
Opulency of Cities. His Seat of Government. And Letters to the Kings Majestie, 
  208 
and others of Qualitie. Also his Demeanor before his Execution (London: Printed 
by W. Bentley, 1651). 
Shakespeare, William, Hamlet, ed. Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor, The Arden 
Shakespeare (London: Thomson Learning, 2006). 
-------------, Hamlet: The Texts of 1603 and 1623, ed. Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor, 
Arden Shakespeare, third series (London: Thomson Learning, 2006). 
-------------, The Tragedy of Coriolanus, ed. R. B. Parker, Oxford World’s Classics 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
-------------, The History of King Lear, ed. Stanley Wells, Oxford World’s Classics 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
-------------, The Norton Shakespeare, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al., 2nd edn (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 2008). 
Sidney, Philip, A Defence of Poetry, ed. J. A. Van Dorsten (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984). 
Spenser, Edmund, The Yale Edition of the Shorter Poems of Edmund Spenser, ed. 
William A. Oram et al. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989). 
Spira, Francesco, Spira Respirans: Or, The Way to the Kingdom of Heaven by the Gates 
of Hell; In an Extraordinary Example (London: T. Stowe, 1695). 
Stow, John, A Survey of London: Written in the Year 1598, ed. Henry Morley (Stroud: 
Sutton, 1994). 
Webster, John, The Works of John Webster, ed. David Gunby, David Carnegie and 
MacDonald P. Jackson, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 
 
Existentialist Texts 
 
Beauvoir, Simone de, The Blood of Others, trans. Yvonne Moyse and Roger Senhouse 
(London: Penguin, 1964). 
-------------, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Citadel 
Press, 1976). 
-------------, Letters to Sartre, trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare (London: Radius, 1991). 
-------------, The Prime of Life, trans. Peter Green (London: Penguin, 1965). 
-------------, Pyrrhus and Cinéas (Paris: Gallimard, 1944).  
-------------, The Second Sex, trans. and ed. H. M. Parshley (London: Vintage, 1997). 
------------- (ed.), Witness to my Life: The letters of Jean-Paul Sartre to Simone de 
Beauvoir 1926-1939, trans. Lee Fahnestock and Norman MacAfee (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1992). 
Buber, Martin, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (Eastford: Martino Publishing, 
2010). 
Camus, Albert, Lyrical and Critical Essays, trans. Ellen Conroy Kennedy (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1970). 
-------------, The Myth of Sisyphus, trans. Justin O’Brien (London: Penguin, 2005). 
-------------, Neither Victims Nor Executioners: An Ethic Superior to Murder, trans. 
Dwight Macdonald (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2007). 
-------------, The Outsider, trans. Joseph Laredo (London: Penguin, 2000). 
-------------, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (London: Penguin, 2000). 
-------------, Resistance, Rebellion and Death (New York: Vintage Books, 1974). 
-------------, Selected Essays and Notebooks, ed. and trans. Philip Thody 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963). 
Dostoevsky, Fyodor, Notes from the Underground and The Double, trans. Ronald Wilks 
(London: Penguin, 2009). 
  209 
Gide, André, The Journals of André Gide, 4 vols (London: Secker and Warberg, 1947-
51). 
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarie and Edward Robinson (New 
York: Harper Perennial, 2008). 
-------------, Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Taylor 
and Francis, 1978). 
Jaspers, Karl, Philosophy, trans. E. B. Ashton, vol. 2 (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1970). 
-------------, Philosophy of Existence, trans. Richard F. Grabau (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1971). 
-------------, Tragedy is Not Enough, trans. Harald A. T. Reiche, Harry T. Moore and 
Karl W. Deutsch (London: Victor Gollancz, 1953). 
Kierkegaard, Søren, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, 
ed. Edna H. Hong and Howard V. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1992). 
-------------, The Essential Kierkegaard, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
-------------, Fear and Trembling, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin, 2005). 
-------------, The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard, trans. Alexander Dru (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1959). 
-------------, The Point of View, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
-------------, The Present Age; and, Of the Difference between a Genius and an Apostle, 
trans. Alexander Dru (New York and London: Harper and Row, 1962). 
-------------, Repetition, ed. Edna H. Hong and Howard V. Hong (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983). 
-------------, The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin, 1989). 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
-------------, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, trans. R. J. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
-------------, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is, trans. R. J. Hollingdale 
(London: Penguin, 1992). 
-------------, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and Nobody, trans. Graham 
Parkes (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 
trans. Hazel E. Barnes (London and New York: Routledge, 2003). 
-------------, ‘Beyond Bourgeois Theatre’, The Tulane Drama Review, 5:3 (1961), 3-11. 
-------------, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. Philip Mairet (London: Methuen, 
1980). 
-------------, The Family Idiot: Gustave Flaubert, 1821-1857, trans. Carol Cosman, 4 
vols (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
-------------, Kean; or, Disorder and Genius, trans. Kitty Black (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1954). 
-------------, Nausea, trans. Robert Baldick (London: Penguin, 2000). 
-------------, No Exit and Three Other Plays, trans. Stuart Gilbert and Lionel Abel (New 
York: Vintage, 1989). 
-------------, A Notebooks for an Ethics, trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1992). 
-------------, Search for a Method, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Random House, 
1968). 
  210 
-------------, Truth and Existence, trans. Adrian van den Hoven, ed. Ronald Aronson 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
-------------, Witness to my Life: The Letters of Jean-Paul Sartre to Simone de Beauvoir 
1926-1939, trans. Lee Fahnestock and Norman MacAfee, ed. Simone de Beauvoir 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992). 
-------------, What is Literature? trans. Bernard Frechtman (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2001). 
Schelling, F. W. J., System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), trans. Peter Heath 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978). 
 
 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Abbagnano, Nicola, Critical Existentialism, trans. Nino Langiulli (New York: Anchor 
Books, 1969). 
Adelman, Janet, Suffocating Mothers: Fantasies of Maternal Origin in Shakespeare’s 
Plays, Hamlet to The Tempest (New York and London: Routledge, 1992). 
Adorno, Theodor W., The Jargon of Authenticity, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic 
Will (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
-------------, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, trans. and ed. Rovert Hullot-
Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). 
-------------, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1992). 
Anderson, Amanda, The Way We Argue Now: A Study in the Cultures of Theory 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
Andretta, Richard A., ‘Is Iago an Atheistic Existentialist?’, Arab Journal for the 
Humanities, 58 (1997), 360-81. 
Ansari, Asloob Ahmad, The Existential Dramaturgy of William Shakespeare: 
Character Created Through Crisis (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 
2010). 
Armstrong, Philip, Shakespeare’s Visual Regime: Tragedy, Psychoanalysis and the 
Gaze  (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000). 
Baker, James V., ‘An Existential Examination of King Lear’, College English, 23:7 
(1962), 546-550. 
Bakhtin, Mikhail, Towards a Philosophy of the Act, trans. Vadim Liapunov (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1993). 
Barbour, Reid, Literature and Religious Culture in Seventeenth Century England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
Barker, Francis, The Culture of Violence: Essays on Tragedy and History (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1993). 
-------------, The Tremulous Private Body: Essays on Subjection (London: Methuen, 
1989).  
Barnes, Hazel E., ‘Walter Kaufmann’s New Piety’, Chicago Review, 13:3 (1959), 87-
101. 
Barrett, William, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (Westport: 
Greenwood, 1958). 
Bate, Jonathan, ‘Shakespeare’s Foolosophy’, in Shakespeare Performed: Essays in 
Honor of R. A Foakes, ed. Grace Ioppolo (London: Associated University Presses, 
2000), pp. 17-32. 
Bauer, George Howard, Sartre and the Artist  (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1969). 
  211 
Bauer, Nancy, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy and Feminism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2001). 
Belsey, Catherine, The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance 
Drama (Methuen: London, 1985). 
Bennett, William E., ‘Shakespeare’s Iago: The Kierkegaardian Aesthete’, Upstart 
Crow, 5 (1984), 156-9. 
Berman, Marshall, The Politics of Authenticity: Radical Individualism and the 
Emergence of Modern Society (London and New York: Verso, 1970). 
Bernd, Magnus, Nietzsche’s Case: Philosophy as/and Literature (New York: 
Routledge, 1993). 
Berry, Ralph, ‘“To say one”: An Essay on Hamlet’, Shakespeare Survey, 28 (1975), 
107-15. 
Bevington, David, Shakespeare’s Ideas: More Things in Heaven and Earth (Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2008). 
Bielmeier, Michael G., Shakespeare, Kierkegaard and Existential Tragedy (Lampeter: 
Edwin Mellen Press, 2000). 
Birenhaum, Harvey, ‘Consciousness and Responsibility in Macbeth’, Mosaic, 15:2 
(1982), 17-32. 
Bloom, Allan, Shakespeare on Love and Friendship (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2000). 
Bloom, Harold, The Anxiety of Influence (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997). 
-------------, Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human (London: Fourth Estate, 1999). 
-------------, The Western Canon: The Books and the School of the Ages (London: 
Papermac, 1995). 
Boyer, Eric R.,  ‘Hamlet and Absurd Freedom: The Myth of Sisyphus as Commentary 
on Shakespeare’s Creation’, Ball State University Forum, 16:3 (1975), 54-66. 
Bradley, A. C., ‘Character and the Imaginative Appeal of Tragedy in Coriolanus’, in 
Coriolanus: A Casebook, ed. B. A. Brockman (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977), 
pp. 53-72. 
-------------, Shakespearean Tragedy, 3rd edn (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan 
Press, 1992). 
Bristol, Michael D. (ed.), Shakespeare and Moral Agency (London: Continuum, 2010). 
Bruster, Douglas, To Be or Not to Be (London: Continuum, 2007). 
Burckhardt, Jacob, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S. G. C. 
Middlemore (London: Penguin, 1990). 
Burke, Kenneth, Kenneth Burke on Shakespeare, ed. Scott L. Newstok (West Lafayette: 
Palor Press, 2007). 
-------------, The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action, 3rd edn 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973). 
Caferro, William, Contesting the Renaissance (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). 
Calderwood, James L., To Be and Not To Be: Negation and Metadrama in Hamlet 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). 
Cassirer, Ernst, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. Mario 
Domandi (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963). 
Cavell, Stanley, Disowning Knowledge in Six Plays of Shakespeare (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
Cefalu, Paul, Revisionist Shakespeare: Transitional Ideologies in Texts and Contexts 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2004). 
Chakrevorty, Jagannath, King Lear: Shakespeare’s Existentialist Hero (Calcutta: 
Avantgarde Press, 1990). 
  212 
Charnes, Linda, Notorious Identity: Materializing the Subject in Shakespeare 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
Cheung, King-Kok, ‘Shakespeare and Kierkegaard: Dread in Macbeth’, Shakespeare 
Quarterly, 35:4 (1984), 430-9. 
Clay, Charlotte N., The Role of Anxiety in English Tragedy: 1580-1642 (Salzburg: 
University of Salzburg, 1974). 
Coleman, Patrick, Jayne Lewis, and Jill Kowalik (eds), Representations of the Self from 
the Renaissance to Romanticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
Collmer, Robert G., ‘An Existentialist Approach to Macbeth’, Person, 44 (1960), 484-
91. 
Cooper, David E., Existentialism: A Reconstruction, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). 
Cooper, John (ed.), Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). 
Cox, John D., Seeming Knowledge: Shakespeare and Skeptical Faith (Waco: Baylor 
University Press, 2007). 
Craig, Leon Harold, Of Philosophers and Kings: Political Philosophy in Shakespeare’s 
Macbeth and King Lear (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2001). 
Crystal, David, and Ben Crystal, Shakespeare’s Words: A Glossary and Language 
Companion (London: Penguin, 2002). 
Cheung, King-Kok, ‘Shakespeare and Kierkegaard: “Dread” in Macbeth’, Shakespeare 
Quarterly, 35:4 (1984), pp. 430-9. 
Daigle, Christine (ed.), Existentialist Thinkers and Ethics (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006). 
Davies, Stevie, Renaissance Views of Man (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1978). 
Davis, Philip, Shakespeare Thinking (London: Continuum, 2007). 
-------------, Sudden Shakespeare: The Shaping of Shakespeare’s Creative Thought 
(London: Athlone, 1996). 
Derrida, Jacques, Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1992). 
--------------, ‘Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority’ in Deconstruction 
and the Possibility of Justice, ed. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David 
Grey Carlson (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp.  3-67. 
--------------, The Gift of Death, trans. D. Wills (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1995). 
-------------, A Taste for the Secret, trans. Giacomo Donis (Cambridge: Polity, 2001). 
Detmer, David, Freedom as a Value (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986). 
Deutscher, Penelope, The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Ambiguity, Conversion, 
Resistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
Dollimore, Jonathan, Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of 
Shakespeare and his Contemporaries, 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004). 
-------------, Sex, Literature and Censorship (Cambridge: Polity, 2001). 
-------------, Sexual Dissidence: Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991). 
Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Mark A. Wrathall (eds), A Companion to Heidegger (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2005). 
Eagleton, Terry, Shakespeare and Society: Critical Studies in Shakespearean Drama 
(London: Chatto and Windus, 1970). 
-------------, Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). 
-------------, William Shakespeare (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
Earnshaw, Steven, Existentialism: A Guide for the Perplexed (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2006). 
  213 
Edmundson, Mark, Literature Against Philosophy, Plato to Derrida: A Defence of 
Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
Escolme, Bridget, Talking to the Audience: Shakespeare, Performance, Self (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2005). 
Fahmi, Mustapha, The Purpose of Playing: Self-Interpretation and Ethics in 
Shakespeare (Québec: Two Continents, 2008). 
Felski, Rita (ed.), Rethinking Tragedy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2008). 
Fernie, Ewan, ‘Dollimore’s Challenge’, Shakespeare Studies, 35 (2007), 133-57. 
-------------, Shame in Shakespeare (London and New York: Routledge, 2002). 
------------- (ed.), Spiritual Shakespeares (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). 
-------------, ‘Terrible Action: Recent Criticism and Questions of Agency’, Shakespeare, 
2:1 (2006), 95-115. 
Ferry, Anne, The Inward Language: Sonnets of Wyatt, Sidney, Shakespeare and Donne 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1983). 
Fineman, Joel, Shakespeare’s Perjured Eye: The Invention of Poetic Subjectivity in the 
Sonnets (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). 
Foucault, Michel, The History of Sexuality: Care of the Self, trans. Robert Hurley 
(London: Penguin, 1990). 
-------------, The History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley 
(London: Penguin, 1987). 
Frank, Mike, ‘Shakespeare’s Existential Comedy’, in Caliban, ed. Harold Bloom (New 
York and Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 1992), pp. 142-65. 
Fromm, Erich, Marx’s Concept of Man, trans. T. B. Bottomore (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2004). 
Frye, Northrop, Fools of Time: Studies in Shakespearean Tragedy (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1967). 
Fuery, Patrick, The Theory of Absence: Subjectivity, Signification and Desire (Westport 
and London: Greenwood Press, 1995). 
Gadd, Ian, and Alexandra Gillespie (eds), John Stow and the Making of the English 
Past (London: British Library, 2004). 
Garber, Marjorie, Shakespeare After All (New York: Pantheon, 2004). 
-------------, Shakespeare and Modern Culture (New York: Pantheon, 2008). 
Gillespie, M. A., Hegel, Heidegger and the Ground of History (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1984). 
Girard, René, A Theatre of Envy: William Shakespeare (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991). 
Goddard, Harold C., The Meaning of Shakespeare (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1951). 
Goldthorpe, Rhiannon, Sartre: Literature and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984). 
Gomez, Christine, ‘Hamlet: An Early Existential Outsider?’, Hamlet Studies, 5 (1983), 
27-39. 
Goodlad, J. S. R., A Sociology of Popular Drama (London: Heinemann Educational 
Books, 1971). 
Grady, Hugh, The Modernist Shakespeare: Critical Texts in a Material World (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991). 
-------------, Shakespeare, Machiavelli, and Montaigne: Power and Subjectivity from 
Richard II to Hamlet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
Greenblatt, Stephen, ‘Invisible Bullets: Renaissance Authority and Its Subversion’, in 
Contemporary Literary Criticism: Literary and Cultural Studies, ed. Robert Con 
Davis and Ronald Schleifer (New York: Longman, 1998), pp. 504-35. 
  214 
-------------, Learning to Curse: Essays in Early Modern Culture (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1990). 
-------------, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
-------------, ‘Shakespeare and the Exorcists’, in Shakespeare and the Question of 
Theory’, ed. Patricia Parker and Geoffrey Hartman (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1985), pp. 163-87. 
-------------, Shakespeare’s Freedom (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2010). 
Grene, Marjorie, Introduction to Existentialism (London and Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1948). 
Grossman, Marshall (ed.), Reading Renaissance Ethics (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2007). 
Guggenheim, Michel, and Richard Strawn, ‘Gide and Montaigne’, Yale French Studies, 
7 (1951), 107-114. 
Guignon, Charles (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
Habermas, Jürgen, ‘How to Answer the Ethical Question’, in Bettina Bergo, Joseph 
Cohen and Raphael Zagury-Orly (eds), Judeities: Questions for Jacques Derrida 
(London: Eurospan, 2007), pp. 142-54. 
Hanson, Elizabeth, Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
Hartle, Ann, Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
Hawkes, Terence, Shakespeare and the Reason: A Study of the Tragedies and the 
Problem Plays (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964).  
Hawley, William M., ‘A Midsummer Night’s Dream: Relating Ethics to Mutuality’, The 
European Legacy, 15:2 (2010), 159-69. 
Hazlitt, William, Characters of Shakespear’s Plays (Boston: Wells and Lily, 1818). 
-------------, Lectures Chiefly on the Dramatic Literature of the Age of Elizabeth 
Delivered at the Surrey Institution (London: Stodart and Steuart, 1820). 
Heller, Agnes, Renaissance Man, trans. Richard E. Allen (London, Henley and Boston: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). 
-------------, The Time is out of Joint: Shakespeare as Philosopher of History (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). 
Hennedy, John F., ‘Macduff’s Dilemma: Anticipation of Existentialist Ethics in 
Macbeth’, Upstart Crow, 18 (1998), 110-17. 
Heter, T. Storm, ‘Authenticity and Others: Sartre’s Ethics of Recognition’, Sartre 
Studies International, 12:2 (2006), 17-42. 
Hill, R. F., ‘Coriolanus: Violentest Contrariety’, Essays and Studies, 17 (1964), 12-23. 
Holbrook, Peter, ‘The Left and King Lear’, Textual Practice, 14:2 (2000), 343-62. 
-------------, Shakespeare’s Individualism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010). 
Holm, Isak Winkel, ‘Monstrous Aesthetics: Literature and Philosophy in Søren 
Kierkegaard’, Nineteenth Century Prose, 32:1 (2005), 52-74. 
Horowitz, David, Shakespeare and Existentialism (London: Tavistock, 1965). 
Howells, Christina, ‘Conclusion: Sartre and the Deconstruction of the Subject’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Sartre, ed. Christina Howells (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), pp. 318-52.  
Hunt, Maurice, ‘Balzac vs. Shakespeare: Making Empathy Personal’, CCTE Studies, 71 
(2006), 1-8. 
-------------, ‘“Violent’st” Complementarity: The Double Warriors of Coriolanus’, 
Studies in English Literature, 31:2 (1991), 309-25. 
  215 
Jeanson, Francis, Sartre and the Problem of Morality (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1980). 
Johnson, Paul K., ‘Battle Within: Shakespeare’s Brain and the Nature of Human 
Consciousness’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4:4 (1997), 365-73. 
Joughin, John J. (ed.), Philosophical Shakespeares (London and New York: Routledge, 
2000). 
Kaufmann, Walter, (trans. and ed.), Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre 
(Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, 1956). 
-------------, Existentialism, Religion and Death (New York: New American Library, 
1976). 
-------------, From Shakespeare to Existentialism: An Original Study (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980). 
Keller, J. Gregory, ‘The Moral Thinking of Macbeth’, Philosophy and Literature, 29:1 
(2005), 41-56. 
Knapp, James A., Image Ethics in Shakespeare and Spenser (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillian, 2011).  
Knight, Everett W., Literature Considered as Philosophy: The French Example 
(London: Routledge and Paul, 1957). 
Knottman, Paul A., (ed.), Philosophers on Shakespeare (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2009). 
Kott, Jan, Shakespeare Our Contemporary, trans. Boleslaw Taborski (New York and 
London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1974). 
Kruks, Sonia, ‘Moving Beyond Sartre: Constraint and Judgment in Beauvoir’s “Moral 
Essays” and The Mandarins’, in Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of Influence, ed. 
Christine Daigle and Jacob Golomb (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 2009), pp. 160-79. 
Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd edn (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1996). 
LaCapra, Dominick, A Preface to Sartre (London: Methuen, 1979). 
Lang, Berel, The Anatomy of Philosophical Style: Literary Philosophy and the 
Philosophy of Literature (Oxford Blackwell, 1990). 
Langley, Eric, Narcissism and Suicide in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009).  
Le Doeuff, Michèle, ‘Operative Philosophy: Simone de Beauvoir and Existentialism’, 
in Critical Essays on Simone de Beauvoir, ed. Elaine Marks (Boston: G. K. Hall, 
1987), pp. 144-153. 
Lee, John, Shakespeare’s Hamlet and the Controversies of Self (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
Levinas, Emmanuel, Time and the Other and Additional Essays, trans. Richard A. 
Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987). 
Lévy, Bernard-Henri, The Philosopher of the Twentieth Century, trans. Andrew Brown 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2003). 
Levy, Eric P., Hamlet and the Rethinking of Man (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson 
University Press, 2008). 
Lottman, Herbert R., Albert Camus: A Biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
1979). 
Low, Anthony, Aspects of Subjectivity: Society and Individuality from the Middle Ages 
to Shakespeare and Milton (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2003). 
Luce, Louise, ‘Alex Dumas’s Kean: An Adaptation by Jean-Paul Sartre’, Modern 
Drama, 28:3 (1985), 355-61.  
Lupton, Julia Reinhard, Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and Life 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
  216 
Macquarrie, John, Existentialism: An Introduction, Guide and Assessment (London: 
Hutchinson, 1972). 
Martin, John Jefferies, Myths of Renaissance Individualism (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004). 
Marks, Elaine (ed.), Critical Essays on Simone de Beauvoir (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1987). 
Martin, John, ‘Investing Sincerity, Refashioning Prudence: The Discovery of the 
Individual in Renaissance Europe’, The American Historical Review, 102:5 
(1997), 1309-42.  
Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. 
Martin Nicolaus (New York; Random House, 1973). 
Mascuch, Michael, Origins of the Individualist Self (Cambridge: Polity, 1997). 
Maus, Katharine Eisaman, Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995). 
McAlindon, Tom, ‘Cultural Materialism and the Ethics of Reading: Or, the Radicalizing 
of Jacobean Tragedy’, The Modern Language Review, 90:4 (1995), 830-46. 
McBride, William L. (ed.), The Development and Meaning of Twentieth-Century 
Existentialism (New York and London: Garland, 1997). 
------------- (ed.), Existentialist Literature and Aesthetics (New York and London: 
Garland, 1997). 
-------------, Sartre’s Political Theory (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). 
McGinn, Colin, Shakespeare’s Philosophy: Discovering the Meanings Behind the Plays 
(New York: Harper Collins, 2006). 
Montrose, Louis Adrian, ‘The Poetics and Politics of Culture’, in New Historicism, ed. 
H. Aram Veeser (New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 15-36. 
Mousley, Andy, Re-Humanising Shakespeare: Literary Humanism, Wisdom and 
Modernity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 
Mulhall, Stephen, Heidegger and Being in Time (London: Routledge, 1996). 
Murdoch, Iris, Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature 
(London: Chatto and Windus, 1997). 
Natoli, Joseph, ‘Dimensions of Consciousness in Hamlet’, Mosaic, 19:1 (1986), 91-8. 
Nehamas, Alexander, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1985). 
Novello, Samantha, Albert Camus as Political Thinker: Nihilisms and the Politics of 
Contempt (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
Nuttall, A. D., Shakespeare the Thinker (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 2007). 
------------- ‘Shakespeare’s Imitation of the World’, in Modern Critical Interpretations: 
William Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea 
House, 1988), pp. 91-8. 
Nussbaum, Martha C., Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
Oaklander, Nathan, Existentialist Philosophy: An Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992). 
Oates, Joyce Carol, ‘Essence and Existence in Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida’, in 
Troilus and Cressida: A Casebook, ed. Priscilla Martin (London and Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1976), pp. 167-85. 
Palfrey, Simon, ‘Macbeth and Kierkegaard’, Shakespeare Survey, 57 (2004), 96-111. 
Paolucci, Anne, ‘Shakespeare and the Genius of the Absurd’, Comparative Drama, 7 
(1973), 231-46. 
Paster, Gail Kern, Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-Wilson (eds), Reading the Early 
Modern Passions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 
  217 
Patterson, Annabel, Shakespeare and the Popular Voice (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1989). 
Patterson, Lee, Negotiating the Past: The Historical Understanding of Medieval 
Literature (Madison, Wisconsin and London: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1987). 
Pattison George, ‘Art in an Age of Reflection’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Kierkegaard, ed. Alistair Hannay and Gordon D. Marino (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 76-100. 
Pemble, John, Shakespeare Goes to Paris: How the Bard Conquered France (London 
and New York: Hambledon and London, 2005). 
Pickus, David, ‘Paperback Authenticity: Walter Kaufmann and Existentialism’, 
Philosophy and Literature, 34:1 (2010), 17-31. 
Poole, William, and Richard Scholar (eds), Thinking With Shakespeare: Comparative 
and Interdisciplinary Essays for A. D. Nuttall (London: Legenda, 2007). 
Robinson, Christopher C., ‘Theorizing Politics After Camus’, Human Studies, 32:1 
(2009), 1-18. 
Roe, John, ‘Rhetoric, Style and Poetic Form’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Shakespeare’s Poetry, ed. Patrick Cheney (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), pp. 33-53. 
Rokem, Freddie, Philosophers and Thespians: Thinking Performance (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010). 
Rosslyn, Felicity, ‘Tragedy and Emancipation’, Cambridge Quarterly, 30:4 (2001), 
307-18. 
Rudrum, David (ed.), Literature and Philosophy: A Guide to Contemporary Debates 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
Ruoff, James E., ‘Kierkegaard and Shakespeare’, Comparative Literature, 20:4 (1968), 
343-54.  
Ryan, Kiernan, ‘King Lear: A Retrospect, 1980-2000’, Shakespeare Survey, 55 (2002), 
1-11. 
-------------, Shakespeare, 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
-------------, Shakespeare’s Comedies (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
-------------, ‘Shakespeare’s Thoughtless Wisdom’, Unpublished Paper, May 2010. 
Santoni, Ronald E., Bad Faith, Good Faith and Authenticity in Sartre’s Early 
Philosophy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995). 
-------------, Sartre on Violence: Curiously Ambivalent (University Park, Pennsylvannia: 
The Pennsylvannia State University Press, 2003). 
Scheenwind, J. B., ‘Montaigne on Moral Philosophy and the Good Life’, The 
Cambridge Companion to Montaigne, ed. U. Langer (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
Schürmann, R., ‘On Constituting Oneself as an Anarchistic Subject’, Praxis 
International, 6:3 (1986), 294-310.  
Selleck, Nancy, The Interpersonal Idiom in Shakespeare, Donne and Early Modern 
Culture (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
Sherman, David, Sartre and Adorno: The Dialectics of Subjectivity (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2007). 
Sherwood, Terry G., The Self in Early Modern Literature: For the Common Good 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2007). 
Shuger, Debora Kuller, Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance: Religion, 
Politics and the Dominant Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1990). 
Slights, William W. E., The Heart in the Age of Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008).	  
  218 
Smith, Bruce R., Phenomenal Shakespeare (Chicester: Wiley Blackwell, 2010). 
Steiner, George, The Death of Tragedy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). 
Stevens, Paul, ‘Pretending to be Real: Stephen Greenblatt and the Legacy of Popular 
Existentialism’, New Literary History: A Journal of Theory and Interpretation, 
33: 3 (2002), 491-519. 
Stewart, Jon (ed.), Kierkegaard and the Renaissance and Modern Traditions: 
Literature, Drama and Music (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). 
Stewart, Stanley, ‘Lear in Kierkegaard’, in King Lear: New Critical Essays, ed. Jeffrey 
Kahan (New York and London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 278-96. 
-------------, ‘Philosophy’s Shakespeare: Breaking the Silence’, Ben Jonson Journal: 
Literary Contexts in the Age of Elizabeth, James and Charles, 10 (2003), 139-59.  
-------------, Shakespeare and Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2010). 
-------------, ‘Was Shakespeare Thinking Philosophy?’, Ben Jonson Journal: Literary 
Contexts in the Age of Elizabeth, James and Charles, 15:1 (2008), 123-37.  
Stralen, Hans van, Choices and Conflicts: Essays on Literature and Existentialism 
(Oxford: Peter Lang, 2005). 
Symonds, J. A., Renaissance in Italy: The Revival of Learning (London: Smith, Elder 
and Co, 1897). 
Szabari, Antonia, ‘“Parler seulement de moy”: The Disposition of the Subject in 
Montaigne’s Essay “De l’art de conferer”’, MLN, 116:5 (2001), 1001-24. 
Szondi, Peter, An Essay on the Tragic, trans. Paul Fleming (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002). 
Taylor, Charles, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: 
Harvard University Press, 1991). 
-------------, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 
Thiel, Udo, The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
Tidd, Ursula, Simone de Beauvoir (London and New York: Routledge, 2004). 
Todd, Olivier, Albert Camus: A Life, trans. Benjamin Ivry (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1997). 
Trilling, Lionel, Sincerity and Authenticity (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). 
Turgenev, Ivan, Sketches from a Hunter’s Album, trans. Richard Freeborn (London: 
Penguin, 1990). 
Uhlig, Claus, ‘Shakespeare and Philosophicalness’, Neohelicon, 30:2 (2003), 147-62. 
Wagner, John A. (ed.), Voices of Shakespeare’s England: Contemporary Accounts of 
Elizabethan Daily Life (Oxford: Greenwood, 2010).  
Wahl, Jean, Philosophies of Existence: An Introduction to the Basic Thought of 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel, Sartre, trans. F. M. Lory (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959). 
Weckermann, Hans-Jürgen, ‘Coriolanus: The Failure of the Autonomous Individual’, in 
Shakespeare: Text, Language, Criticism, ed. Bernhard Fabian and Kurt Tetzeli 
von Rosador (New York: Olms-Weidmann, 1987), pp. 334-50. 
Wehrs, Donald R., ‘Moral Physiology, Ethical Prototypes, and the Denaturing of Sense 
in Shakespearean Tragedy’, College Literature, 33:1 (2006), 67-92. 
Weimann, Robert, Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theater: Studies in the 
Social Dimension of Dramatic Form and Function, ed. Robert Schwartz 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).  
Weitz, Morris, Shakespeare, Philosophy, and Literature (New York: Peter Lang, 1995). 
Wild, John, The Challenge of Existentialism (Bloomington and London: Indiana 
University Press, 1970). 
  219 
Williams, Raymond, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London: Fontana 
Press, 1983). 
Wilson, Richard, Shakespeare in French Theory: King of Shadows (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2007). 
Witmore, Michael, Shakespearean Metaphysics (London: Continuum, 2008). 
Wrathall, M., and J. Malpas (eds), Heidegger, Authenticity and Modernity: Essays in 
Honour of Herbert L. Dreyfus (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000). 
Zalloua, Zahi, ‘Roquentin and the Metaphysics of Presence: Philosophy, Literature, 
Textual Play’, The Comparatist, 25 (2001), 133-50. 
Žižek, Slavoj, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: 
Verso, 2000). 
 
